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LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER MCCUTCHEON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND
SPEECHNOW
Albert W. Alschuler
ABSTRACT
The plurality and dissenting opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC seem unreal. These opinions, which
considered a series of strategies for circumventing federal limits on contributions to candidates, failed
to notice that these limits were no longer breathing. The D.C. Circuit’s 2010 decision in
SpeechNow.org v. FEC created a far easier way to evade the limits than any of those the Supreme
Court discussed. SpeechNow held all limits on contributions to super PACs unconstitutional.
This Article contends that SpeechNow was wrongly decided. It also considers what can be said for
and against a bumper sticker’s declarations that money is not speech and that corporations are not
people. It proposes a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulations
that differs from the one currently employed by the Supreme Court. And it proposes a legislative
scheme of campaign-finance regulation that would effectively limit contributions while respecting the
Supreme Court’s campaign-finance decisions.
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LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER MCCUTCHEON, CITIZENS
UNITED, AND SPEECHNOW
Albert W. Alschuler *
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEPHANT (OR SUPER PACHYDERM) IN THE ROOM
Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions in McCutcheon v.
FEC 1 seem unreal. At issue in McCutcheon was the validity of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA’s) limits on the total amounts
a person may contribute to all candidates and political committees during
a single election cycle (its “aggregate” contribution limits). The principal
issue dividing the Supreme Court was whether, in the absence of these
limits, donors could evade the BCRA’s “base” limits—its limits on the
amount a person may contribute to an individual candidate.
The Court held the aggregate limits unconstitutional by a vote of five
to four. In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that limits on
campaign contributions and expenditures should be subject to strict
scrutiny—a standard that apparently would invalidate them all. The most
significant aspect of the McCutcheon decision, however, may be the
willingness of the other eight justices to assume the validity of the base
limits and of measures truly necessary to prevent their circumvention.
The four dissenting justices described a series of circumvention
strategies they said might follow invalidation of the aggregate limits.
These strategies involved multiple political action committees, 2 party
committees, joint fundraising committees, and contributions from one
campaign to another. The dissenters and the four justices of the plurality
debated at length whether the hypothesized scenarios were realistic,
whether they would violate existing laws (a tangle of statutes and
regulations described by Justice Scalia at argument as “so intricate that I
can’t figure [them] out” 3), and whether, if the circumvention strategies
were not already prohibited, legislation less restrictive than the aggregate
contribution limits could block them. A reader of the principal opinions
was likely to end up full of admiration for judicial patience that outran
*
Julius Kreeger Professor, Emeritus, the University of Chicago Law School. I am
grateful to James Phander, Michael Rocca, Sonja Starr, John Stinneford, and Laurence
Tribe for valuable comments.
1
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
2
Conventional PACs, not super PACs. The difference will be explained shortly.
3
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)
(No.
12-536),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-536_21o2.pdf.
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his own.
The premises of both the plurality and the dissenting opinions were
that contributors would employ the circumvention strategies if only they
could and that it would matter whether they did. Both opinions contrived
not to notice that the base limits were no longer breathing. Contributors
had a far easier way to evade them than any of those the Supreme Court
discussed. The corpse lay at the justices’ feet, and the Court itself had
been widely accused of homicide. But the justices averted their eyes.
A super PAC is a political action committee that does not contribute
to the official campaigns of candidates for office but that prepares and
places its own advertisements supporting candidates and/or disparaging
their opponents. 4 Two months after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC 5 in 2010, the en banc D.C. Circuit held all limit
on donations to super PACs unconstitutional in SpeechNow.org v. FEC. 6
The court offered no defense of the merits of its ruling. It simply said that
one broad statement in the Citizens United opinion (“[W]e now conclude
that independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption” 7) compelled its result.
Before SpeechNow, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) enforced
a statute limiting a person’s contributions to a PAC of any sort to $5000
per year. 8 On June 12, 2012, however, Sheldon Adelson and his wife
Miram exercised the newly recognized right of all Americans to
contribute $10 million to the super PAC of their choice. They gave these
funds to Restore Our Future, an organization supporting the election of
Mitt Romney as President. 9 At the time of their contribution, Sheldon
Adelson told friends that he planned to spend at least $100 million
supporting causes and candidates during the 2012 election cycle. 10
Adelson’s estimate was too low. Although the Adelsons’
contributions to official campaigns and super PACs roughly matched the
estimate ($98 million—including an additional $20 million to Restore
Our Future), two Republican fundraisers told the press that they
contributed at least $45 million more to groups that were not required to

4

See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 n.2.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6
599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
7
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
8
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
9
See Alicia Mundy & Sara Murray, Adelson Gives $10 Million to Pro-Romney
Super
PAC,
Wall
St.
J.,
June
13,
2012,
available
at
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/06/13/adelson-gives-10-million-to-pro-romneysuper-pac/.
10
Id.
5
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identify their contributors. 11 The amount of the Adelsons’ 2012 donations
exceeded the entire amount the Republican nominee for President in
2008, John McCain, spent during his general election campaign. 12 The
Adelsons led a list of 95 individuals or couples and 56 organizations that
each contributed $1 million or more to outside spending groups in
2012. 13
An independent expenditure group like Restore Our Future may not
coordinate its expenditures with those of an official election campaign. 14
Like many other “candidate-specific” or “alter ego” super PACs,
however, Restore Our Future was managed by people close to the
candidate it supported. 15 They included Carl Forti, the political director
of Romney’s 2008 presidential campaign; Charles Spies, counsel and
chief financial officer of the 2008 campaign; and Larry McCarthy,
another prominent veteran of Romney’s 2008 effort. 16 These managers
might have known without coordination or palaver what expenditures
would please Governor Romney. 17
Candidates may, within limits, raise money for super PACs and may
address super PAC gatherings. 18 In the month before the Adelsons’ initial
11

See Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on
Campaign 2012?, PROPUBLICA, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/howmuch-did-sheldon-adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012. 501(c)(4) or “dark money”
groups are tax-exempt organizations whose earnings are devoted to charitable,
educational, or recreational purposes. An IRS regulation seemingly plucked from the air
allows these groups to “intervene in political campaigns as long as [their] primary
activity is the promotion of social welfare.” INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 7.25.4.7; see
note infra. Unlike super PACs, 501(c)(4) groups need not reveal the identity of their
contributors.
12
See FEC, Press Release: 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity
Summarized: Receipts
Nearly Double 2004 Total, June 8, 2009,
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml. Because Senator McCain
accepted federal funding for his campaign, the amount he could spend was limited. See
id. His opponent, Senator Obama, did not accept federal funding, and no future nominee
is likely to accept it either.
13
See OpenSecrets.org, 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=V
&superonly=N.
14
See
11
CFR
§§
109.20-109.23
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/law/cfr/cfr_2009.pdf.
15
See Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between “Super PACs” and
Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012, at A1.
16
See Rachael Marcus, PAC Profile: Restore Our Future, The Center for Public
Integrity, http://www.publicintegrity.org/node/7977/. McCarthy’s chief claim to fame
was that, in 1988, he devised the Willie Horton ad for candidate George H. W. Bush. Id.
17
Priorities USA, President Obama’s alter ego super PAC, was similarly directed
by people close to him.
18
See FEC Advisory Opinion AO 2011-12 (June 30, 2011), available at
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$10 million contribution, Sheldon Adelson met with Governor Romney
and reportedly sought “assurance that Romney would support Israel more
strongly than President Obama has.” 19
Adelson, a Las Vegas casino owner, has an agenda. It includes
opposition to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
positions on a number of issues that directly affect Adelson’s business
interests. An appendix to this Article (“The Effect of Campaign Dollars
II: The Generosity of Sheldon Adelson”) describes some of these
interests.
Without prearrangement or coordination, the managers of a super
PAC may recognize an effective division of labor. Their job is to attack
an opponent while the favored candidate takes a higher road. Independent
expenditure groups have been called “the attack dogs and provocateurs of
modern politics.” 20 A report shortly before the 2012 election declared:
Republican super PACs have spent three times as much
opposing Obama as they have backing Romney, $46 million
to $14 million. The gap is even larger on the Democratic side
(though the absolute numbers are much smaller), where
there's been nearly $28 million in attacks on Romney and
only a little more than $3 million in favor of Obama. . . .
Republican super PACs spent more trying to sink Mitt
Romney during the Republican primaries than the president's
Democratic allies have spent in favor of [the President]
during the entire campaign, $4.7 million to $3.2 million.21
Once SpeechNow unleashed super PAC contributions, the pretense
http://www.fec.gov/pages/fecrecord/august2011/ao2011-12.shtml.
Although,
after
SpeechNow, an individual may give unlimited amounts to a super PAC, a candidate may
not request a donation exceeding the amount this individual could give to a
conventional PAC. Id. For a useful description of the very strange law on this subject,
see Venable LLP Political Practice Group, Candidates and Super PACs: A Complicated
http://www.politicallawbriefing.com/myRelationship
(Feb.
13,
2013),
blog/2013/02/candidates-and-super-pacs-a-complicated-relationship.html.
19
See Callum Borchers, Romney PAC Gets $10M Gift: Casino Magnate May Give
$100M in Election, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2012, at A10.
20
See Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative “Super PACs” Synchronize Their Messages,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at A10 (“Independent groups have long been the attack
dogs and provocateurs of modern politics. The ads they produce—about a convict on
furlough named Willie Horton or Swift Boat veterans—have become synonymous with
dirty politics.”).
21
David A. Graham, The Incredible Negative Spending of Super PACs, THE
ATLANTIC, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/theincredible-negative-spending-of-super-pacs-in-1-chart/263643/.
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that the BCRA’s base and aggregate limits served a useful purpose
became absurd. These limits do more harm than good. Restricting
contributions to official election campaigns while permitting unlimited
contributions to super PACs does not limit the amount an individual may
contribute to an electoral effort; it merely channels funds to less
responsible and more destructive speakers. Contributions to a candidate’s
official campaign currently are capped at $2,600 per election ($5,200
total for both primary and general elections) 22 while an off-leash satellite
campaign may accept $10,000, $100,000, $1 million, and $10 million
contributions.
To consumers of commercials on couches, super PACs are faceless
groups with noble names like Restore Our Future, Priorities USA, and
Making a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow. 23 When one of these groups goes
too far (for example by telling demonstrable falsehoods), a candidate can
deplore its conduct and accurately insist, “’Twasn’t me.” Unlike the
candidates they support, super PACs typically vanish once an election is
over.
SpeechNow has degraded rather than enhanced the quality of electoral
advocacy. The flood of attack ads has contributed to the nation’s
cynicism about politics, a cynicism that runs deep among young people. 24
Even without the SpeechNow decision, running for office would mean
entering a world of sharpened knives, but SpeechNow has made the
warfare worse. 25 Michael McConnell comments, “I am skeptical of any
22

See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 (2013).
The names are not fictitious. In 2012, the first super PAC named supported Mitt
Romney; the second, Barack Obama; and the third, Steven Colbert.
24
See INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, SURVEY OF YOUNG
AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE (23d edition 2013),
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/spring_poll_13_Exec_Summary.pdf
(“At no time since President Obama was elected in 2008 have we reported less trust,
more cynicism and more partisanship among our nation’s youngest voters.”).
25
New Jersey’s elections for state offices in 2013 provide an illustration. These
elections followed a consent decree that, echoing SpeechNow, forbade the enforcement
of state limits on super PAC contributions. See Fund for Jobs, Growth, & Sec. v. New
Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, No. 13-CV-02177-MAS-LHG (D.N.J. July
11, 2013). Outside spending then reached $35 million, twice what it had been in the
year of the immediately preceding gubernatorial election, 2009. See Nicholas
Confessore, Big Money Flows in New Jersey Races to Thwart Christie Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2013, at A1. One super PAC spent $2 million to influence a single state
senate race, all of it apparently devoted to broadcasting an advertisement in which an
ominous voice declared that a candidate had been “prohibited from practicing law in
New Jersey.” The voice did not mention that the candidate’s “prohibition” was brief and
rested on his failure to pay an annual registration fee on time. Id.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Bowdich, 700 S.E.2d 1 (N.C.
2010), that retroactively requiring people convicted of sex offenses to wear large ankle23
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governmental effort to police campaign speech to make it less negative,
vitriolic, or immoderate, but there is little to be said for laws that
exacerbate these tendencies.” 26
Allowing unlimited contributions to feral attack dogs while limiting
contributions to candidates themselves is schizophrenic. No sane
legislator would vote in favor of this regime, and no legislator ever has.
America has this topsy-turvy regime because the D.C. Circuit (or the
Supreme Court or the two courts together) held that the First Amendment
requires it.
The thought that the Constitution requires it, however, looks crazy
too. Just as only a loopy legislator could vote in favor of America’s
current system of campaign finance, only a cracked court could confront
the question afresh and conclude that a $3000 contribution to Mitt
Romney’s presidential campaign may be prohibited because it is
corrupting while a $10 million contribution to Restore Our Future is
protected because it “does not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.” 27 No single court has taken full responsibility for the
bracelet transmitters and visible GPS tracking devices, to spend six hours per day
recharging these devices, and to submit to electronic monitoring of their movements, in
some cases for the rest of their lives, was non-punitive and did not violate the ex post
facto clause. Justice Robin Hudson and two other justices dissented. When Justice
Hudson ran for reelection four years later, a group called Justice for All NC sponsored
television advertisements accusing her of “sid[ing] with the predators.” This group,
which listed a mailbox in a U.P.S. store as its headquarters, had received $650,000 from
a Washington, D.C., super PAC funded primarily by businesses like Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, Koch Industries, and the Las Vegas Sands Corporation. See OpenSecrets.org,
Republican
State
Leadership
Committee
Contributors,
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2
014.
Six former justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court called the attack on
Justice Hudson false and disgusting, and the justice’s principal opponent disavowed it,
saying “I will always run a positive effort.” A commentator observed, “[S]pecial interest
money . . . often goes toward ads attacking judges’ criminal records, even when the
interest group is focused on business interests or other unrelated issues.” The amount
Justice Hudson was able to raise to respond to the advertisement fell far short of the
amount spent broadcasting it. See Erik Eckholm, Outside Spending Enters Arena of
Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, at A12.
Television viewers have seen innumerable advertisements like the ones just
described. As both McCutcheon and Citizens United observed, “[T]he First Amendment
‘has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office.’” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (same).
26
Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case,
123 YALE L.J. 412, 455 (2013).
27
Citizens United used the quoted language to describe super PAC expenditures,
see 558 U.S. at 360, but SpeechNow concluded that this language applied to super PAC
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constitutional decision that produced America’s Dickensian system of
campaign finance.
As best I can tell, no supporter of the BCRA has said out loud that it
would be better to strike down the statute’s base limits than to retain
them as a device for channeling funds to super PACs. But I just said it.
Rather than keep the BCRA on life support, the Supreme Court would do
better to pull the plug, overrule its long line of precedents upholding
contribution limits, and afford the statute a decent burial. Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion in McCutcheon referred to Buckley v.
Valeo, 28 the 1976 decision that first upheld base and aggregate
contribution limits, and said, “What remains of Buckley is a rule without
a rationale.” 29
SpeechNow left no way to go but up. McCutcheon in fact improved
federal campaign financing a bit by permitting major contributors to
channel a larger portion of their donations to candidates and political
parties rather than super PACs. 30 Rather than acknowledge that the
BCRA’s contribution limits died in 2010, however, the supporters of
campaign finance regulation sounded the customary trumpets. “[T]oday’s
decision eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws,” the
McCutcheon dissenters cried. 31 An orchestra of journalists,
commentators, and fundraisers for politicians denouncing the decision
echoed this theme. 32
The dissent did not give super PACs contributions and expenditures
even a glance, and the plurality adverted to them only in a footnote—one
that might have led an uninitiated reader to the erroneous view that
circumvention by super PAC is part of the statutory scheme rather than
the result of dubious constitutional rulings:
A PAC is a business, labor, or interest group that raises or
spends money in connection with a federal election, in some
contributions as well.
28
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring).
30
See Nathaniel Persily, Bringing Big Money Out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES,
April 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/bringing-big-money-out-ofthe-shadows.html.
31
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32
See, e.g., Robert Reich, McCutcheon, and the Vicious Cycle of Concentrated
Wealth and Political Power, April 3, 2014, at http://robertreich.org (declaring that the
“shameful” McCutcheon decision “effectively eviscerate[s] campaign finance laws”);
Linda Greenhouse, An Indecent Burial, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-burial.html (declaring that
McCutcheon threw the post-Watergate system of campaign-finance regulation “out the
window”).
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cases by contributing to candidates. A so-called “Super PAC”
is a PAC that makes only independent expenditures and
cannot contribute to candidates. The base and aggregate
limits govern contributions to traditional PACs, but not to
independent expenditure PACs. See SpeechNow.org v.
Federal Election Comm’n . . . . 33
During the argument in McCutcheon, however, four Supreme Court
justices—Ginsburg, Kennedy, Breyer, and Scalia—pointed to the
elephant in the room. Each of these justices asked whether super PAC
contributions and expenditures hadn’t made the BCRA’s aggregate limits
pointless or worse. 34 Justice Scalia, for example, asked Solicitor General
Verrilli, “[I]sn’t the consequence of—of this particular provision to sap
the vitality of political parties and to encourage . . . drive-by PACs for
each election?” Verrilli managed almost to complete a sentence—one
that included the words “I think the answer is we don’t know one way or
33

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 n.2.
Transcript of oral argument, supra note , at 20 (Scalia, J., noting that “much of
the money that used to go to [political parties] now goes to [super] PACs” and that “the
consequence . . . has been very severe with respect to national political parties”), 30
(Scalia, J., suggesting that if donating the entire $3.7 million an individual could give to
all federal candidates, parties, and conventional PACs in the absence of the aggregate
limits poses “the evil of big money,” so does giving the same amount to an independent
PAC), 31 (Scalia, J., declaring, “[B]ig money can be in politics. The thing is you can’t
give it to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, but you can start your own
PAC. That’s perfectly good. I’m not sure that’s a benefit to our political system.”), 33
(Breyer, J., declaring, “And now you say the person can do the same thing anyway; just
call it independent. And what the independent does, he can spend 40 million. He can
spend 50 million. And all that does is sort of mix up the messages because the parties
can’t control it. Now, that’s, I think the question that’s being asked. And I think that is a
very serious question. . . . Is it true? So what? What are we supposed to do?”), 33
(Kennedy, J., following Justice Breyer’s question with the statement, “And I have the
same question. You have two – two persons. One person gives an amount to a candidate
that’s limited. The other takes out ads, uncoordinated, just all on his own, costing
$500,000. Don’t you think that second person has more access to the candidate who’s—
when the candidate is successful, than the first?”), 42-43 (Ginsburg, J., suggesting that
an aggregate limit “drives contributions toward the PACs and away from the parties,
that money—without these limits, they money would flow to the candidate, to the party
organization, but now, instead, it’s going to the PACs. What is your response to that?”),
43 (Scalia, J., initiating the dialogue with the Solicitor General that is described in the
text immediately following this footnote), 51-52 (Scalia, J., calling it “fanciful to think
that the sense of gratitude that an individual Senator or Congressman is going to feel
because of a substantial contribution to the Republican National Committee or
Democratic National Committee is any greater than the sense of gratitude that the
Senator or Congressman will feel to a PAC which is spending enormous amount of
money in his district”).
34
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the other”—before Justice Scalia interjected, “I think we do.” 35
There seemed to be no good answer to the justices’ queries. The
solicitor general said things like, “I’m not here to debate the question of
whether the Court’s jurisprudence is correct with respect to the risk of
corruption from independent expenditures,” 36 and “Well, the—we take
the constitutional First Amendment framework of this Court’s decisions
as a given. The Court has—the Court has determined that independent
expenditures do not present a risk of quid pro quo corruption . . . .”37
Translated into English, these responses seemed to say, “Weren’t you
guys the ones who started this charade?”
One commentator noted Justice Scalia’s questions to the solicitor
general and accused the justice of chutzpah—“‘that quality enshrined in a
man who, having killed his mother and father, throws himself on the
mercy of the court because he is an orphan.’” 38 Justice Scalia and the
other justices of the Citizens United majority had created the super PAC,
and to point to this PACman’s gobbling up of the BCRA as a reason for
dismantling the statute further took nerve. It was as though, some years
after McCutcheon, the dissenters’ predictions of circumvention had
proven accurate and the plurality’s contrary predictions had proven
incorrect—and the plurality then had pointed to the ease of
circumvention as a reason for striking the limits down. 39 The comedian
Jon Stewart played portions of the McCutcheon argument on The Daily
Show and made the same point. 40 As the argument played, the screen
showed what appeared to be a courtroom sketch of the justices on the
bench smoking from a hookah.
Perhaps the plurality opinion in McCutcheon ignored the super PAC
elephant because pointing to it as the justices had at argument would
have brought further charges of chutzpah. But pretending the elephant
wasn’t there did not make either the plurality opinion or the dissenting
opinion stronger. Rather than plead for mercy as an orphan, the killer
35

Id. at 43.
Id. at 52.
37
Id. at 43.
38
Garrett Epps, How Close Will the Supreme Court Get to Ending Campaign
ATLANTIC,
Oct.
8,
2013,
Finance
Laws?,
THE
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/how-close-will-the-supreme-courtget-to-ending-campaign-finance-laws/280401/ (quoting Leo Rosten’s definition of
chutzpah).
39
See Joe Patrick, McCutcheon Oral Argument: Or, Justice Scalia Explains How
$3.5 Million Isn’t That Much Money, ABOVE THE LAW, Oct. 9, 2013,
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/mccutcheon-oral-argument-or-justice-scalia-explainshow-3-5-million-isnt-that-much-money/.
40
See Donors Unchained, THE DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART, April 3, 2014, at
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/74yxyf/donors-unchained.
36
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seemed to be insisting that his parents were alive and needed his care.
When Solicitor General Verrilli indicated that super PAC circumvention
was a product of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, Justice
Scalia had an accurate, if somewhat chilling, response: “It is what it is,
though.” 41 The justice might have added, “Just look at that elephant we
brought in.”
Many observers predict that the Supreme Court will end the
irrationality of limiting contributions to candidates while permitting
unlimited contributions to satellite campaigns by striking down the limits
on contributions to candidates. This Article, however, argues for the
opposite resolution—rejecting the SpeechNow decision and upholding
the BCRA’s limits on contributions to super PACs.
Until now, SpeechNow seems to have escaped criticism. Even
commentators who deplore unlimited super PAC contributions accept the
D.C. Circuit’s judgment that this consequence flows inescapably from
Citizens United. 42 Michael Kang, for example, declares that Citizens
United “utterly removed room for argument about Super Pacs” 43 and
“made SpeechNow an easy case with only one possible outcome.” 44
All nine members of the en banc D.C. Circuit (including the three
appointed by Democrats) joined the SpeechNow opinion. Five other
federal courts of appeals have since endorsed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling,45
and one court of appeals had made a similar decision prior to
SpeechNow. 46 The Supreme Court declined to review SpeechNow, 47 and
the FEC acquiesced in the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. 48 This Article will swim
against the tide and fill a large gap in the literature.
41

Transcript of oral argument, supra note , at 52.
Hostility to the Citizens United decision may have contributed to the willingness
of some commentators to give the D.C. Circuit a pass.
43
Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902,
1912 (2013).
44
Id. at 1911.
45
See Texans for Free Enterprise v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535 (5th
2013); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696-99
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010)); Wisconsin Right to Life State Political
Action Committee v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011); New York Progress &
Protection PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013) (approving a preliminary
injunction but formally reserving judgment on the merits); Republican Party v. King,
741 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2013).
46
See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008). See also
EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Richard Briffault, Super PACs,
96 MINN L. REV. 1629, 1642-50 (2012).
47
See Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (denying a writ of certiorari to review
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
48
See FEC Adv. Op. 2010-09 (Club for Growth); FED Adv. Op. 2010-11
(Commonsense 10).
42

[August 27, 2014]

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

For 38 years, however, the Supreme Court has distinguished
contributions to groups making electoral expenditures from the
expenditures made by these groups. It has said that statutory limits on
expenditures are subject to “strict” scrutiny. They must not only “further
a compelling interest” but also be “narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.” 49 The Court has treated limits on contributions to candidates
and political groups differently. These limits must merely be “closely
drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” 50 In its opening
paragraph, its closing paragraph, and many places in between, the
opinion in Citizens United described the issue before the Court as one of
the validity of expenditure limits. The Court noted that “contribution
limits, . . . unlike limits on independent expenditures, have been an
accepted means of preventing quid pro quo corruption.” 51
Contributions to super PACs are in fact contributions. As the Court
acknowledged, the validity of limiting contributions of any sort was not
before it.
The claim that Citizens United resolved an issue the Court said it was
not resolving rests on a single sentence: “[W]e now conclude that
independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.” 52 SpeechNow reasoned that if independent
expenditures do not corrupt, the contributions that make these
expenditures possible cannot corrupt either.
As this Article will show, the sentence upon which the D.C. Circuit
relied was dictum. Moreover, if read literally, this sentence would be
incompatible with the precedents on which the Court purported to rely,
with a very recent decision the Court certainly did not mean to disturb
(Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 53), and with a later statement by the
plurality in McCutcheon.
What the Court apparently meant, and indeed the only thing it
properly could have decided, was that independent expenditures are
insufficiently corrupting to warrant any limitation. Under the Court’s twotiered standard of review, an interest can be strong enough to justify a
limitation of contributions even when it is insufficient to justify a
restriction of expenditures. Reading the crucial sentence to mean only
what the Citizens United Court probably did mean would have left the
49
See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)).
50
See, e.g., Buckley, 434 U.S. at 30; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t Pac, 528 U.S. 377,
387-88 (2000); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 158-59 (2003).
51
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; see id. at 356 (again stressing Buckley’s
distinction between expenditures and contributions).
52
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
53
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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validity of Congress’s limitation of super PAC contributions unresolved.
In resolving this issue, the D.C. Circuit should have treated as central
a question it ignored entirely—whether limits on contributions to super
PACs can sensibly be treated differently from the limits on contributions
to official campaigns that Buckley v. Valeo upheld. The answer to that
question would have been an obvious no. Although Citizens United not
only left Buckley undisturbed but relied on it heavily, the D.C. Circuit did
not consider the bearing of Buckley on the issue before it.
This Article will examine Citizens United’s distinction between
preventing quid pro quo corruption (an interest the Court has held can
justify Congressional restrictions of speech) and limiting ingratiation and
access (an interest that Citizens United says cannot justify any restriction
of speech). It will consider four sorts of behavior the proponents of
campaign finance regulation might call corrupt—the explicit exchange of
favorable governmental action for campaign contributions, the implicit
understanding that favorable action will follow contributions, the
conscious taking of favorable action in response to contributions without
any prior agreement or understanding, and affording gratitude and access
to contributors without consciously favoring them in making more
substantial decisions. It will conclude that, despite some signals the other
way, the Court probably meant to distinguish only between the third and
fourth categories. It did not mean to deny that deliberately using public
dollars to repay private favors is corrupt and that Congress may prohibit
contributions large enough to make conscious favoritism of this sort
likely. Under this standard, large super PAC contributions qualify as
corrupting.
This Article also will emphasize a related governmental interest that
neither Citizens United nor SpeechNow mentioned at all—the anticircumvention interest that became the primary focus of the principal
opinions in McCutcheon. The most obvious objection to unlimited super
PAC contributions is that they provide a way around statutory limits on
contributions to candidates. As the Supreme Court’s focus on
expenditures in Citizens United slipped into the D.C. Circuit’s focus on
contributions in SpeechNow, however, neither court addressed this issue.
Citizens United should not be read as resolving an issue the Court did not
consider.
This Article will propose a legislative scheme for restricting electoral
contributions and expenditures grounded on the anti-circumvention
principle. This scheme would impose no limits on independent
expenditures by either individuals or groups. Subject to some
exemptions, however, every group making electoral expenditures would
be required to provide an accounting of which individuals had provided
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the funds it spent and how the funds each individual supplied had been
allocated to the support of particular candidacies. Individuals and groups
would be responsible for ensuring that no more of any individual’s funds
were used to influence a single election than the law allowed. Groups that
for practical reasons could not make the required accounting could
establish separate political action committees to receive, spend, and
account for individual contributions. This Article will maintain that a
legislative scheme of this sort would meet the requirements of Buckley,
Citizens United, McCutcheon, and the First Amendment.
This Article also will propose a framework for analyzing campaign
finance restrictions that differs from the one the Supreme Court has
employed. The Court has treated electoral contributions and expenditures
simply as speech and has considered whether the interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption can justify restricting this speech. Contributions
and expenditures would better be viewed as hybrids of protected speech
and unprotected conduct. These contributions and expenditures affect
two different audiences in two different ways. From the perspective of
one audience—the public—political contributions and expenditures look
like speech. Their goal is to persuade members of this audience to vote a
certain way. From the perspective of a second audience, however—the
favored candidate—these contributions and expenditures look like other
corrupting gifts. Campaign dollars can persuade a candidate to favor a
contributor in the same way that an expense-paid trip to the Super Bowl
might persuade him.
The Court’s leading decision on hybrids of protected speech and
unprotected conduct is United States v. O’Brien, 54 which upheld
convictions of war protestors for destroying their draft cards. Although
Buckley v. Valeo concluded that the standard articulated in O’Brien did
not apply to campaign finance regulation, it did not consider the sort of
argument offered in this Article. Whether one uses the Supreme Court’s
current mode of analyzing campaign finance issues or the one proposed
by this Article, however, SpeechNow was wrongly decided.
Some observers may believe that the train has left the station and that
to argue against the SpeechNow ruling is to stand on the station’s
deserted platform and whistle. They have no doubt that the Supreme
Court would approve SpeechNow, and they would not be surprised if the
Court were to strike down all limits on campaign contributions too.
I have five comments:
First, Citizens United and McCutcheon were decided by five-to-four
votes with the same five justices in the majority in both cases. If even one
54

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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of these justices were to vote to uphold limits on contributions to super
PACs, these limits would be likely to stand.
Second, only a Court that wished to preserve a façade of campaign
finance regulation while gutting its core would be likely to strike down
limits on super PAC contributions while upholding limits on
contributions to candidates. A split judgment of this sort could happen,
but I am reluctant to attribute disingenuous posturing to any of the
justices. The limits on super PAC contributions and the limits on
contributions to candidates seem likely to stand or fall together, as they
should.
Third, if Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas were to confront the
issue afresh, they apparently would hold all limits on campaign
contributions unconstitutional. The other two members of the majority,
however, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, have not indicated that
they share this position. In the arguments and opinions in McCutcheon
and Citizens United, these justices seemed genuinely concerned about the
overbreadth of the challenged statutes. As the McCutcheon plurality
argued, forbidding an individual who has contributed the maximum
amount to each of nine candidates from contributing to a tenth is a
peculiar way of keeping him from contributing too much to any one
candidate. 55 Moreover, as this Article will explain, Citizens United was
correct to strike down a statute that blocked a group from preparing and
disseminating campaign material simply because this group had
organized as a corporation.
Fourth, even justices who would strike down all limits on campaign
contributions if they were to consider the issue afresh might hesitate to
overrule a line of Supreme Court decisions upholding these limits over
the course of almost four decades. 56
Fifth and finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United
sparked widespread indignation. One week after the decision, President
Obama denounced it in his State of the Union address. 57 Obama’s
opponent in the presidential election of 2008, Senator McCain, called it
“the worst decision ever.” 58 Fourteen resolutions in Congress proposed
55

See McCutcheon, 133 S. Ct. at 1448-49.
Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (emphasizing “the
force of stare decisis” when reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973), 19 years
after that decision). In a concurring opinion in Citizens United joined by Justice Alito,
Chief Justice Roberts offered an exceptionally thoughtful analysis of the principle of
stare decisis. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
57
See Adam Liptak, A Rare Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2010, at A12.
58
See Alice Robb, McCain Addresses Oxford, OXONIAN GLOBALIST, Oct. 11, 2012,
http://toglobalist.org/2012/10/mccain-addresses-oxford/.
56
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correcting it by constitutional amendment. 59 A public opinion poll
reported 80% opposition. 60 A decision striking down all remaining limits
on electoral contributions could provoke similar outrage—especially if
this decision were by a five-to-four vote and especially if every justice
appointed by a Republican president were on one side and every justice
appointed by a Democratic president on the other. A constitutional
amendment repudiating the Court’s position might follow. 61 The damage
that decimating the last remnants of federal election law would do to the
Court’s reputation could give some justices pause.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THIS ARTICLE
This Article proceeds as follows: Part III, the Part following this one,
describes the Citizens United and SpeechNow rulings and how they
changed federal election law. It explains why the Supreme Court’s
statement that independent expenditures do not corrupt was dictum and
perhaps double dictum.
Part IV examines how Citizens United and SpeechNow changed the
financing of election campaigns. Contrary to widespread perception,
59

See League of Women Voters, Review of Constitutional Amendments Proposed
in Response to Citizens United, http://www.lwv.org/content/review-constitutionalamendments-proposed-response-citizens-united.
60
Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on
POST,
Feb.
17,
2010,
Campaign
Financing,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.
In political terms, it seemed that five Supreme Court justices had pushed elected
officials from the path of an onrushing bus and stood in the path themselves. Citizens
United enabled legislators to divert attention from the porousness of their own
limitations on political contributions and expenditures and to cast themselves as
reformers committed to revoking the license the Supreme Court had issued to buy and
sell influence. A five-to-four ruling in which every justice in the majority had been
appointed by Republican Presidents and three of the four dissenters had been appointed
by Democrats made the Court seem responsible for what some have called a system of
legalized bribery.
One suspects that Chief Justice Roberts’ decisive vote to uphold most of the
Affordable Health Care Act in National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012), was influenced partly by his desire to avoid another five-to-four,
Republican vs. Democrat decision invalidating major legislation—a decision that would
have made a seemingly partisan Court responsible for America’s inability to repair its
defective health-care system as well as its defective campaign-finance system. The
indignation engendered by Citizens United may not prompt the Supreme Court to
reconsider that decision anytime soon, but it might have saved Obamacare.
61
In retirement, Justice Stevens has joined the call for such an amendment. See
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION 79 (2014).
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these decisions appear to have produced no significant increase in
political spending by large business corporations. Instead they have led to
an explosion of large individual contributions.
Part V takes as its text a bumper sticker displayed by opponents of
Citizens United: “MONEY IS NOT SPEECH! Corporations are not
People!” Both of this bumper sticker’s assertions may appear to be nonstarters. Although money is not speech, the First Amendment protects the
expenditures needed to bring speech to audiences; and although corporate
entities are not people, government may not deny the use of a common
and beneficial form of organization to speakers alone.
The bumper sticker nevertheless suggests appropriate concerns.
Campaign contributions are not simply funds used to bring speech to
audiences; they are also cash gifts likely to influence recipients and
beneficiaries in ways the First Amendment does not protect. And
although people have a right to use the corporate form of organization
when they speak, they have no right to use this form to evade appropriate
restrictions of individual speech, including limits on campaign
contributions.
Part VI draws on the analysis of Part V and argues that campaign
contributions and expenditures should be viewed as hybrids of protected
speech and unprotected gifts. When the harms produced by speech do not
depend on the message this speech conveys, an all-but insurmountable
presumption against legislative regulation is inappropriate.
Part VII proposes a legislative scheme for enforcing statutory limits
on individual contributions—one in which, with some exceptions, every
organization making electoral expenditures would be required to account
for which individuals had supplied the funds it used to influence
particular elections.
Citizens United declared that campaign contributions and
expenditures may be limited only to prevent quid pro quo corruption.
Part VIII considers several possible meanings of the term quid pro quo
corruption and which of them the Supreme Court had in mind.
Part IX explains why SpeechNow erred by striking down the BCRA’s
limits on contributions to super PACs. Not only was the statement in the
Citizens United opinion on which D.C. Circuit relied dictum but the
Supreme Court gave several indications that it did not mean this
statement quite the way it sounds. The central question in SpeechNow
should have been whether contributions to super PACs differ
significantly from the limits on contributions to official election
campaigns that the Supreme Court has upheld, and the answer to this
question would have been obvious.
Part X considers whether the ability of a candidate’s supporters to
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establish multiple super PACs makes limiting contributions to an
individual PAC pointless. It argues among other things that the Supreme
Court’s decision in McCutcheon does not preclude aggregate limits on
super PAC contributions.
Part XI ends the article on a somewhat fanciful note. It explores the
implications of SpeechNow by discussing a hypothetical case in which a
lobbyist places a newspaper advertisement for a used car dealership
owned by a powerful state legislator and also hires a political satirist to
deliver a monologue at the legislator’s birthday party.
Several appendices follow the Article. They address issues tangential
to the Article, and they document at greater length than a footnote could
some observations the Article offers along the way.
Appendix A—“Have Citizens United and SpeechNow Ended the
Game?”—considers whether, by halting the enforcement of BCRA
restrictions, Citizens United and SpeechNow have left no one with
standing to raise the issues presented by these cases again.
Appendix B—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars I: Statistical and
Non-Statistical Evidence”—examines the efforts of social science
researchers to determine whether campaign contributions have influenced
the decisions of elected officials.
Appendix C—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars II: The Generosity of
Sheldon Adelson”—considers what motivates one of the largest political
donors of all time and what effect his contributions might have had.
Appendix D—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars III: Executive
Clemency”—focuses on one kind of official decision that unmistakably
has been influenced by campaign contributions.
Appendix E—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars IV: The Appointment
of Ambassadors”—focuses on another.
Appendix F—“Partisan Advantage and Incumbent Protection”—
considers how much the self-interest of legislators is likely to shape
campaign-finance legislation and how ready courts should be to strike
down legislation that may have been prompted in part by the legislators’
own interests.
III. CITIZENS UNITED, SPEECHNOW, AND HOW THESE DECISIONS CHANGED
ELECTION LAW
For more than 100 years prior to Citizens United, federal law had
prohibited corporations from contributing to the campaigns of candidates
for federal office, 62 and labor unions had been subject to the same
62

See 34 Stat. 864, 864-65 (1907) (the Tillman Act). President Roosevelt had urged
Congress to enact this prohibition, saying, “Let individuals contribute as they desire; but
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prohibition for 67 years. 63 Unions and corporations also had been
prohibited for 64 years from using funds from their general treasuries to
advocate expressly the election or defeat of particular candidates. 64 These
entities, however, could support candidates in several other ways.
First, corporations and unions could use their general funds to
establish and pay the administrative expenses of political action
committees (PACs), and they could direct these PACs’ actions. The
PACs could collect contributions in limited amounts from individuals
associated with their creators. They could make contributions in limited
amounts to candidates for federal office and could make unlimited
expenditures of their own to advocate the election of favored
candidates. 65
Second, without using PACs, corporations and unions could place
advertisements concerning political issues, and these advertisements
could imply support for or opposition to particular candidates. 66
Finally, unions and corporations could support candidates in
communications circulated only within these organizations, and they
could engage in “nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals
to register and vote.” 67 “Nonpartisan” get-out-the-vote efforts typically
focused on voters likely to support favored candidates. 68
In Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation sought to make available
on cable TV a documentary it had produced disparaging Hillary Clinton,
who was then a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.
Funding and promoting the broadcast might have violated two provisions
of the BCRA—one prohibiting the use of corporate funds to advocate
expressly the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office 69 and
another prohibiting the use of corporate funds in the period just before an
election to produce any “broadcast, cable, or satellite communication”
let us prohibit in effective fashion all corporations from making contributions for any
political purpose, directly or indirectly.” 5 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL
ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 898-99 (1910).
63
See 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (the Smith-Connally Act § 9); 61 Stat. 136, 15960 (1947) (the Taft-Hartley Act § 313).
64
See 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (the Taft-Hartley Act § 304). See also 2 U.S.C. §
441b(a) (codifying the prohibition of corporate and labor union contributions and
expenditures).
65
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C); FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, SSFS AND
NONCONNECTED
PACS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.shtml.
66
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2) & 434(f)(3)(A).
67
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ii).
68
See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign
Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUBL. POL’Y 643, 646-50 (2011).
69
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
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that even “refer[red] to a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” 70
The Supreme Court had held that the First Amendment allowed
application of the second provision only to communications were the
“functional equivalent” of express advocacy. 71
Citizens United was argued twice. Three months after the initial
argument, the Supreme Court restored the case to the docket and ordered
the parties to address a question they had not addressed previously—
whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 72 and a portion of
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n 73 should be overruled. 74 As the
first paragraph of Citizens United explained, “Austin . . . held that
political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate
identity,” 75 and a portion of McConnell had reiterated that holding. 76
70

See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2) (prohibiting “electioneering communications”) &
434(f)(3)(A) (defining “electioneering communications”).
71
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S 449 (2007).
72
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
73
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
74
Order of June 29, 2009, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08205), http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-205.htm.
75
Citizens United, 558 U.S at 318.
76
Jeffrey Toobin offers a fascinating but somewhat baffling account of the
deliberations that followed the initial argument in Citizens United. See Jeffrey Toobin,
Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice Roberts Orchestrated the Citizens United
NEW
YORKER,
May
21,
2012,
Decision,
THE
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/21/120521fa_fact_toobin?currentPage=al
l.
Citizens United’s counsel, Theodore Olson, maintained that the statutory
restrictions did not apply to the group’s proposed distribution of its film, and Toobin
reports that a majority of the Supreme Court voted at conference to accept Olson’s
argument. Chief Justice Roberts assigned the majority opinion to himself.
According to Toobin, Justice Kennedy then prepared
a concurrence which said the Court should have gone much further.
Kennedy’s opinion said the court should declare [the statutory] restrictions
unconstitutional, overturn an earlier Supreme Court decision from 1990
[Austin], and gut long-standing prohibitions on corporate giving. But after
the Roberts and Kennedy drafts circulated, the conservative Justices began
rallying to Kennedy’s more expansive resolution of the case. In light of
this, Roberts withdrew his own opinion and let Kennedy write for the
majority. . . .
The new majority opinion transformed Citizens United into a vehicle for
rewriting decades of constitutional law in a case where the lawyer had not
even raised those issues. Roberts’s approach to Citizens United conflicted
with the position he had taken earlier in the term. At the argument of a
death-penalty case known as Cone v. Bell, [556 U.S. 499 (2009),] Roberts
had berated at length the defendant’s lawyer, Thomas Goldstein, for his
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temerity in raising an issue that had not been addressed in the petition.
Now Roberts was doing nearly the same thing . . . .
[Justice] Souter wrote a dissent that aired some of the Court’s dirty
laundry. . . . [He] accused the Chief Justice of violating the Court’s own
procedures to engineer the result he wanted.
Id. The Court then ordered reargument, affording the government an opportunity to
persuade it not to do what it would have done without hearing argument if Justice
Souter had not threatened to make a stink.
What’s baffling about Toobin’s report is its failure to explain how every member of
a majority that initially voted to accept Olson’s statutory argument ultimately came to
join the Citizens United dissenters in rejecting this argument. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion began by rejecting all of Olson’s statutory claims. It concluded that the
case could not “be resolved on other, narrower grounds” than those the Court ultimately
approved. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 322-29.
Unless one of the dissenters in Citizens United initially voted to accept Olson’s
statutory claims, Justice Kennedy must have been a part of the majority that Toobin
says voted to accept these claims. Did Justice Kennedy vote at conference to accept
Olson’s statutory argument and then think better of it? Or might Toobin’s sources (an
untrustworthy law clerk or two?) have erred in reporting that a majority of the Court
voted to reverse on statutory grounds?
How were Chief Justice Roberts and the other justices who initially voted to accept
Olson’s statutory claims persuaded to join an opinion rejecting them? At some point, the
five justices who agreed that Citizens United should win its case apparently differed
among themselves. Some of them apparently favored ruling for Citizens United on
statutory grounds while others rejected these grounds but concluded that the group
should prevail on the basis of a constitutional argument it had not made. If the case had
remained in this posture, Citizens United would have secured a reversal of the lower
court’s judgment despite the fact that a majority of the Court had expressly rejected its
statutory claims and only a minority had concluded that it should win on the basis of a
constitutional claim. Two unsuccessful arguments (one of which Citizens United had
never offered) would have made the group a winner.
With the Court divided into three minorities (one for reversing on statutory
grounds, one for reversing on constitutional grounds, and one for affirming), its decision
would have stood for nothing. The Court, however, could not have resolved the
difficulty by dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted, for Citizens United had
come to the Court on appeal, not certiorari. Summarily affirming a case on appeal
leaves the lower court opinion in place (although the Supreme Court does not approve
this opinion). Summarily reversing without an opinion or with an opinion noting a
hopeless division leaves the case in a lawless limbo.
Might the Chief Justice and others have changed their minds about the merits of
Olson’s statutory argument simply to avoid an awkward situation? Were these justices
willing to reverse their position on a legal question (a not very important legal question)
just to move things along? Or did the force of Justice Kennedy’s analysis persuade them
in a way the government’s argument had not and lead them to repudiate an argument
they earlier had approved?
The choice for the majority was not simply between a narrower and a broader
ground of decision. It was between a narrower ground and an incompatible broader
ground. All members of the Court agreed they could not properly address the broader

[August 27, 2014]

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

21

Following re-argument, Citizens United did overrule Austin and
McConnell. The Court’s holding (at least its principal holding) was that
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s
corporate identity.” 77 The Court declared that the First Amendment
prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing
speech by some but not by others.” 78 It found “no basis for the
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.” 79 “Speech
restrictions on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means
to control content,” 80 the Court commented. Congress might have
prohibited corporate speech simply because it disliked what many
corporations have to say. The judgment that Congress may not forbid
corporations from speaking or from making political expenditures fully
resolved the case before the Court—yet the Court did not stop.
Citizens United mentioned the two branches of the “strict” scrutiny
standard Buckley v. Valeo had applied to expenditure restrictions—
requiring both a “compelling interest” and “narrow tailoring” 81—but the
Court’s analysis did not clearly separate these branches. Its principal
holding apparently concerned “tailoring” or the means Congress had
chosen to achieve its goals. However important Congress’s objectives
might have been, it could not achieve them by prohibiting speech by
corporations alone. Once the Court had explained this holding, 82 it had
little reason to discuss the strength of the government’s regulatory
interests, but it discussed them anyway. 83
The Court noted that Buckley v. Valeo had regarded only one interest
as “sufficiently important” to justify a restriction of campaign
contributions—“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption.” 84 Austin had said that Congress also could prevent “immense
aggregations of [corporate] wealth” from distorting election results, 85 but
Citizens United returned to Buckley’s position. It noted, “When Buckley
identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing
ground if the narrower ground sufficed, as some or all members of the majority once
might have voted to say that it did.
77
Id. at 346. See id. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political
speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”).
78
Id. at 340.
79
Id. at 341.
80
Id. at 340.
81
Id.
82
See id. at 336-49.
83
See id. at 349-62.
84
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
85
See Austin, 494 U.S. at 684.

22

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

[August 27, 2014]

corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to
quid pro quo corruption.” 86 The Court said that “[t]he practices Buckley
noted would be covered by bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement
were proved.” 87 It added, “Ingratiation and access are not corruption.”88
After offering its narrow view of corruption, the Court concluded, “The
anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in
question.” 89 This statement fully resolved the case before the Court a
second time.
The familiar principle that a court should not decide constitutional
issues in advance of necessity 90 means among other things that it should
not make two constitutional decisions when one will do. As Chief Justice
Roberts observed before becoming Chief Justice, “[I]f it is not necessary
to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” 91 Either branch of the
Citizens United opinion, however, would have sufficed without the other.
Once the Court had said that the government may not restrict independent
expenditures on the basis of corporate identity, there was no reason for it
to consider in addition whether the government may not restrict these
expenditures at all. And if the Court had said initially that independent
expenditures are insufficiently corrupting for Congress ever to restrict
them, there would have been no reason for it to consider in addition
whether this speech-related activity may be restricted on the basis of
corporate identity.
Even after resolving the case before it twice, the Court did not stop.
Three sentences after it declared that “[t]he anticorruption interest is not
sufficient to displace the speech here in question,” it went farther: “[W]e
now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.” 92 The Court’s first formulation declared the anticorruption
interest insufficient to support any restriction of political expenditures.
The second declared this interest nonexistent. A declaration that
independent expenditures do not corrupt at all went far, far, far beyond
the necessities of the case.
The Court slipped easily from one formulation to the other, but the
difference between them is great. If the Court had merely declared the
anticorruption interest insufficient, Citizens United would have said
86

Id. at 359.
Id. at 908 (citation to 18 U.S.C. § 201, a federal bribery statute, omitted).
88
Id. at 360.
89
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
90
See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936).
91
PDK Labs, Inc. v. United States DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Roberts, J., concurring in part).
92
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
87
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nothing about the validity of Congress’s limitation of contributions to
super PACs. Under the Court’s two-tiered standard of review, an interest
can be strong enough to justify a limitation of contributions even when it
is not strong enough to justify a limitation of expenditures.
Since Buckley in 1976, the Court has struck down every expenditure
limitation to come before it, but it has upheld most contribution
limitations. 93 If, in Citizens United, Court had decided the case before it
only twice and then stopped, one might have anticipated a repetition of
the pattern: Although Congress could not limit super PAC expenditures, it
could limit contributions to these groups. A nonexistent interest, however,
cannot justify anything. The Court’s declaration that the government had
no regulatory interest whatever was dictum or perhaps double dictum (a
statement unnecessary to a discussion that itself was unnecessary). 94
The Court’s off-hand transition from labeling the government’s
regulatory interest inadequate to labeling it nonexistent suggests that it
might not have been attuned to the important difference between these
formulations that Buckley’s two-tiered standard of review created. This
Article will note other indications that the Court did not mean its broader

93

The Court struck down expenditure limits in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518
U.S. 604 (1996) (Colorado I); and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). It
upheld contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 47 (1976); California Medical
Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528
U.S. 377 (2000); and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). The Court struck down
contribution limits in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1982)
(declaring limits on contributions to groups supporting or opposing referendums
unconstitutional because these contributions pose no risk of corrupting public officials)
and Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s extremely low
limits).
In FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001)
(Colorado II), the Court held that when a group’s expenditures are not “independent” of
a campaign, they must be treated as contributions to the campaign. It said, “[W]e have
routinely struck down limitations on independent expenditures by candidates, other
individuals, and groups while repeatedly upholding contribution limits.” Id. at 441-42
(emphasis and citations omitted).
94
See
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/obiter-dictum
(defining obiter dictum as “a judge’s incidental expression of opinion, not essential to
the decision and not establishing precedent”). The dissenters in McCutcheon declared
that Citizens United’s “statements . . . about the proper contours of the corruption
rationale” should be regarded “as dictum, as . . . overstatement, or as limited to the
context in which [they] appear.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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declaration quite the way it sounds. 95
Other broad formulations offered by the Citizens United opinion,
moreover, have not fared well. Although the Court announced that the
First Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some but not by others,” 96 the majority
opinion itself revealed that this declaration was not as unqualified as it
seemed. The Court acknowledged that it had upheld limits on speech
simply because the speaker was a student, a prisoner, a civil servant, or a
member of the military. It explained that “these rulings were based on an
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” 97
What the Court meant, apparently, was that limitations of speech may not
distinguish among speakers unless these limitations enable the
government to perform some function. 98
Two years after Citizens United, however, the Court abandoned even
this narrower proposition. It summarily upheld a ban on campaign
contributions by non-citizens who were not permanent residents of the
United States. 99 The declaration that the government may not restrict
speech on the basis of a speaker’s identity evidently had become
inoperative. 100
The Supreme Court did not disavow its statement that “the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s
corporate identity” 101—the statement that had appeared to be Citizens
United’s principal holding. The federal courts of appeals, however, have
not taken this statement seriously. The only four to rule on the question
have held that total bans on corporate contributions to election campaigns
survive Citizens United, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in two
of these cases. 102
95

See text at notes infra.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
97
Id. at 341.
98
The Court seemed to conclude that the government may distinguish among
speakers only when it occupies a special supervisory role over those it restricts.
99
See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (summarily affirming Bluman v.
FEC, 800 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 2011)).
100
See WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 346 (rev. ed. 1993)
(defining “inoperative” as “a correction without an apology, leaving the corrector in a
deep hole”).
Citizens United itself had said, “We need not reach the question whether the
Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations
from influencing our Nation’s political process.” 558 U.S. at 362. Even leaving this
question open indicated that, despite the Court’s broad language, it was not committed
to the proposition that all distinctions among speakers are invalid.
101
Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
102
See Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 877-80
96
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Seven years before Citizens United, the Supreme Court had upheld
Congress’s prohibition of corporate contributions to candidates, 103 and
the majority opinion in Citizens United did not expressly overrule this
decision. The courts of appeals relied in part on the Court’s declarations
that when one of its precedents applies directly, lower courts “should . . .
leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of offering its own decisions.”104
These courts also insisted, however, that Citizens United had no
application to contribution limits. The Second Circuit declared, for
example, “In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that the
government cannot prohibit independent expenditures in support of a
political candidate based on the source’s corporate identity. Contrary to
Appellant’s exhortation, however, Citizens United applies only to
independent corporate expenditures. . . . It therefore has no impact on the
issues before us in this case.” 105
The courts of appeals and the Supreme Court itself have deflated
Citizens United’s declarations that legislatures may not restrict speech on
the basis of the speaker’s identity. They have done so despite the fact that
the Court’s declaration that government may not limit the speech on the
basis of corporate identity appeared to be its principal holding. Although
Citizens United’s declaration that independent expenditures do not
corrupt was dictum and although the Court offered several indications
that it did not mean this statement to be as sweeping as it seemed, the
courts of appeals have not deflated it. 106 To the contrary, following the
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 183-84
(2d Cir.), cert. denied. 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d
1109, 1124-27 (9th Cir. 2011); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d
Cir. 2010).
103
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
104
E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
105
Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 183.
106
Describing a Supreme Court holding narrowly and refusing to consider its
implications for other situations is bad judging. The courts of appeals, however, could
have made this move to deflate the Supreme Court’s statement that independent
expenditures do not corrupt at least as easily as they could have to deflate its statements
that government may not restrict speech on the basis of corporate identity. In fact, the
declaration that independent expenditures do not corrupt formally addressed only
expenditures while the declarations that government may not restrict speech on the basis
of corporate identity apparently referred to both expenditures and contributions. By
insisting that Citizens United concerned only expenditures, the courts of appeals
disregarded more than the implications of its declarations that government may not
restrict speech on the basis of corporate identity; they disregarded what these
declarations said. Taking the Court’s language seriously, however, would have
produced very unfortunate consequences that the Court probably did not intend. See text
at notes infra.
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lead of the D.C. Circuit, they have read it for all it might be worth.
The D.C. Circuit maintained in SpeechNow that, if expenditures by
super PACs do not corrupt, contributions to these groups cannot corrupt
either. These contributions can influence public officials only through the
expenditures that the Supreme Court has declared non-corrupting as a
matter of law. 107 Although contribution limits are judged by a less
demanding standard than expenditure limits, the D.C. Circuit said that the
standard of review did not matter. “‘[S]omething . . . outweighs nothing
every time.’” 108 Acknowledging even a smidgen, soupçon, or scintilla of
regulatory interest would have undercut the court’s analysis entirely.
IV. HOW CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW CHANGED ELECTION
FINANCING
On the day the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, President
Obama described it as “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks,
health insurance companies and . . . other powerful interests.” 109 Critics
of the decision spoke of “corporate dominance of politics.” 110 The
practical significance of the Court’s judgment that large business
organizations may make independent expenditures on behalf of
candidates for office, however, has been close to nonexistent. The
creation of super PACs and the authorization of limitless contributions to
these groups, however, transformed American politics.
Citizens United and SpeechNow were followed by a stunning increase
in outside spending in federal election campaigns. 111 The first postCitizens United congressional elections came in 2010, ten months after
the Supreme Court’s ruling. In the campaign leading up to the preceding
non-presidential federal election in 2006, outside spending totaled $69

107

SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694-95.
Id. at 695 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d
873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and adding, “All that matters is that the First Amendment
cannot be encroached upon for naught”).
109
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement from the
President on Today’s Supreme Court Decision (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-todays-supreme-courtdecision-0.
110
See, e.g., Fran Korten, 10 Ways to Stop Corporate Dominance of Politics: It’s
Not Too Late to Limit or Reverse the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Disastrous
MAGAZINE,
Decision
in
Citizens
United
v.
FEC,
YES!
http://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/10-ways-to-stop-corporate-dominance-ofpolitics.
111
By outside spending, I mean spending controlled neither by candidates nor by
party committees.
108
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million. In 2010, it was $316 million. 112
The first presidential election following Citizens United and
SpeechNow was the election of 2012. During the preceding 2008
campaign, outside groups spent $338 million on all federal races. In
2012, they spent $1 billion, 38 million. 113
The 1310 super PACs that participated in the 2012 campaign
accounted for more than half of the total outside spending—$609 million.
They collected far more than that in contributions—$828 million.114
About 70% of all contributions to super PACs came from individuals
rather than collective entities of any sort—corporations, labor unions,
nonprofits, and political action committees. 115 Only about 9% of the
contributions came from corporations. 116 More than 25% of the corporate
contributions came, not from true business enterprises, but from “shell
corporations used by individuals . . . to cloak their donations.” 117
In the 2012 election cycle, not a single Fortune 500 company made
any independent expenditure to support or oppose a candidate for federal
office. Only ten contributed to super PACs. 118 Of these ten, only one
contributed more than $1 million—Chevron Corporation, which donated
$2.5 million to a super PAC close to House Speaker John Boehner. 119 In
112

See OpenSecrets.org, Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding
Party
Committees,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php?cycle=2012&view=A&cha
rt=N#viewpt.
113
Id. For an argument that some of the “exponential leap in political spending”
that followed Citizens United might have occurred anyway, see Matt Bai, How Much
Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at MM
14.
114
See OpenSecrets.org, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S.
115
See Anupama Narayanswamy, Corporate, Union, and Nonprofit Giving to Super
PACs Tops $167 Million, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTING GROUP BLOG, Oct. 22,
2012, http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/organizational-giving/.
116
See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of
Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 10 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313232.
117
Id. (noting that nearly $20 million of the $75 million contributed by corporations
was attributable to these shells).
118
See Wendy Hansen, Michael S. Rocca, & Brittany Ortiz, The Effects of Citizens
United on Corporate Contributions in the 2012 Presidential Election (2013) (APSA
2013
Annual
Meeting
Paper),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300930. Although the cited paper
reported that only nine Fortune 500 companies contributed to super PACs, id. at 20, its
authors later discovered one additional contributor. Email to the author from Michael S.
Rocca, Jan. 17, 2014.
119
See Hansen et al., supra note , at 20; Dan Eggen, Chevron Donates $2.5 Million
POST,
Oct.
26,
2012,
to
GOP
Super
PAC,
WASHINGTON
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other words, all 500 of the Fortune 500 companies declined the invitation
offered by Citizens United to make independent expenditures, and 490 of
them declined the invitation offered by SpeechNow to contribute to super
PACs. 120
The misperception that corporations dominate political campaigns
stems partly from media descriptions of the amounts contributed by
“business interests” and by specified industries like “the energy industry”
and “the financial services industry.” These statements are likely to
convey the impression that the contributions were made by businesses.
Almost invariably, however, the statements are traceable to the Center for
Responsive Politics, which includes individual contributions in its
compilations of interest-group donations. The Center attributes a
contribution to a group by noting the occupation and employer listed by
the individual contributor. 121
Excluding individual donations would be misleading; some
individual donations are made for the purpose of advancing their donors’
business interests. As the following discussion will indicate, however,
including these donations may be even more misleading. 122
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/10/26/chevron-donates-25-million-to-gop-super-pac/.
120
Wendy Hansen and her co-authors comment, “Over 500 of the world’s largest
and most powerful companies opted to stay away from donating to SuperPACs during
an election where SuperPACs spent over $600 million . . . .” Hansen et al., supra note ,
at 21. The authors refer to “over” 500 corporations because they examined the
expenditures of 545 companies in order to include all that made the Fortune 500 list in
either 2008 or 2012. Id. at 11.
Some of the business corporations that neither made independent expenditures nor
contributed to super PACs undoubtedly contributed to 501(c)(4) groups and 501(c)(6)
trade associations—particularly the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In 2012, the Chamber
began sponsoring ads expressly urging the election or defeat of particular candidates,
and it spent $35.7 million influencing federal elections. See OpenSecrets.org, US
Chamber
of
Commerce,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cycle=2012&cmte=US+Cham
ber+of+Commerce. Contributions to 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) groups, however, are not
reported publically. See note supra.
About two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies have established conventional
PACs. The electoral spending of these PACs increased 15% between 2008 and 2012.
This amount was “about half the percentage increase over the same period of major
non-corporate PACs.” Id. at 15. Neither Citizens United nor Speech Now affected the
ability of conventional PACs to make political donations.
121
See OpenSecrets.org, 2012 Overview: Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC &
Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs, and Outside Spending
Groups, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php. The Center for Responsive
Politics is a respected nonpartisan group that, among other things, analyzes campaign
finance statistics and makes them readily accessible.
122
The Center itself clearly divides interest group contributions into those made by
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Corporate executives have contributed a remarkable amount to
political campaigns—well over $1 billion in each of the most recent
election cycles. 123 As Adam Bonica recently discovered, 83% of all
Fortune 500 directors and CEOs have made political contributions at
some point in their careers. Moreover, of those who have failed to
contribute, many are foreign nationals barred from doing so. 124 The
contribution rate of the nearly 4500 top-firm executives Bonica studied
greatly exceeds that of doctors (15 to 20%) and lawyers (45 to 50%). 125
The average amount a contributing executive had given to campaigns
over the years was $197,000. The median was $39,000. These figures do
not include the amounts given by spouses. 126
Despite a common perception of the corporate world as a fortress of
conservatism, “the typical board [of a publically traded Fortune 500
company] includes donors from across the ideological spectrum,” 127 and
“ideologically homogenous firms are quite rare.” 128 The distribution of
campaign contributions by Fortune 500 executives skews to the right and
to the Republican Party, but only moderately. 129 This tilt could “as easily
be explained as a function of [the] demographics [of a group
disproportionately composed of white males over 50] as it could by the
supposed link between the corporate interests and Republican
policies.” 130
The contributions of business executives seem less strategic and more
the product of ideology than those of their businesses’ PACs. Executives
are far less likely than business PACs to contribute to both candidates in
a single race. 131 (Forty-three executives, however—3% of all
contributors—did give to both presidential nominees in 2012, and 114
did so in 2008. 132) Executives are also far less likely to tilt their
contributions toward the party in power. 133 If the contributions of
business executives are made to advance “business interests,” the donors
plainly have differing ideas of how best to advance these interests.
individuals and those made by PACs. See id.
123
See Bonica, supra note , at 16.
124
Id. at 15.
125
Id. at 32-33.
126
Id. at 15.
127
Id. at 37.
128
Id. at 35. An exception is the energy industry, which “stands out for the
conservatism of its management and work force.” Id.
129
Id. at 28-32.
130
Id. at 29.
131
Id. at 18-19.
132
Id. at 19, Table 2.
133
Id. at 20-23.
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Candidates and office holders may not assign individual contributions to
interests in the same way the Center for Responsive Politics does.
When a Fortune 500 company’s endorsement of a candidate would
alienate many of its directors, executives, and shareholders, the company
is unlikely to make an endorsement. The company may have other
reasons for declining to contribute to super PACs as well. About half the
customers of a business corporation marketing to the public would be
likely to support the opponent of whichever candidate the corporation
endorsed. Unlike lobbying on an issue affecting the corporation’s
interests, 134 participation in a general election campaign is often bad for
business. 135 Entities that do not market to the public (labor unions and
trade associations in particular) are more likely to make large
contributions. Richard Epstein calls electoral spending a constitutional
right that large corporations do not want. 136
Ninety-five individuals or couples and 56 organizations contributed
$1 million or more to outside spending groups in 2012. 137 Together they
contributed almost 60% of the total amount collected by these groups. 138
At the top of the list were Sheldon and Miriam Adelson, who together
134

See Bonica, supra note , at 2 (“[C]orporate lobbying expenditures have
historically eclipsed PAC contributions by ratios of more than ten to one.”).
135
See, e.g., Jia Lynn Yang & Dan Eggen, Exercising New Ability to Spend on
Campaigns, Target Finds Itself a Bull’s-Eye, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081806759.html (describing the national
boycott that followed Target’s contribution to a gubernatorial candidate in Minnesota
who opposed same-sex marriage).
136
See Richard A. Epstein, Corporate Speech and Electoral Spending: Citizens
United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big Corporations Should Have but do not
Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 391 (2011). Apart from the fact that a corporation’s
participation in an election campaign may be bad for business, permitting corporate
contributions exposes businesses to implicit extortion—the unspoken threat that
rejecting a request for funds may lead to reduced access or less favorable treatment.
137
See OpenSecrets.org, 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=V
&superonly=N. Among the lists that appear at this website are one for top individual
contributors in 2012 and another for top organizational contributors. A menu enables a
viewer to toggle from one list to the other. The discussion that follows draws from a
merger of the two lists.
138
See Keenan Steiner & Jacob Fenton, The 2012 Super PAC Million Dollar Club,
FOUNDATION
REPORTING
GROUP,
Dec.
7,
2012,
SUNLIGHT
http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/2012-super-pac-million-dollar-club/
(using figures slightly different from those reported by the Center for Responsive
Politics); Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Billion-Dollar Democracy: The Unprecedented
Roll of Money in the 2012 Elections, DEMOS, Jan. 17, 2013,
http://www.demos.org/publication/billion-dollar-democracy-unprecedented-rolemoney-2012-elections.
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gave $92.8 million. Following them were three more individuals or
couples (Harold and Annette Simons, who contributed $26.9 million;
Robert Perry, who gave $23.5 million; and Fred Eychaner, who gave
$14.1 million). Then came a labor union (the United Auto Workers, $14
million); an individual (Michael Bloomberg, $13.7 million); another
union (Service Employees International, $13.3 million); another
individual (Joe Ricketts, $13.1 million); and another union (the National
Educational Association, $13 million).
The top corporate contributor finally appeared at number 10 on the
list—Specialty Group Inc., a mysterious enterprise that filed its
incorporation papers less than a week before contributing its first $5
million and that ultimately contributed $10.6 million. 139 One must go
past three more individuals and six more unions before encountering a
second business corporation—Oxbow Corp., an energy development
holding company founded by Bill Koch, a brother of Charles and David
Koch, 140 which contributed $4.4 million.
The business corporations that contributed $1 million or more (22)
slightly outnumbered the unions that did (20), 141 but the amount
contributed by the 20 unions ($102 million) was more than double that
contributed by the 22 corporations ($50 million). Most of the
corporations that gave $1 million or more appeared to be closely held by
one or a few owners. Several in fact seemed to be straws created for the
purpose of masking their owners’ contributions. 142
139

See Jack Gillum, Specialty Group Inc., Mystery Firm, Formed Days Before $5
POST,
Oct.
27,
2012,
Million
Campaign
Gift,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/27/specialty-group-incdonation_n_2031207.html; William Rose, Press Release (Nov. 3, 2012),
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/502074-press-release-from-william-rose-onfreedomeworks.html (statement by Knoxville resident William Rose declaring that he is
“the CEO, President and General Counsel of Specialty Group,” that the company is
developing land his family has owned for 50 years, and that “[o]ver the past several
weeks, the failings of the Obama administration . . . have been hidden by the
mainstream news media, with Fox News leading the lonely path towards the truth”).
140
See
WIKIPEDIA,
Bill
Koch
(Businessman),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Koch_(businessman) (last visited Aug. 5, 2013).
141
The organizations contributing $1 million or more that were neither labor unions
nor business corporations were mostly political groups—for example, the Republican
Governors Association and the League of Conservation Voters.
142
See Corporations or People? Let’s Ask Romney About Eli Publishing, F8LLC,
Spann LLC and Paying Taxes, MN POLITICAL ROUNDTABLE, Aug. 13, 2011,
http://mnpoliticalroundtable.com/2011/08/13/corporations-or-people-let’s-ask-romneyabout-eli-publishing-f8-llc-spann-llc-and-paying-taxes/ (noting, for example, that W
Spann LLC filed incorporation papers in March, contributed $1 million to Restore Our
Future in April, and was dissolved in July). See Michael Beckel & Reity O’Brien,
Mystery Firm is Election’s Top Corporate Donor at $5.3 Million, OpenSecretsblog,
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Wendy Hansen, Michael Rocca, and Brittany Ortiz, the authors of a
study of political spending by Fortune 500 companies, concluded,
“Corporate political spending changed very little following the Citizens
United ruling.” 143 Adam Bonica’s bottom line was similar: “In a careful
accounting of corporate political expenditures, I find little evidence that
the recent Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United has had any practical
effect on how corporations spend on politics.” 144 But large contributions
by individuals have skyrocketed.
V. REFLECTIONS ON A BUMPER STICKER
A bumper sticker marketed to people offended by the Citizens United
decision proclaims, “MONEY IS NOT SPEECH! Corporations are not
People!” 145 Justice Alito has called it “very frustrating” for a Supreme
Court opinion to be “reduced to a slogan that you put on a bumper
sticker.” 146 The bumper sticker, however, provides a place to start. This
section assesses some basic campaign finance issues by considering
what’s wrong and what’s right about the sticker’s two assertions.
A. “Money is not Speech”
1. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Wrong (Mostly)
The declaration that money is not speech appears not only on bumper
stickers but also on refrigerator magnets, T-shirts, 147 and a proposed
constitutional amendment endorsed by more than 360,000 petition
signers. 148 The city councils of Los Angeles, California and Portland,
Oregon have passed resolutions declaring that money is not speech, and
voters in Boulder, Colorado and Madison, Wisconsin have approved
referenda saying the same thing. 149
Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-topcorpo.html.
143
Hansen et al., supra note , at 18.
144
Bonica, supra note , at 36.
145
See http://www.cafepress.com/mf/70462926/money-is-not-speech_bumpersticker?utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=758086923&utm_source=google&utm_campaig
n=sem-cpc-product-ads&utm_content=search-pla&productId=758086923.
146
See LAURENCE TRIBE AND JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 96 (2014) (quoting Alito and citing a Boston.com
website story that apparently is no longer on the web).
147
See, e.g., http://www.zazzle.com/money_is_not_speech_bumper_sticker128314648852904232.
148
See https://movetoamend.org (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
149
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Is Money Speech?, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 5, 2012,
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It is true that money is not speech, but the First Amendment could not
protect speech unless it also protected other things. As Geoffrey Stone
has observed, a bus is not speech, but a law forbidding bus rides to
political rallies would violate the First Amendment. 150 Although money
is not speech, Congress could not prohibit the use of money to buy a
book. In Buckley v. Valeo, 151 the Supreme Court rejected the D.C.
Circuit’s conclusion that contribution and expenditure limitations “should
be viewed as regulating conduct not speech.” 152 As the Court observed,
one cannot send a telegram or publish a newspaper without spending
money. 153 Unless critics of Citizens United would allow Congress to
suppress newspapers by prohibiting the expenditures needed to publish
them, they cannot resolve the First Amendment issues posed by
campaign finance regulations simply by proclaiming that money is not
speech.
2. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Right (Partly)
The Constitution protects the expenditures needed to bring speech to
an audience, but that is not the only thing campaign contributions and
expenditures do. These contributions and expenditures have harmful
effects not produced by the messages they deliver. They differ greatly
from the spending necessary to publish a newspaper or send a telegram.
Unlike the funds used to publish a newspaper or send a telegram,
political contributions are intended to influence, and do influence, two
audiences. From the perspective of one of these audiences—the public—
they look like speech. Their goal is to persuade the audience of some
proposition (“vote Obama”). American democracy could not function
without them.
From the perspective of a second audience, however—the favored
candidate—political contributions look like other corrupting gifts. They
do not persuade the candidate to support his own candidacy. Instead, they
may persuade him to provide favors to the contributors. When they do,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/is-money-speech_b_1255787.html.
150
Id.
151
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
152
Id. at 15-16.
153
Id. at 17. Western Union sent its last telegram in 2006, thirty years after Buckley.
See Dan Tynan, 10 Technologies that Should Be Extinct (But Aren’t), PC WORLD, July
4,
2010,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/200325/10_technologies_that_should_be_extinct.html.
One can still send a telegram through iTelegram, which recommends using the service
for, among other things, weddings, special occasions, sympathy, and fun and romance.
See http://www.itelegram.com.
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they persuade him in the same way that an expense-paid trip to an old golf
course in Scotland might persuade him. 154 Campaign cash is just as good
as money. 155
The principal reason for restricting the receipt of political
contributions does not differ from the reason for restricting the receipt of
golf outings, honoraria, tickets to sporting events, Christmas baskets, and
private employment. Campaign contributions corrupt as much as these
other valued benefits. Because the contributions serve an important public
purpose, however, there is greater reason for tolerating the corruption.
The codes of conduct that limit the ability of public officials to accept
gifts are described as curbing conflicts of interest. The Supreme Court’s
campaign finance decisions consume more than 1500 pages of the reports,
however, and the words conflict of interest do not appear. The Supreme
Court speaks more obscurely of “the actuality and appearance of
corruption.” 156
Speaking of conflicts of interest would be better. 157 To be sure, this
language would sound less grand. Corruption has an ominous ring, and
curbing it sounds like a more “compelling” governmental interest.
Speaking of conflicts of interest, however, would underscore the need to
draw a line between permissible and impermissible conflicts. The
Supreme Court sometimes has seemed hesitant to recognize this necessity.
Attempting to eliminate all conflicts of interest would be a fool’s
errand. Conflicts are ubiquitous. An effort to stamp all of them out would
leave public officials without any social life, family life, religious life, or
political life. This effort also would violate the First Amendment.
Congress could not prohibit a $100 contribution simply because it might
make its beneficiary somewhat more receptive to the contributor’s
entreaties.
Strong conflicts of interest, however, are appropriately forbidden. The
interest in preventing them is both important and compelling. 158 The
154

See Wikipedia, List of Trips Funded by Jack Abramoff,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_trips_funded_by_Jack_Abramoff (last visited Nov.
13, 2013).
155
See Yogi Berra, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Yogi_Berra (last
visited Sept. 25, 2012) (noting Yogi Berra’s statement in an AFLAC commercial, “And
they give you cash which is just as good as money”).
156
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
157
Twenty-five years ago, Daniel Lowenstein noted, “[T]he question of campaign
finance is a question of conflict of interest.” See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On
Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
301, 324 (1989).
158
When the Constitution is read to safeguard unlimited contributions to super
PACs, laboring over a code of government conduct looks like rearranging deck chairs
on the Titanic. A code might prohibit a lobbyist from sending a legislator a $100

[August 27, 2014]

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

35

Lincoln bedroom, 159 the ambassadorship to Luxembourg, 160 and pardons
for the friends and families of major donors 161 need not remain up for
grabs. Small political contributions usually are motivated by a desire to
persuade the public rather than buy influence. Large contributions are
likely to be motivated by both a desire to persuade the public and the hope
of gaining clout. 162 Forbidding some conflicts of interest is an excellent
idea.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court cited the impossibility of
drawing a principled line between large and small conflicts of interest as
its reason—its only reason—for excluding from its concept of corruption
every conflict of interest except those created by bribes. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court quoted an earlier opinion by Justice
Kennedy, noting that this earlier opinion was a separate opinion but not
that it was a dissent. He wrote, “‘Favoritism and influence are not . . .
avoidable in representative politics. It is the nature of an elected
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to
favor the voters and contributors who support those policies.’”163
Moreover, “[a] ‘generic favoritism or influence theory is at odds with
standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and
susceptible to no limiting principle.’” 164 Justice Kennedy apparently saw
Christmas gift, but the restriction would hardly matter. The lobbyist would have a
simpler and easier way to buy influence.
159
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush accused
President Clinton of “virtually renting out the Lincoln bedroom to big campaign
donors.” He condemned using this “hallowed chamber” for political purposes. Helen
Thomas, Selling Lincoln Bedroom Disrespectful, HEARST NEWSPAPERS, Sept. 28, 2002,
http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Selling-Lincoln-bedroom-disrespectful1097153.php. Later, however, Bush, like his predecessor, hosted many major
contributors as overnight guests in the White House. A presidential spokesman refused
to say in which bedrooms they slept. Id.
160
See Appendix E to this Article, “The Appointment of Ambassadors.”
161
See Appendix D to this Article, “Executive Clemency.”
162
Laurence Tribe once posed the following thought experiment to his First
Amendment class: Imagine a high-tech information filter that can reveal information to
one audience while blocking it from another. Imagine further that the law mandates the
use of this device to make the sources of campaign financing transparent to the public
but anonymous to the benefitted candidates. Then consider how many contributors
would still pour millions of dollars into campaigns. Email to the author from Laurence
Tribe, Sept. 29, 2012. For less hypothetical proposals to conceal the identity of donors
from candidates, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 48-50, 102-04 (2004); Ian Ayers & Jeremy Bulow,
The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political
Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
163
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
164
Id. (again quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
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no alternative to leaving the ambassadorship to Luxembourg and much
more up for grabs.
The Supreme Court, however, often draws “unprincipled” lines of the
sort Citizens United declined to draw. In Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
Pac, 165 for example, the Court upheld Missouri’s low contribution limits,
and then, in Randall v. Sorrell, 166 it invalidated Vermont’s even lower
limits. The Court has recognized that legislatures must make judgment
calls and that courts charged with safeguarding the First Amendment must
review the reasonableness of these calls.
The distinction between the two audiences and the two different ways
of persuading them has been lost on some Supreme Court justices. The
dissenters in Citizens United cited the scholarship of Zephyr Teachout—
scholarship showing that the Framers of the Constitution “‘were obsessed
with corruption,’ which they understood to encompass the dependency of
public officeholders on private interests.” 167 In a concurring opinion
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia objected that the
Framers’ concept of corruption could not justify restricting speech: “[I]f
speech can be prohibited because, in the view of Government, it leads to
‘moral decay’ or does not serve ‘public ends,’ then there is no limit to the
Government’s censorship power.” 168
Limiting contributions and expenditures because the political
messages they send could persuade viewers, listeners, and readers to
dissenting)).
165
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
166
548 U.S. 230 (2006).
167
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Zephyr
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 348 (2009)).
Teachout’s scholarship sometimes produces a surprisingly uncomprehending
response. Critics note the ubiquity of the kind of corruption she describes, the
impossibility of eliminating this corruption, and the unfairness of calling every official
who considers anything but the public good “corrupt.”
Teachout, however, did not suggest that the Constitution allows Congress to
prohibit all speech that creates conflicts of interest and that diverts officials from
serving the public. She did not set forth a standard for separating protected from
unprotected speech. She simply emphasized an interest to be weighed against the
expressive value of speech and showed how important this interest was to the Framers
of the Constitution. Moreover, Teachout would not call officials who fail to focus
entirely on the public good dishonest; her point was that the word “corruption”
sometimes refers, not to dishonesty, but to falling away from an Aristotelian ideal of
public service. Corruption in the sense most often invoked by the Framers is a matter of
more or less, not yes or no.
Teachout argued that the interest in minimizing conflicts of interest is sometimes
strong enough to justify limiting speech. For an examination of where the contrary view
would lead, see text at notes infra.
168
Id. at 391 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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favor selfish interests or might cause moral decay of the part of these
audiences certainly would offend the First Amendment. No one,
however, has proposed limiting contributions and expenditures because
the messages they send corrupt their audiences. Providing valued gifts to
governmental officials to encourage them to disregard the public interest
is entitled to no First Amendment protection.
The plurality in McCutcheon also seemed oblivious to the difference
between campaign contributions and speech that sends a message to only
one audience. It wrote, “Money in politics may at times seem repugnant
to some, but so too does much of what the First Amendment vigorously
protects. If the First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests,
and Nazi parades—despite the profound offense such spectacles cause—
it surely protects political campaign speech despite popular
opposition.” 169
The public, however, does not seek to suppress campaign
contributions for the same reason legislators once sought to suppress flag
burning and Nazi marches. Its quarrel is not with the content of the
advertisements broadcast by Democrats and Republicans. What makes
money in politics repugnant to many is the ability of backers of both
Republicans and Democrats to secure official favors. The messages
Republican and Democratic donors send the public differ from one
another, but the conflicts of interest created by their contributions look a
lot alike. The McCutcheon majority seemed slow to recognize the
difference between limiting conflicts of interest and censoring repugnant
speech. It was too quick to claim the mantle of Milton, Mill, Holmes, and
Brandeis.
The defenders of Citizens United and the critics of this decision
sometimes have seemed like the blind men describing the elephant. 170 The
defenders have failed to acknowledge the extent to which political
contributions and expenditures differ from other funds used to bring
speech to audiences. The critics, however, have seen these contributions
as corrupting without acknowledging the crucial role they play in
enabling speech. Both sides have been wrong and both right. 171

169

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
This Article is headed toward a record in the use of hackneyed metaphors.
Readers are requested to envision an elephant in a stateroom on the Titanic
unmentioned except by a group of blind passengers who describe it to an orphaned
murderer in a deck chair after the ship has left the station.
171
Some critics’ concern about conflicting interests is mixed with concern about
buying elections and distorting election results—a concern that does raise questions
about censorship.
170
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B. “Corporations are not People”
1. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Wrong (Mostly)
Some of the constitutional amendments proposed to “overrule”
Citizens United insist, “[H]uman beings, not corporations, are persons
entitled to constitutional rights.” 172 Justice Stevens wrote for the
dissenters in Citizens United, “[The Framers] had little trouble
distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they
constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was
the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.”173
Delegates to the 2012 Democratic Convention cheered Elizabeth Warren
when she told them, “Corporations are not people. People have hearts,
they have kids, they get jobs, they get sick, they cry, the dance. They live,
they love, and they die. And that matters. That matters because we don’t
run this country for corporations, we run it for people.” 174
Even the motorists whose bumper stickers decry Citizens United,
however, might not deny corporations all constitutional rights. One
doubts, for example, that they would convict these entities of crimes
without affording them the right to counsel and the right to jury trial. 175
At the same time, no one has proposed affording corporations the right to
vote. It apparently is necessary to distinguish some constitutional rights
from others, something that cannot be done on a bumper sticker.
In 2012, Mitt Romney responded to an audience member’s repeated
shouts of the word corporations by saying, “Corporations are people, my
friend.” 176 This answer prompted widespread ridicule. The Chairperson
172

See the website https://movetoamend.org (favoring a constitutional amendment
with the language quoted in text); Tester’s Constitutional Amendment, Scribd.,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/148533402/Tester-s-Constitutional-Amendment (presenting
the text of a constitutional amendment sponsored by Senators Jon Tester and Chris
Murphy: “We the people who ordain and establish this Constitution intend the rights
protected by this constitution to be the rights of natural persons.”).
173
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174
See Elizabeth Warren Addresses DNC: “The System is Rigged,” REAL CLEAR
POLITICS,
Sept.
5,
2012,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/09/05/elizabeth_warren_addresses_dnc_th
e_system_is_rigged.html.
175
Affording these rights to corporations seems uncontroversial. Nevertheless,
“[f]or ever-shifting reasons, all of them bad, the Supreme Court has held the privilege
against self-incrimination inapplicable to corporations.” Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways
to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1366
(2009).
176
See Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says “Corporations are People” at Iowa State
Fair, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2011, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-
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of the Democratic National Committee called it a “shocking
admission,” 177 and a poster portrayed Romney as declaring, “Of course
corporations are people. Some of my best friends are corporations!”
People probably would not have seen Romney as ridiculous,
however, if he had said, “Baseball teams are people, my friend,” “church
congregations are people,” or “labor unions are people.” Indeed, if
Romney had seemed ridiculous after making one of these other
comments, it might have been because he saw the need to verbalize
something so obvious.
Why might listeners have accepted descriptions of labor unions as
people while rejecting similar descriptions of corporations? Was it just
that some people consider corporations more beastly? Or does the
statement that “unions are people” sound like an obvious truth—simply a
recognition that members comprise these organizations—while the
statement that “corporations are people” sounds like an obvious
falsehood—a preposterous statement about corporate entities themselves?
One guesses that Romney meant only to remind his audience of the
human beings who consider themselves part of corporate organizations
and without whom these organizations would not exist, but listeners
heard him deny that a fictional entity was fictional. 178
The Citizens United majority and its critics appeared to make the
same error. Both took a legal fiction seriously and envisioned a
corporation owned by many people simply as a single entity. The
majority insisted that this entity should be treated no differently from an
individual speaker while critics saw it as a nonhuman thing without
rights. Analogizing a corporation to a single person or a single thing,
however, is usually a mistake. 179 What might be called the Romney
move—piercing the corporate veil and focusing on the human beings
behind it—sharpens the issues. 180
08-11/politics/35270239_1_romney-supporters-mitt-romney-private-sector-experience.
177
Id.
178
Romney had no hope of correcting the misunderstanding. Although Justice
Brandeis famously declared that the remedy for falsehood and fallacies is “more
speech,” Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring), he never
ran for office.
179
See Alschuler, supra note (arguing that blaming corporations for the crimes
committed by their employees is comparable to blaming animals and inanimate objects
and commenting, “The embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is that it punishes
the innocent along with the guilty,” id. at 1637).
180
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014), the Court
belatedly explained, “When rights, constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of [the people (including shareholders,
officers and employees) who are associated with the corporation in one way or
another].” One wishes the Citizens United majority had made the same statement and
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Agreeing that only human beings have First Amendment rights begs
the question what rights they have. Does the Constitution guarantee them
not only the right to speak as individuals but also the right to join with
others for the purpose of speaking? And if the First Amendment entitles
them to form “speech groups,” why should the groups they form be
denied the benefits of corporate organization? Should only non-speaking
business entities be allowed to incorporate? Should these nonhuman (or,
if you prefer, subhuman) organizations have special privileges denied to
groups that speak?
Just as the government may not prohibit using a bus to ride to a
political rally, it should not be allowed to prohibit the use of a common
and beneficial form of organization simply because organizers wish to
engage in protected speech. A widely available organizational tool cannot
constitutionally be denied to speakers alone. Like a bus, incorporation
can help speakers get where they’re going. It would be more precise to
say that people have a right to use the corporate form when they speak
than to say that corporations have a right to speak, but it is difficult to see
an important difference between the two formulations. 181
Citizens United was not the first Supreme Court decision to recognize
the right of speakers to employ the corporate form of organization. The
Court cited no fewer than 25 earlier decisions in which it had recognized
the First Amendment rights of incorporated groups. 182
In fact, the Supreme Court had decided a case very much like
Citizens United 24 years earlier. In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, 183 a nonprofit corporation sought to distribute broadly a newsletter
headlined “EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PROLIFE.” 184 The Court recognized the group’s right to distribute this
newsletter. It held Congress’s prohibition of corporate expenditures “in
connection with” federal election campaigns unconstitutional as applied
to nonprofit corporations formed for the sole purpose of expressing
political ideas. The Court’s opinion was by Justice Brennan.
Citizens United differed from Massachusetts Citizens for Life in only
one respect. The plaintiff in Citizens United, unlike the plaintiff in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, accepted donations from for-profit
corporations. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the Firstconsidered its implications.
181
Because the right ultimately belongs to individuals, the government should be
allowed to take reasonable steps to ensure that they wish to exercise this right—in other
words, to ensure that the people on the bus want to go where it’s going.
182
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342.
183
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
184
See id. at 243.
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Amendment rights of for-profit corporations too. As Michael McConnell
observed, “The vast majority of the Court’s press cases involve for-profit
corporations . . ., and no one, even in dissent, has ever suggested that
corporate status mattered in those cases.” 185
The Sierra Club is a nonprofit corporation, and the New York Times is
a for-profit corporation. Unless the critics of Citizens United would deny
the right to speak and publish to the Sierra Club and the Times, they
cannot plausibly maintain that only “human beings, not corporations, are
persons entitled to constitutional rights.”
Citizens United held Congress’s prohibition of independent electoral
expenditures by unions and corporations unconstitutional 64 years after
its enactment. One year after its enactment, however, Justices Rutledge,
Black, Douglas, and Murphy declared in a concurring opinion that they
would hold this prohibition unconstitutional. 186 They did so in a case in
which the majority found it unnecessary to reach the question but did say
that it would have “the gravest doubt” about the prohibition’s
constitutionality if it were construed to prevent internal distribution of a
list of union endorsements. 187 Nine years later, in another case in which
the majority found it unnecessary to resolve the question, Chief Justice
Warren joined a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas and Black
reiterated their view that the prohibition was unconstitutional.188
At the time Chief Justice Warren and Justices Rutledge, Black,
Douglas, and Murphy declared that they would hold Congress’s
prohibition of independent expenditures by unions and corporations
unconstitutional, Congress had enacted only token restrictions on
contributions by individuals. 189 When people were effectively free to
give as much as they liked to whichever candidates they liked, there was
no substantial reason to limit their ability to join others in making and
coordinating contributions and expenditures—and no substantial reason
to deny the groups they formed the benefits of corporate organization.
Once Congress had limited individual contributions, however, and
once the Supreme Court had recognized Congress’s power to do so, the
appropriate analysis changed. The government then had a strong interest
185
186

See McConnell, supra note , at 417.
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the

result).
187

Id. at 121 (majority opinion).
United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
joined by Warren, C.J., and Black, J., dissenting).
189
The Hatch Act amendments of 1940 limited individual contributions to a federal
candidate or political committee to $5000 per year but did not prevent a donor from
giving that amount to multiple committees working for the same candidate and
coordinating their electoral efforts. See Ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940).
188
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in preventing the use of organizations to circumvent individual
contribution limits. Neither the majority nor the dissenters in Citizens
United seemed to notice the change.
2. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Right (Partly)
a. Contributions
One morning, Mr. Hyde donated the maximum allowable amount to
Senator Claghorn’s reelection campaign. 190 He said to the senator, “Of
course there’s no quid pro quo, but I hope you’ll support subsidies for the
widget industry, which would create thousands of jobs.”
Mr. Hyde later donned dark glasses, a fedora, and a false mustache.
That afternoon, he again contributed the maximum amount to Senator
Claghorn’s campaign. “I am not Mr. Hyde,” he told the senator in a
falsetto voice. “I am the Jeckyll Corporation, a leading manufacturer of
widgets. Like my friend Hyde, however, I hope you’ll support enormous
subsidies for our industry.”
The case of Mr. Hyde and the Jeckyll Corporation prompts the
following observations.
i. Corporate Entities Are Not People
As noted above, every federal court of appeals to address the issue
has held that Congress’s prohibition of corporate contributions to election
campaigns survives Citizens United. 191 If the courts had taken more
seriously the Supreme Court’s declaration that “the Government cannot
restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity,”192
however, they would have afforded corporations the same right as
individuals to make political contributions. Every corporation then could
have donated $2600 per candidate per election. 193
The number of corporations an individual can form is unlimited. If,
after donating $2600 to Senator Claghorn himself, Mr. Hyde had created
100 corporations, each of these corporations could have contributed
$2600 to the senator’s campaign. By making contributions through these
190
Senator Beauregard Claghorn, an invention of radio comedian Fred Allen, is
remembered today, not for his legislative accomplishments, which were nonexistent, but
for his devotion to the South—devotion so deep that he refused to wear a union suit or
drive through the Lincoln Tunnel. See WIKIPEDIA, Senator Claghorn,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senator_Claghorn (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
191
See text at note supra.
192
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346.
193
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 (2013).
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corporations, Mr. Hyde would have gained more clout than he should
have—101 times more. At the same time, Koch Industries, with 60,000
employees and annual revenues of $115 billion,194 could have
contributed a total of $2600. The fearsome corporate mountain could
have given birth to a mouse. As the bumper sticker insists, analogizing
corporate entities to individual speakers is misguided. The number of
artificial legal entities people create should not affect what they can give.
The people who own corporations are not artificial entities. In
Elizabeth Warren’s words, they live, love, and die. The reason some
corporate contributions are appropriately forbidden is not that
corporations are sub-human, demonic entities entitled to no constitutional
rights. Rather, the reason is the opposite: “Corporations are people, my
friend.” The people who comprise a corporation are entitled to only their
fair share of clout. Their contributions to particular candidates should be
subject to effective limitation.
ii. Limiting and Equalizing Clout
This Article has maintained that campaign contributions are hybrids
of protected speech and unprotected, influence-generating gifts to
candidates. The limits on contributions upheld by Buckley v. Valeo mark
the point at which the danger of conflicting interests appears to outweigh
the benefits of electoral speech.
When people aggregate small contributions, however, they can create
large conflicts of interest. One thousand members of the National Widget
Association, for example, might each contribute the maximum amount to
Senator Claghorn’s campaign, and each might accompany his
contribution with a note thanking the senator for his unwavering support
of the right to bear widgets. Senator Claghorn later might vote against a
proposed widget-control measure, not because he or most of his
constituents disapproved of the measure, but because he hoped to keep
the Widget Association members’ cash flowing. The persuasion worked
by these members’ contributions would not have been the kind the First
Amendment protects, but no constitutional regime of campaign finance
regulation could have blocked it.
This Article will endorse a scheme of campaign finance regulation in
which organizations may bundle contributions and act as the
contributors’ spending agents. A bundling group—call it a political
action committee—could collect a large enough war chest that candidates
might be wary of offending it.
194

See Forbes, America’s Largest Companies, http://www.forbes.com/largestprivate-companies/list/, last visited June 22, 2014.
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The situation obviously differs when Mr. Hyde, wearing 1000
disguises, has contributed 1000 times more than the law allows.
Although the aggregate amount of improper influence he purchased
might have been no different from that purchased by 1000 lawful
contributions, Mr. Hyde would have gained an unfair advantage. He is
entitled to no more than his fair share of clout. Even when limits on
individual contributions do not block the creation of conflicts of interest,
they limit people to their proportionate share of clout.
The Supreme Court has rejected a different equalization claim—that
the government may prevent the political contributions of the wealthy
from “distorting” election results. Although Austin embraced a variation
of this claim, 195 Buckley, Citizens United, and McCutcheon firmly
repudiated it. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court observed that
restricting the speech of some in order to equalize the speech of others is
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” 196
The government could not block a wealthy person from writing and
distributing a pamphlet on a political issue (or from publishing this
pamphlet as a full-page advertisement in the New York Times) simply
because opponents of his position were less wealthy and less able to
disseminate their views. Equalizing electoral speech seems similarly
objectionable.
Equalizing clout differs, however, from equalizing speech and is not
“foreign to the First Amendment.” Although the First Amendment
guarantees a marketplace of ideas, 197 it does not guarantee a marketplace
in clout. The argument for equalizing clout does not focus at all on the
advantage that wealth may provide in conveying messages to the public
or on distorted election results. It focuses on a kind of influence the First
Amendment does not protect.
iii. Anonymous Clout
In McCutcheon, the Supreme Court maintained that even if funds
donated to a group unassociated with a candidate might find their way
into this candidate’s coffers, “it is hard to see how a candidate today
could receive a ‘massive amount[] of money’ that could be traced back to
195
See Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (declaring that Congress may prevent “immense
aggregations of [corporate] wealth” from distorting election results).
196
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-50; McCutcheon,
134 S. Ct. at 1450.
197
See Abrams v. United States, 259 U.S. 616, 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”).
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a particular contributor.” 198 It observed that when “the chain of
attribution grows longer, . . . any credit must be shared among the various
actors along the way.” 199 It spoke of the hurdles election law poses “for a
donor who seeks both to channel a large amount of money to a particular
candidate and to ensure that he gets the credit for doing so.” 200 The Court
apparently assumed that a donor could have illegitimate influence only
when the recipient knew his identity.
When Mr. Hyde, disguised as the Jeckyll Corporation, contributed a
second time to Senator Glaghorn’s campaign, however, the influence he
gained did not depend on Senator Claghorn’s ability to see through his
disguise (that is, to pierce his corporate veil). In both of Mr. Hyde’s
personae, he made Senator Claghorn aware of the amount of his
contribution and what he wanted. When the amount contributed is large
enough, these two conditions can create campaign-cash clout. Mr. Hyde
believed that his two contributions together would reinforce the senator’s
appreciation of the central role of widgets in our economy—and not
because they would persuade the senator of anything. Clout need not be
personal clout; someone who remains anonymous but contributes to an
influence-buying fund has clout too. To block improper influence, one
must obscure both the identity and the objectives of a donor. 201
b. Expenditures
All corporations—not just shell corporations, one-person
corporations, and closely held corporations—offer paths around
contribution limits. Moreover, corporate expenditures may provide a
broader circumvention path than corporate contributions.
Although no Fortune 500 company has yet accepted Citizens United’s
invitation to make an independent expenditure to advocate a candidate’s
election, 202 suppose that one does. The massive Jeckyll Corporation
spends $1 million to create and broadcast an advertisement urging
Senator Claghorn’s reelection.
Suppose that, prior to this expenditure, Mr. Hyde, the owner of 5% of
the outstanding shares of Jeckyll Corporation, had contributed as much as
the law allowed to Senator Claghorn’s campaign. The corporation’s
independent expenditure on behalf of Senator Claghorn was not Mr.
Hyde’s independent expenditure.
198

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452-53.
Id. at 1452.
200
Id. at 1446.
201
See note supra.
202
See text at notes supra.
199
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When the Supreme Court first distinguished between contributions
and expenditures, it explained, “The transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.” 203 When one person funds another’s speech, the First
Amendment protects his contribution less than the speech he finances.
The distinction between contributions and expenditures apparently
proceeds from the same intuition that prompted the bumper sticker’s
declaration that money is not speech: Writing checks is something less
than speaking. 204
Although political contributors usually write checks, Mr. Hyde did
less. Funds that he and others owned were already in the Jeckyll
Corporation treasury for managers to use to promote the reelection of
Senator Claghorn if they liked. Five percent of the corporation’s $1
million expenditure ($50,000) was attributable to Mr. Hyde’s share of
these funds. This cash bought Mr. Hyde more than his fair share of
clout. 205
One can appropriately presume an identity of interest between
corporate managers and shareholders. (If one couldn’t, protecting
shareholders from the use of their funds to support candidates they
oppose would supply a strong reason for forbidding political spending by
corporations. 206) The candidates backed by a corporation are likely to be
the same candidates its shareholders support through their own
contributions. Many shareholders are likely to give enough as individuals
that allowing them to provide additional support through their
corporations would send their contributions beyond the limit.
This Article will propose a mechanism for allowing political
203

Id.
The Court’s distinction expresses this intuition in a considerably milder form
than the bumper sticker. It treats the money a speaker uses to bring speech to an
audience (the speaker’s own expenditures) like speech itself, and it treats writing a
check to the speaker, not as non-speech, but as low-value speech. The Court
nevertheless agrees with its bumper-sticker critics that the First Amendment does not
protect check writing as much as it protects full-fledged speech.
205
For one thing, Mr. Hyde had more clout than his equally wealthy twin sister, a
strong proponent of widget control. Mr. Hyde’s sister had invested her wealth, not in a
business corporation, but in art and precious metals. The law blocked her from
contributing more than other individuals could contribute.
206
See FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)
(recognizing the government’s interest in protecting “individuals who have paid money
into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from
having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed”);
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (same); but see Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 362 (observing that the procedures of corporate democracy allow shareholders to
protect their interests).
204

[August 27, 2014]

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

contributions and expenditures through corporations, unions, and other
groups while ensuring individual compliance with contribution caps. If
neither this mechanism nor an alternative seems workable, however, the
bumper sticker’s bottom line begins to look good: corporate contributions
and expenditures should be forbidden. If the answer must be either yes or
no, it should be no.
The reason the bumper sticker gets it partly right is again the opposite
of the reason it gives. No objection in principle to corporate electoral
expenditures is persuasive. People should be allowed to contribute as
much through unions and corporations as they can as individuals. But
they should not be allowed to contribute more. Contributions and
expenditures by corporations allow their shareholders to give when
everyone else has been required to stop. Piercing the veil exposes the
double counting. Mr. Hyde and the Jeckyll Corporation turn out to be the
same person. 207
Neither the majority nor the dissenters in Citizens United mentioned
the government interest in preventing the circumvention of individual
contribution limits. The government’s briefs never asked the Court to
consider this interest. Seven years before Citizens United, however, in
FEC v. Beaumont, 208 the Supreme Court relied in part on the anticircumvention interest when it upheld Congress’s prohibition of
corporate campaign contributions. Although the Court spoke only of
contributions and not expenditures, its analysis had implications for both:
Quite apart from war-chest corruption and the interests of
contributors and owners, . . . another reason for regulating
corporate electoral involvement has emerged with
restrictions on individual contributions, and recent cases
have recognized that restricting contributions by various
organizations hedges against their use as conduits for
“circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.” To the
degree that a corporation could contribute to political
candidates, the individuals “who created it, who own it, or
whom it employs,” could exceed the bounds on their own
contributions by diverting money through the corporation .
. . . 209

207

Cf. L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 183 (1900) (“[T]hey saw,
in just the spot the screen had hidden, a little old man, with a bald head and a wrinkled
face, who seemed to be as much surprised as they were.”)
208
539 U.S. 146 (2003).
209
Id. at 155 (internal citations omitted).
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Citizens United should not be read as rejecting Beaumont’s analysis or as
resolving an issue the Supreme Court did not consider.
b. Other Regulations
Just as corporate contributions and expenditures provide a way
around contribution limits, they provide a way around other
regulations—in particular, the BCRA’s disclosure requirements 210 and its
prohibition of contributions by foreign nationals. 211
Wealthy individuals responded to SpeechNow by forming shell
corporations whose only purpose was to make multi-million dollar
contributions to super PACs—contributions whose human sources these
donors wished to conceal. 212 And although federal law bars Kim Jong-un,
the Supreme Leader of North Korea, from contributing to Senator
Claghorn’s reelection campaign, nothing blocks his investment in a
corporation likely to use its funds to support the senator. 213 If, like Mr.
Hyde, the Supreme Leader owned 5% of the publically traded Jeckyll
Corporation, he would effectively have contributed $50,000 to Senator
Claghorn’s campaign. 214
The critics of Citizens United and the defenders of this decision again
resemble the blind men describing the elephant. The critics fail to see the
legitimate interests of the human beings behind the corporate veil while
210

See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3).
See 2 U.S.C. § 441e.
212
See text at notes supra. See generally Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and
Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011).
213
Kim Jong-un may not himself participate in the “decision making process” that
produces a corporation’s political expenditures. See 11 C.F.R. 110.20(i).
214
Although Citizens United did not discuss using corporations to circumvent the
BCRA’s base limits, it did note the possibility of circumventing the BCRA’s prohibition
of contributions by foreign nationals:
211

We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling
interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing
our Nation’s political process. Section 441b is not limited to corporations
or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded
predominantly by foreign shareholders. Section 441b therefore would be
overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a
compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362. The Court did not explain its apparent assumption that
only corporations created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreign
shareholders pose a risk of circumvention. If the Court would uphold § 441b’s
application to corporations funded in part by foreign shareholders, few if any publically
traded corporations could make electoral expenditures.
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the defenders fail to see the ways in which the people behind this veil can
use the corporate form to evade appropriate regulation. Once more both
sides have been wrong and both right.
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
A. John Hart Ely’s Variation on a Theme by O’Brien
This Article has maintained that campaign contributions and
expenditures combine valued speech and corrupting gifts in a single
package. The Supreme Court’s leading decision on hybrids of protected
speech and unprotected conduct is United States v. O’Brien, 215 in which
the Court upheld the convictions of war protestors for destroying their
draft cards. It said:
[W]hen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech elements
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. . . . [A] government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 216
As John Hart Ely observed, the distinction between speech and
conduct does not fully capture what made O’Brien distinct from most
other First Amendment cases. 217 Arguments for limiting speech usually
focus on the message a speaker delivers. They maintain that this message
deceives, defames, persuades listeners to harm others, prompts violent
retaliation, offends unwilling audiences, injures some audiences
(particularly children), and/or generates long-range cultural harm.
215

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 376-77.
217
See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1491-1502 (1975). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
829-30 (2d ed. 1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW.
U.L. REV. 237, 242 (1978).
216
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The First Amendment creates strong barriers to limiting speech
because its message offends or injures. When the harm produced by
speech does not proceed from its message, however, Ely maintained that a
strong presumption against regulation is inappropriate. The important
distinction is not between speech and conduct but between harms
produced by a speaker’s message and harms that do not proceed from this
message. The Supreme Court came closer to the mark when it spoke of a
“government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression”218
than when it spoke of conduct that combines “speech” and “nonspeech”
elements. 219 The corrupting influence of campaign funds on a candidate
does not depend on the message these funds send the public. 220
B. Can Campaign Speeches be Hybrids Too?
As this article has noted, conflicts of interest are ubiquitous. Conflicts
can arise from any favor, including one that takes the form of verbal
speech. A president’s campaign appearances with a candidate, for
example, might create a stronger sense of indebtedness than a $50,000
contribution to the candidate’s campaign. An influential labor leader
might endorse a candidate partly to curry the candidate’s favor.
Although speeches endorsing a candidate can combine protected
speech with unprotected clout buying, endorsement speeches merit
categorical protection. 221 These speeches differ from campaign
contributions and expenditures in several ways, and when balancing could
not justify restriction, there is no reason to do it.
218

O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 376.
220
Of course campaign contributions would have no value to a candidate if the
messages they sent could not persuade a larger audience. That proposition would be true
even of contributions given in return for explicit promises of favorable government
action—contributions that could lead to 15-year sentences for bribery. See McCormick
v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); 18 U.S.C. § 201. Hardly anyone would argue that
the harm worked by a bribe given in the form of a campaign contribution proceeds from
or has anything to do with the message to the public the bribe may be used to send.
221
The Supreme Court, however, has upheld a restriction of purely verbal political
speech simply because this speech might prompt the sort of favoritism that campaign
contributions generate. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), the
Court upheld a provision of the Hatch Act that bars executive branch employees other
than the president and other high-level officials from engaging in partisan political
activity. The challengers of this provision argued that the justifications offered for it did
not extend to a federal employee who worked as a “roller in the mint” and neither
interacted with the public nor determined policy. The Court replied, “[I]f in free time he
is engaged in political activity, Congress may have concluded that the activity may
promote or retard his advancement or preferment with his superiors.” Id. at 101.
219
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First, forbidding an endorsement speech would require someone who
favors a candidate to keep his thoughts secret and would deprive the
public of important information. 222 Campaign finance regulation does not
require anyone to conceal his thoughts or suppress relevant information.
Second (a related point), the only way to block the conflicts of interest
created by endorsement speeches is to forbid them. The conflicts created
by campaign contributions and expenditures can be controlled without
forbidding them altogether. Outlawing them would in fact be
unconstitutional.
Third, even on the implausible assumption that some conflicts of
interest could justify forbidding endorsement speeches, no legislator or
judge could be trusted with the task of determining which speeches pose a
sufficient danger. With campaign contributions and expenditures, no ad
hoc evaluation is necessary. Lawgivers can use the metric provided by
money to mark the point at which the likelihood of serious conflicts
justifies limiting speech. They can draw a bright, workable line to
separate the contributions and expenditures that merit protection from
those that do not.
Finally, the sense that gifts of money are more corrupting than other
favors seems pervasive. This sentiment may inform both the bumpersticker declaration that money is not speech and the Supreme Court’s
judgment that the First Amendment protects campaign contributions less
than other speech.
The law of bribery in fact distinguishes payments of cash (and of
goods and services with ascertainable market value) from nonmonetizable personal and political favors. Offering cash to a legislator for
his vote is bribery, and so is offering him free yard service for a year. But
logrolling—offering to support a proposed bridge in exchange for a
legislator’s support of widget subsidies—is not bribery. The statement,
“I’ll contribute to your campaign if you agree to support widget
subsidies,” is likely to send the speaker to prison. 223 No one, however, has
gone to prison for saying, “I’ll make public speeches on your behalf if
you agree to support widget subsidies.” 224
222

An endorsement speech supplies information about the speaker’s state of mind.
Only the person who makes the endorsement can supply the information it provides.
223
See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). The supposed bribe that
led to the imprisonment of Don Siegelman, a former governor of Alabama now serving
a 6½-year term, consisted of a contribution to a group supporting a referendum he
favored. Possibly pursuant an understanding that preceded the contribution, the
governor appointed the contributor to a state board. See United States v. Siegelman, 640
F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011).
224
Cf. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding that a prosecutor did not violate a federal bribery statute by offering leniency to
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C. How Deeply Did Buckley Bury O’Brien?
When the D.C. Circuit decided Buckley v. Valeo, it declared that
O’Brien provided “the pertinent standard” for reviewing campaign
finance regulations. 225 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the D.C.
Circuit and declared this standard inapplicable.
The D.C. Circuit offered and the Supreme Court considered only one
argument for applying O’Brien—“that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.” 226 As the Court noted, this argument would have made
O’Brien the relevant standard for judging a limitation of the funds that
may be used to publish a newspaper. It would have afforded less
protection to the spending needed to bring speech to an audience than to
the speech itself.
The Court failed to notice that campaign contributions and
expenditures differ from the funds used to publish a newspaper. As this
Article has observed more than a few times, these contributions and
expenditures affect two audiences in two different ways, one of them
beneficial and protected by the First Amendment and the other harmful
and unprotected. Buckley should not be read as rejecting an argument the
Court did not consider.
I do not love the O’Brien standard. Just as some of the language of
Citizens United might lead the Supreme Court to protect $10 million
contributions, 227 some of O’Brien’s language might allow legislatures to
prohibit $200 contributions. 228 When speech is combined with conduct
a criminal defendant in return for his testimony against an alleged co-conspirator).
225
See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
226
Id. at 16.
227
See text at notes supra.
228
The O’Brien standard has four parts. See 397 U.S. at 376-77.
First, a regulation of speech-conduct must be “within the constitutional power of
government.” Of course all legislation must be within the constitutional power of
government. Whether a regulation falls within the limited powers granted the federal
government is a different question from whether it violates the First Amendment. This
portion of the test has no purpose except to sound grand.
Second, the regulation must “further an important or substantial governmental
interest.” Prohibiting a $200 campaign contribution does further a substantial
governmental interest—the same interest that has led federal and state governments to
prohibit $200 gratuities to public officials.
Third, the government interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. As argued in the text, it is.
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(or, better, when it produces harms unrelated to the message it sends), an
open, un-tilted balance would be better. Nevertheless, courts should
recognize that large political contributions do combine speech with
conduct or, in the language proposed by John Hart Ely, that the harm
these contributions produce is unrelated to the message they deliver. 229
O’Brien holds that acts combining “speech” and “nonspeech”
elements are subject to restriction upon a showing of “an important or
substantial governmental interest.” 230 Under Buckley, the standard of
justification for restricting campaign contributions is similar—a
“sufficiently important interest.” 231 Recognizing the relevance of O’Brien
would be unlikely to affect the Supreme Court’s analysis of campaign
contributions, but it might alter the Court’s analysis of independent
electoral expenditures.
This Article focuses on contributions. It proposes no restriction of
independent expenditures. The remainder of this Article will consider
only how best to apply the Supreme Court’s current standards.
VII. A PROPOSED SCHEME OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
A. Tracking Individual Contributions
According to Buckley, a constitutional regime of campaign finance
regulation may not restrict independent expenditures by either individuals
or groups. According to Citizens United, such a regime may not limit
expenditures on the basis of corporate identity. According to
McCutcheon, aggregate contribution limits are generally impermissible;
an individual must be allowed to contribute the maximum amount to
every candidate in every race.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld limits on
what an individual may contribute to particular candidates, and it has
Fourth, the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms must be no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government’s interest. The only way to
eliminate conflicts of interest is to forbid conflicts of interest.
Perhaps the O’Brien standard is flexible enough that a court could apply it
differently. Especially as applied to campaign finance regulation, however, this test
seems insufficiently protective of expression.
229
As Buckley noted, one harm allegedly produced by large campaign
contributions—the distortion of election results—may not be independent of the
messages the contributions deliver. See Buckley, 434 U.S. at 17. With that possible harm
set aside, however, the justification for limiting these contributions does not focus on
the messages they deliver.
230
See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
231
See Buckley, 434 U.S. at 30.
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held that measures necessary to enforce these limits are valid as well.
Justice Thomas would overrule these precedents, but, in McCutcheon,
every other justice proceeded on the assumption that base contribution
limits and suitably tailored anti-circumvention measures remain valid.
Campaign finance regulations consistent with these principles would
allow individuals and groups to make independent expenditures without
restriction. These regulations, however, might limit the amount an
individual could contribute to any entity in order to influence the
outcome of a single election. 232 Within this limit, the regulations might
allow an individual to allocate his contributions as he liked among
whatever groups he liked—campaign committees, party committees,
PACs, super PACs, non-profit corporations, for-profit corporations,
partnerships, unions, and even biker gangs and churches.
The organizations’ ability to accept contributions and make electoral
expenditures would be subject to one limitation. They would be required
to provide an accounting of which individuals had provided the funds
they spent and how the funds each individual had contributed had been
allocated to particular races.
An individual could authorize as many organizations as he liked to
spend his funds but could not authorize them to spend more together to
influence any race than the law allowed. His failure to limit the use of his
funds to comply with contribution limits would be subject to sanction,
and so would an organization’s failure to observe limits it had accepted
on the use of a contributor’s funds.
People whose total contributions would not exceed the limit for a
single race (most people) would have no difficulty allocating their
contributions among as many organizations as they liked. Their
contributions could be unrestricted. Moreover, a wealthy donor who
wished to contribute the maximum amount to, say, every Democratic
candidate for federal office could do so, either by contributing this
amount to every candidate himself or by making a large contribution to a
party organization that would allocate his funds. 233
Other wealthy donors might make more elaborate arrangements. A
donor, for example, might contribute the maximum amount to the
candidates he most wished to support and then make an additional
232
Unlike current election law, which limits the amount an individual may
contribute to a group engaged in electioneering, the proposal would limit what an
individual may contribute to influence the outcome of a particular election.
233
McCutcheon rejected the argument that a multi-million-dollar contribution to a
party organization or other group supporting multiple candidates itself poses a danger of
quid pro quo corruption. The plurality called this argument a “new” rationale for
aggregate limits and said that it “dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of
quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460.
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contribution to a party committee or other political group (say, the
Widget Rights Victory Fund) with instructions to use his funds to support
any candidates other than those to whom he had already given. Or he
might contribute to two political groups with instructions to each of them
not to use his funds to give to any single candidate more than 50% of the
maximum an individual might contribute. Conceivably he might instruct
a group not to allocate any of his funds to a candidate without checking
the public record of his contributions to be sure that doing so would not
send his contributions beyond the limit. 234 A computer could flag
unlawful allocations and contributions.
Although the proposed scheme would not have been feasible prior to
the computer era, it seems feasible today. Nevertheless, this scheme does
pose administrative difficulties. The following sections of this Article
will discuss some of these difficulties and also the need to exempt some
communications and expenditures from the proposed regulations.
B. Tracking the Money Coming In
Many organizations cannot trace expenditures from their general
treasuries to particular funding sources. The ownership of a publically
traded corporation, for example, changes day by day, and many of its
shareholders are likely to be collective entities themselves. Moreover, if a
publically traded corporation could determine which individuals owned it
at the moment it made a particular electoral expenditure, it undoubtedly
would find that some of these people had contributed the maximum
amount to whatever candidate it supported.
Should the managers of an organization like the Jeckyll Corporation
be allowed to find shareholders who have not contributed to Senator
Claghorn’s campaign and, with their permission, allocate the
corporation’s expenditure on the senator’s behalf to their allowances?
The difficulty is that the corporation’s expenditure would not reduce
these shareholders’ wealth by the amount of their supposed contribution.
This expenditure would instead diminish the value of every share of the
corporation—probably by a trivial amount. 235 The corporation’s
234

The feasibility of this arrangement would depend on whether expenditures could
be reported when they were made rather than at the conclusion of a reporting period.
There is no apparent reason why a group making expenditures could not update the
public record at the same time it updated its own. The public record then would provide
a running tally of an individual’s contributions to particular candidates. See 2 U.S.C. §
434 (a)(12)(A) (contemplating a computerized tally for contributions made directly to
candidate committees).
235
If Senator Claghorn were to win reelection and then vote for widget subsidies,
the investment in his reelection might prove profitable—just as a contribution by an
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expenditure on Senator Claghorn’s behalf would proceed from all of its
owners, many of whom might have “maxed out.”
When the accounting required by the proposed scheme would disable
an organization from making electoral expenditures from its general
treasury, it could establish a separate political action committee to
receive, spend, and account for individual contributions. An organization
could pay the administrative expenses of its PAC and could control the
PAC’s expenditures and contributions.
Proposing the use of PACs may sound both familiar and
unpromising. Citizens United held that the ability of corporations to
establish PACs did not justify Congress’s prohibition of corporate
speech. It noted that a PAC is distinct from its creator, and it added,
“PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and
subject to extensive regulations.” 236 The Court recited many of the
regulations applicable to PACs without indicating what, if any, purpose
they might serve.
The scheme proposed by this Article, however, differs from the one
struck down in Citizens United. It would not prohibit speech on the basis
of corporate identity. Any corporation that could comply with the
scheme’s accounting requirements could make political expenditures
from its treasury, and some business corporations (those that could in fact
attribute expenditures to individual owners) might do so. In addition,
most of the political organizations that tracked individual contributions
undoubtedly would be organized as corporations.
Moreover, the burdens imposed by this scheme’s accounting
requirements would serve a clear and important purpose. They would
provide a more straightforward anti-circumvention mechanism than the
aggregate limits struck down in McCutcheon. They would in fact
constitute the less restrictive alternative McCutcheon demanded. No
more direct way of forbidding the circumvention of contribution limits
can be imagined than forbidding the circumvention of contribution limits.
A court could not strike down the proposed tracking requirements
without abandoning the idea of enforceable contribution limits and
without overruling decades of precedent.
Although Citizens United permitted large business corporations to
make independent electoral expenditures from their general treasuries,
they have shown no interest in doing so. 237 The fact that the proposal
individual donor might prove profitable. The ultimate profitability or unprofitability of a
contribution (that is, whether the contribution ultimately turned out to be funded by us
taxpayers) does not bear on who made it for purposes of election law.
236
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 338.
237
See text at note supra.
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would effectively require these corporations (along with churches and
many other organizations that cannot trace expenditures to particular
funding sources) to use separate PACs would not change much, but it
might reassure Citizens United’s critics.
The proposed scheme might reassure these critics in other ways as
well. It would bring the demise of the alter-ego super PAC (a PAC
formed simply to further a single candidacy). Such a PAC serves no
purpose other than facilitating the evasion of contribution limits. With
these limits enforced, almost every donor would prefer to make his
donation directly to a candidate. Similarly, the scheme would bring an
end to the shadow-party super PAC (a PAC formed to further the
interests of a particular party). Again almost everyone would prefer to
make his contribution to the real thing.
PACs furthering special interests like the Widget Rights Victory
Fund would persist, but they would no longer enable a few wealthy
people to pour millions of dollars into particular races. A special interest
PAC could swamp its opposition in a particular race only if it received
support from a large number of donors.
While allaying the concerns of Citizens United’s critics, the proposal
would satisfy all of the constitutional requirements articulated by the
Supreme Court. Individuals would be allowed to make unlimited
electoral expenditures, 238 and group expenditures also would be
unrestricted. As long as a group provided assurance that individual
donors had adhered to their own limits, it could spend as much as it could
collect. The proposal would not restrict speech on the basis of corporate
identity, and it would not impose an aggregate limit on contributions.
Anyone with sufficient wealth could contribute the maximum amount to
every candidate.
C. Tracking the Money Going Out
Under the proposal, a group that distributed an electoral
communication urging voters to support multiple candidates in multiple
races (“vote Republican” or “support these pro-widget candidates”)
would be required to apportion the cost of producing and distributing this
communication among the candidates. If the communication featured
some candidates more prominently than others, the group might be
required to apportion costs on the basis of the airtime or print space
allocated to each.
Apportioning a group’s general administrative expenses among the
238

For a discussion of whether these expenditures would greatly reduce the value of
the scheme, see text at notes infra.
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candidates it supported (and between the group’s electoral and nonelectoral activities) also might be necessary, 239 but the effectiveness of
the scheme would not be greatly diminished if these expenses were
exempted from contribution limits and tracking requirements.
D. Exemptions
The proposed regime of campaign finance regulation would be
unconstitutional without at least one exemption. Its restrictions should
not apply to the funds used to produce and disseminate “any news story,
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any
broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication.” 240 A newspaper publisher should be allowed to print an
editorial endorsing a candidate without supplying an account of how
much the publication cost and what each of the newspaper’s shareholders
had contributed to this expenditure.
The exemption of the institutional press from campaign finance
regulations would not rest on an interpretation of the First Amendment
that afforded the press special privileges. It would rest instead on the
factual differences between editorial endorsements and the electoral
communications that warrant restriction. 241
239

The proration of general administrative expenses seems feasible. See Carey v.
FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that a single group may operate as
both a conventional PAC and a super PAC if it segregates the funds it uses for
contributions to candidates from those it uses to place advertisements of its own and if it
apportions administrative expenses between these two activities).
240
The suggested language comes from a statutory exemption to the regulations
that Citizens United struck down. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(ii)(B)(i). A publication owned or
controlled by a political party, PAC, or candidate was not entitled to this exemption. Id.
241
Michael McConnell’s recent defense of the result in Citizens United consisted of
two propositions: (1) The First Amendment affords a newspaper publisher the right to
print an editorial endorsing a candidate; and (2) the First Amendment affords no greater
right to the newspaper publisher than to the rest of us, including the plaintiff in Citizens
United. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case,
123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013).
The Citizens United dissenters briefly questioned the second proposition. They
wrote that when corporations “are part of the press,” they may be entitled to “special
First Amendment status.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority responded, “‘We have consistently rejected the proposition that the
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.’” Id. at
352 (majority opinion) (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
McConnell and the Citizens United majority had the better of this argument. The
First Amendment affords all of us the right to speak and publish. It does not give the
pros special privileges. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of
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Although electoral advocacy is what campaign committees and super
PACs do, it is a small part of what most regularly published newspapers
and television stations do. Because electoral advocacy is central to the
mission of campaign committees and super PACs, wealthy people
contribute to these organizations in the hope of gaining influence over
elected officials. Wealthy people rarely buy newspapers or television
stations because they consider owning these outlets the best way to gain
the favor of public officials. Newspaper publishers are much less likely
than super PAC contributors to be clout seekers.
Moreover, newspaper endorsements generally evaluate a candidate’s
stands on many issues. They usually are unaccompanied by an indication
of a personal or organizational interest they hope the favored candidate
will support. A newspaper publisher is unlikely to follow an editorial
endorsement with a request for a meeting so that it can urge the candidate
it endorsed to take an action it favors. The publisher is also unlikely to
hire a lobbyist. A newspaper’s endorsements differ greatly in both
purpose and effect from the advertisements placed by campaign
committees and super PACs.
Feature films, books, and monographs (defined, perhaps, as written
communications of more than 10,000 words or spoken or film
communications of longer than 70 minutes) also might be exempted from
campaign finance regulations. During the initial argument of Citizens
United, a deputy solicitor general responded to questions from the bench
by saying that a corporation could be prohibited from publishing a book
if the book’s last sentence endorsed a candidate. This answer did not
advance his cause. 242
Even without an exemption for books, films, and monographs, the
regulatory scheme proposed in this Article would not prohibit anyone
from publishing anything. It would merely limit how much an individual
could contribute to a group for the purpose of publishing books and other
things that qualified as electoral communications.
There would be almost as little reason, however, to restrict the
financing of books, feature films, and monographs as to restrict the
publication of newspapers. The suggested scheme would remain effective
the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. . . . [It] comprehends every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of the
Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all
persons in their right to print what they will as well as utter it.”).
The speech of all of us, however, is subject to restriction when it poses a sufficient
danger of corrupting public officials. Large contributions to candidates and super PACs
pose a sufficient danger; newspaper editorials do not.
242
See Toobin, supra note (describing counsel’s argument as “an epic disaster”).
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if it reached only more familiar sorts of campaign communications—
broadcast and print advertisements, billboards and other signs, direct
mailings, and pamphlets or recordings distributed on the street or doorto-door. Books, films, and monographs ordinarily are distributed to
purchasers and/or others who have indicated an interest in receiving their
messages. Because effective electioneering requires reaching less
involved audiences, political campaigns rely almost entirely on other
media. 243
E. Independent Expenditures
Daniel Ortiz has observed that the distinction between campaign
contributions and independent expenditures is the most troubling and
most often criticized aspect of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence. 244 Michael McConnell has commented that this distinction
“pleases no one.” 245 Six justices of the Supreme Court would in fact
abandon the distinction. Because three of them would abolish it by
increasing the protections afforded contributions and three would abolish
it by reducing the protections afforded expenditures, however, the
distinction persists. 246
Although the Supreme Court’s arguments for distinguishing
contributions from expenditures may not convince many, 247 the
distinction expresses the common intuition that writing a check is less
worthy of protection than actually speaking. 248 It also marks in a rough
way where serious conflicts of interest are likely to arise. It is the checkwriters, not the speakers or the spenders, who may have given America its
intricate tax code, its sugar subsidies, its armaments approved by
Congress despite opposition by the Pentagon, and a public health care
system that accommodates the interests of pharmaceutical and insurance

243

Other exemptions from the scheme might be designed to reduce its
administrative burdens. For example, a group whose treasury included individual
membership dues of no more than, say, $75 per year should not be required to include
these dues in its account of individual contributions.
244
Daniel R. Ortiz, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study: From Rights to
Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1999).
245
See McConnell, supra note , at 451.
246
See id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 337, 409-10 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.);
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491-92 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.)).
247
See text at notes infra (reviewing these arguments and noting that all but one of
them apply equally to super PAC contributions).
248
See text at supra.
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companies as well as the public. 249
This section will consider how to draw the line between contributions
and expenditures. It then will consider whether independent expenditures
would seriously diminish the effectiveness of the proposed regulatory
scheme.
1. Drawing the Line
The distinction between contributions and expenditures rests on the
premise that financing speech differs from speaking. The financing may
be restricted even when the speech may not. When Person A writes a
check and Person B determines what speech the check will finance,
Person A’s activity may be limited, but Person B’s may not. As the
plurality opinion observed in California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 250
“‘[S]peech by proxy’ . . . is not the sort of political advocacy that this
Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection.” 251
The Supreme Court has not indicated how much separation between
financier and speaker is necessary before the financier’s activity may be
restricted. Under Buckley’s analysis, a wealthy person’s purchase of space
in a newspaper to publish his own list of reasons for supporting a
candidate would be a paradigmatic independent expenditure and would be
fully protected. Moreover, his expenditure would remain independent and
protected if other people joined him in composing the list and buying the
space. Something more than writing a check to a group is required,
however, and the “something more” probably cannot be merely symbolic
(something like filling out a questionnaire that super PAC managers might
or might not take into account). When “[t]he transformation of
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor,” Buckley indicates the contributions may be limited. 252
Assessing the degree of separation between speaker and financier on a
highly fact-specific basis would be impractical. A wealthy person might
pay a veteran campaign operative to write and place advertisements
supporting a candidate and might give this person funds to spend as he
chose. If the financier did not supervise the work of this operative at all,
he would look like a contributor rather than a speaker. He would have
funded “speech by someone other than” himself. If, however, the
campaign veteran served only as an advisor to the wealthy person, the
249

The political operatives who collect and spend donated funds rarely seek more
for themselves than new political jobs.
250
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
251
Id. at 196.
252
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
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wealthy person’s expenditures would remain independent. Drawing the
line between contribution and expenditure by determining which person
was the “real” speaker does not seem feasible.
A more workable system would resolve the separation issue
formally. Under this regime, any use of a person or legal entity other than
the financier himself to make an expenditure would put his spending in
the “contribution” rather than the “expenditure” category. If the financier
ultimately made the expenditures himself, he could hire as many people
as he liked to help him prepare and disseminate his messages. The
financier, however, would be required to take public responsibility for
these messages: “I’m Pierpont Mogul, and I approved this message.” 253
2. How Big is the Loophole?
a. Groups
If the amount individuals could contribute to organizations to
influence the outcome of particular elections were effectively limited,
limiting expenditures by the organizations themselves would serve no
important purpose.
Without accepting any contributions, the National Widget Association
or its PAC could advise members to include reminders of their association
membership when they sent their individual checks. It also could advise
them where their contributions would be most likely to advance the cause
of widget rights. 254 Forbidding the Association to accept, bundle, and
spend its members’ contributions would merely make members who
sought to coordinate their contributions less efficient in doing so.
A cap on the Widget Association’s expenditures, moreover, would not
notably impede its members’ ability to coordinate their contributions. It
simply would lead to the formation of a second PAC to receive and spend
the contributions the first PAC could not spend. Little would be gained by
253

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-68 (upholding disclosure requirements); Citizens
United, 358 U.S. at 366-71 (same). Nothing would prevent a financier from acting
jointly with others, but each of the joint actors would be required to take responsibility
as an individual for the group’s message. If these actors were to form a distinct legal
entity to make their expenditures, they would all become contributors, and their
contributions would be subject to reasonable limitation.
254
The first political action committee made no political contributions. This
committee, which the CIO formed in 1944, simply urged union members to contribute
to President Roosevelt’s reelection campaign. See Manny Calavera, The Effectiveness of
Corporate PAC Expenditures and Their Role in the Legislative Process, YAHOO
VOICES, Apr. 13, 2007, http://voices.yahoo.com/the-effectiveness-corporate-pacexpenditures-and-283948.html?cat=37.
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mandating the formation of two groups, the National Widget Association
Political Action Committee and the Widget Rights Victory Fund.
b. Individuals
Dissenting in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee 255 eight years after Buckley, Justice Marshall confessed that he
had erred in Buckley when he endorsed the distinction between
contributions and expenditures. He wrote:
It does not take great imagination . . . to see that, when the
possibility for direct financial assistance is severely limited, as
it is in light of Buckley’s decision to uphold the contribution
limitation, . . . an individual [seeking favor] will find other
ways to financially benefit the candidate’s campaign. It simply
belies reality to say that a campaign will not reward massive
financial assistance provided in the only way that is legally
available. 256
The Supreme Court later observed in McConnell v. FEC, “Money, like
water, will always find an outlet.” 257
Experience, however, has not validated the hydraulic hypothesis. 258
Justice Marshall provided no illustrations of clout-seeking individuals
who had made “massive” individual expenditures to evade contribution
limits, and illustrations are almost as rare today. 259
Two other ways around contribution limits, both antedating Citizens
United, might have made independent expenditures by individuals
unnecessary. Unlike independent expenditures, donations to 527 and
255

470 U.S. 480 (1984).
Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
257
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
258
But see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) ("First, we think political money,
like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air. Second, we
think political money, like water, is part of a broader ecosystem.").
259
Don Blankenship, the chairman and chief executive officer of the Massey Coal
Company, did spend $500,000 from his own pocket to influence the outcome of a West
Virginia judicial election, but he donated five times more—$2.5 million—to a PAC to
influence the same election. See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868
(2009); text at notes infra. I am unaware of anyone other than Blankenship who has
made a $500,000 independent expenditure to support a candidacy other than his own,
and a candidate who uses his own wealth to advance his campaign does not corrupt
himself. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54 (striking down a statutory limit on independent
expenditures by candidates).
256
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501(c)(4) groups demanded no more of a favor seeker than that he write a
check. 260 A check to one of these groups, however, was likely to be less
effective than a check to an official campaign committee in producing
clout. 261 Before Citizens United, money given to either sort of group could
not be used to advocate a candidate’s election directly; the group was
required to cast its advocacy as commentary on a political issue. 262 And
half of the money given to a 501(c)(4) group could not be used even for
issue advertisements if they were intended to influence an election. 263
Citizens United and SpeechNow cast aside the limitations of earlier
work-arounds. These decisions together created a new way of evading
contribution limits that did not differ much from blowing up the limits
altogether. And after SpeechNow came the deluge.
The enormous increase in large individual contributions that followed
SpeechNow revealed that campaign finance law makes a difference. 264
The amount of political money devoted to influence buying is not fixed.
Some loopholes are larger than others. Before Citizens United and
SpeechNow, some cynics pointed to leakage and called the dam useless.
They were proven to have exaggerated when SpeechNow demolished the
dam.
Independent expenditures are a particularly unlikely and unattractive
work-around. Even someone willing to write a $10 million check to a
super PAC probably would balk when invited to support a campaign by
using the same funds to hire and manage a satellite campaign staff of his
own and by taking personal responsibility for the messages it sent. If
(remarkably) this financier did agree to make independent personal
260

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 527 & 501(c)(4).
It was also likely to be less effective in persuading the public.
262
During John Kerry’s 2004 presidential campaign, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth
registered as a 527 group. The Federal Election Commission later concluded, however,
that it did not qualify and had violated election laws by failing to observe contribution
limits. See Federal Election Commission, Press Release: FEC Collects $630,000 in
Civil
Penalties
from
Three
527
Organizations,
Dec.
16,
2006,
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006/20061213murs.html. Today, following Citizens
United and SpeechNow, there are no limits. A group like Swift Boat Veterans for Truth
would have no reason to mask its electoral purpose even slightly.
263
501(c)(4) or “dark money” groups are tax-exempt organizations whose earnings
are devoted to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes. See 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(4). The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that these groups may “intervene in
political campaigns as long as [their] primary activity is the promotion of social
welfare.” INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 7.25.4.7. Like the super PACs that devote all of
their efforts and funds to campaigning, 501(c)(4) groups may operate as “independent
expenditure groups.” When they do, SpeechNow allows them to collect and spend
unlimited amounts supporting and opposing candidates. Unlike PACs and 527 groups,
501(c)(4) groups need not report publically the identity of their contributors.
264
See text at notes supra.
261
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expenditures on behalf of a candidate, one of the dubious things Buckley
said about these expenditures might become true: “Unlike contributions, .
. . independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.” 265
Although independent expenditures provide a path around individual
contribution limits, few contributors would be likely to take it.
VIII. CONCEPTS OF CORRUPTION 266
A. Two-Part Typologies
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court noted that Buckley v. Valeo
had treated only one interest as “sufficiently important” to justify a
restriction of campaign contributions—“the prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption.” 267 The Court added, “When Buckley
identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to
quid pro quo corruption.” 268
The Court explained what quid pro quo corruption is not.
“Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption,” 269 it said. “The fact that
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not
mean that these officials are corrupt.” 270 The Court also offered a positive
definition: “The practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery
laws if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved.” 271 This sentence
indicated that quid pro quo corruption meant bribery and nothing else.
265

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. Living rooms in battleground states might resound with
the voices of George Soros, Sheldon Adelson, and Charles and David Koch (in unison)
noting their approval of political advertisements.
266
The Supreme Court allows limitations of speech in order to reduce either
corruption or the appearance of corruption, and the word appearance has myriad
meanings. See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1563 (2012). Presumably the appearance of corruption is not “anything that smells
a bit like corruption”; it is instead “something that is believed or suspected to be
corruption.” Moreover, the corruption that is suspected must be of the kind that justifies
regulation, and an unreasonable belief or suspicion in the existence of this corruption
probably cannot justify limiting speech. The appropriate remedy for an unfounded belief
is usually “more speech.” Thus the appearance of corruption probably means
“something that is reasonably believed or suspected to be corruption of the sort that
justifies regulation” or “something that might in fact be corruption of the sort that
justifies regulation.”
267
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
268
Id. at 909.
269
Id.
270
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
271
Id. at 908 (citation to 18 U.S.C. § 201, a federal bribery statute, omitted).
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Corruption in its classic sense describes something that has become
impure or perverted. When people speak of corrupted computer files and
corrupted chemical solutions, for example, they do not mean that the
computer files and chemical solutions take bribes.
Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers spoke of corrupted
government in a similar way. Corruption meant departure from an
imagined state of perfection. Corruption was a matter of degree, not yes
or no, and every real-world government was to some degree corrupt. 272
Aristotle described the most common type of corruption: “The true
forms of government . . . are those in which the one, the few, or the many
govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule
with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions.” 273 On the
assumption that a public official’s duty is to advance the public good,274
everything that diverts him from serving the public—every conflict of
interest—corrupts.
As Zephyr Teachout has shown, the framers of the Constitution often
used the word corruption in its classic sense. They regarded limiting the
corruption that arises from the private interests of both elected officials
and the voters who choose them as one of their central missions. 275
Today’s dictionaries, however, do not place the classic definition first
272

Richard Mulgan nicely develops this point in Richard Mulgan, Aristotle on
Legality and Corruption, in CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS 25 (Manuhuia
Barcham, Barry Hindess, and Peter Lamour, eds., 2012).
273
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 59 (Benjamin Jowett, tr.) (Forgotten Books ed. 2007).
274
Sadly, some theorists dismiss Aristotle’s concept of the public good. They not
only embrace pluralism as a description how American politics operates but also
romanticize group greed. An influential early work is ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE
PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES (1908).
275
See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341
(2009).
The Constitution structured the federal government to minimize the temptation and
ability of officials to subvert the public good. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 343
(Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (declaring that “the genius of the whole system”
would limit “legal discriminations in favor of . . . a particular class of the society”); 4
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 302 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (remarks of Charles Pinckney)
(“[C]orruption was more effectually guarded against, in the manner this government
was constituted, than in any other that had ever been formed.”).
In addition, the Constitution forbade a few specific conflicts of interest. It barred
the appointment of present and former members of Congress to offices that had been
created or whose compensation had been increased while they were in office, U.S.
CONST., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, and it prohibited office holders from accepting gifts or titles
“of any kind whatever” from kings, princes, and foreign governments without the
consent of Congress, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8. The foreign emoluments clause has
no exception for campaign contributions.
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on their list. Their first definition of corruption usually is: “guilty of
dishonest practices, as bribery; without integrity, crooked: a corrupt
judge.” 276
Scholars like Teachout and Lawrence Lessig have regarded the
Supreme Court’s distinction between quid pro quo corruption and all
other corruption as matching roughly the distinction between dishonestconduct corruption and classic corruption. 277 Further disaggregation,
however, might be instructive. Quid pro quo corruption is less than
classic corruption, but, despite a sentence in Citizens United that appears
to say the contrary, it might encompass more than bribery.
B. Understanding Quid Pro Quo Corruption
1. A Four-Part Typology
Consider four types of behavior the proponents of campaign finance
regulation might call corrupt—the explicit exchange of favorable
governmental action for campaign contributions (explicit agreement), the
implicit understanding that favorable action will follow contributions
(implicit agreement), the conscious taking of favorable action in response
to contributions without any prior agreement or understanding (conscious
favoritism), and affording gratitude and access to contributors without
consciously favoring them in making more substantial decisions
276

THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 302 (rev. ed. 1975); see OXFORD
DICTIONARIES
ONLINE
(U.S.
ENGLISH),
http//oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/corrupt?region=us (defining
corrupt as “having shown a willingness to act dishonestly in return for money”);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT 226 (“The ordinary meaning of corruption—at least when we’re speaking of
government officials, or public institutions—is clear enough. Corruption means
bribery.”).
277
Lessig distinguishes dishonest-conduct corruption from what he calls
“dependence corruption.” “Dependence corruption” looks a lot like classic corruption,
but it may not encompass everything that diverts public officials from advancing the
public good. It may refer only to substantial conflicts of interest that create long-term
dependencies. Lessig argues that the Framers of the Constitution intended elected
officials to be dependent only on the people. Today, he says, candidates must survive a
“money primary” and have become dependent on a narrow class of wealthy donors as
well. LESSIG, supra note , at 15-20, 230-47. See also Lawrence Lessig, What an
Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean: The 2013 Jorde Lecture, 102
L.
REV.
__
(2013)
(forthcoming);
“Corruption,”
originally,
CAL.
http://ocorruption.tumblr.com (undated: “a blog collecting every use of the term
‘corruption’ among the records of the Framers. Submitted to the Supreme Court as an
appendix to an amicus brief by Lawrence Lessig for the Constitutional Accountability
Center”).
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(preferential access).
Citizens United’s concept of quid pro quo corruption unmistakably
includes explicit agreement and unmistakably excludes preferential
access. It almost certainly includes implicit agreement as well. Whether it
includes conscious favoritism, however, is problematic. Although the
Court’s signals were conflicting, this Article will argue that the Court’s
concept of quid pro quo corruption should be understood to encompass
this favoritism. A public official who deliberately provides a
governmental benefit because he has received a private benefit should be
seen as returning “this for that” (or quid pro quo) despite the absence of
an earlier agreement to do so.
2. Preferential Access
Selling access is not good government. Aristotle and the Framers of
the Constitution would not have balked at calling it corrupt. As
Representative Romano Mazzoli observed, “Access is power. Access is
clout.” 278 Campaign contributors do not seek access simply because they
enjoy chatting. They seek it because it produces outcomes they like.
Officials cannot be persuaded by arguments they do not hear. Moreover,
it is difficult for officials to refuse the requests of people who have
placed them in office. Officials may strive earnestly to benefit the public,
but their unconscious favoritism is favoritism too.
Affording special access to contributors is nevertheless a routine and
acknowledged feature of American politics. Barack Obama wrote of the
“people of means” he met at Democratic fundraisers, “As a rule they
were smart, interesting people . . . expecting nothing more than a hearing
of their opinions in exchange for their checks.” 279 An email sent by the
Mitt Romney presidential campaign declared:
The campaign is asking people who are able to make a $50,000
contribution to do so today and become a “Founding Member”
of Romney Victory. These donors will be invited to a special
retreat with Governor Romney in late June in California and
will have preferred status at the first Presidential Inaugural
retreat as well as yet to be determined access at the Republican
278

Democracy Matters, What Do Elected Officials Think About the Role of Money
in Politics?, http://www.democracymatters.org/what-you-need-to-know-about-moneyin-politics-2/overview/what-do-elected-officials-think-about-the-role-of-money-inpolitics/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2014) (quoting Representative Mazzoli).
279
BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 114 (2006).
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National Convention in Tampa in August. 280
One need not applaud affording special access to contributors to
conclude that this practice is now ingrained and that interest in
preventing it cannot justify any limitation of political contributions and
expenditures. Citizens United’s position on the least troubling of the four
types of corruption was clear and plausible. As the McCutcheon plurality
reiterated, “[G]overnment regulation may not target the general gratitude
a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the
political access such support may afford.” 281
3. Explicit and Implicit Agreement
An implicit understanding or agreement to trade campaign cash for
government benefits does not constitute criminal bribery. The Supreme
Court held in McCormick v. United States 282 that, unlike other payments,
campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when “the
payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the
official to perform or not to perform an official act.” 283 Although the
Eleventh Circuit has concluded (dubiously) that a later Supreme Court
decision modified McCormick, 284 at least six other courts of appeals
280
Ben Smith, Exclusive: Romney Sells Inauguration Access, Nine Months Early,
BUZZFEED POLITICS, Apr. 16, 2012, http://www.buzzfeed.com/bensmith/romney-sellsinauguration-access-nine-months-earl (reprinting the email in full). See also Democracy
Matters, supra note (reciting public acknowledgements by Members of Congress that
they afford special access to contributors).
In United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit
rejected the government’s claim that a state legislator violated the Hobbs Act by
affording access in exchange for campaign contributions. It wrote:

[T]here are several times as many lobbyists in Sacramento as there are
state legislators. Elected officials must ration their time among those who
seek access to them and they commonly consider campaign contributions
in deciding how to ration their time. This practice “has long been thought
to be well within the law [and] in a very real sense in unavoidable.” . . .
Accordingly, we hold that granting or denying access to lobbyists based on
levels of campaign contributions is not an “official act” . . . and cannot, by
itself, form the basis for a charge of extortion or attempted extortion under
the Hobbs Act.
Id. at 827 (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991)).
281
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
282
500 U.S. 257 (1991).
283
Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
284
See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011)
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insist that an explicit agreement remains necessary. 285 If Citizens
United’s statement that quid pro quo corruption means criminal bribery
were to be taken literally, an implicit understanding that government
favors would follow a campaign contribution would be insufficient.
The majority opinion in Citizens United, however, included several
statements that probably should not be read literally, and the declaration
that “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery laws if a
quid pro quo arrangement were proved” 286 is one of them.
Justice Kennedy, the author of the Citizens United opinion, would in
fact abandon McCormick as a measure of criminal bribery. In a
concurring opinion one year after McCormick, he wrote that a public
official and his benefactor “need not state the quid pro quo in express
terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing
winks and nods.” 287 It seems unlikely that Citizens United meant to
exclude from the category of quid pro quo corruption conduct that Justice
Kennedy himself would treat as felonious.
Moreover, the reasons for applying a special standard of bribery to
campaign contributions do not apply to campaign finance regulations.
Whenever an elected official adheres to the positions that prompted
voters and contributors to support him, he exhibits a pattern of favoritism
for these supporters. This pattern may bespeak conviction, not corruption.
Ambitious prosecutors and cynical jurors, however, can easily infer a
corrupt agreement from the common pattern. When an official has
supported widget subsidies after accepting large contributions from
widget manufacturers, for example, prosecutors and jurors may infer that
there must have been an implicit understanding. Allowing inferences of
this sort whenever officials have acted to benefit contributors could make
public life intolerable. As Justice Kennedy’s reference to winks and nods
suggests, it grates that McCormick places a premium on indirection, but
the alternative probably would be worse.
When legislatures address the risk of corruption by enacting specific
ex ante regulations rather than by inviting jurors to draw ex post
inferences of unspoken agreement, the concerns that justify McCormick
disappear. In the context of ex ante regulation, it is difficult to fathom
(discussing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)).
285
See United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 253-54, 258 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d
245, 256-61 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 515-19 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Kincaid-Chauncey,
556 F.3d 923, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009).
286
Id. at 908.
287
Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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any reason for excluding wink-and-nod agreements from the concept of
quid pro quo corruption, and the Supreme Court probably did not mean
to exclude them.
4. Conscious Favoritism
Did the Court mean to exclude conscious favoritism? Again, the
statement that quid pro quo corruption means bribery suggests that it did.
Conscious favoritism does not constitute bribery even when the alleged
bribe consists of something other than a campaign contribution. Bribery
requires at least an implicit agreement at the time the alleged bribe is
received. 288
The Court reinforced the sense that conscious favoritism was “out”
when it wrote, “[F]ew if any contributions to candidates will involve quid
pro quo arrangements.” 289 Favoritism, unlike bribery, requires no
“arrangement” and does not appear to be rare. 290 The Court also spoke
directly of favoritism, declaring that “‘[f]avoritism and influence are not .
. . avoidable in representative politics’” and that a “‘generic favoritism or
influence theory is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses
because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle.’”291
These statements all indicated that deliberate favoritism for donors did
not constitute the kind of corruption that could justify limiting campaign
contributions and expenditures.
Citizens United might have pointed in the other direction when it
said, “If elected officials succumb to improper influences from
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if
they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for
concern.” 292 The import of this statement, however, was unclear. Did it
indicate that reducing improper influence was an appropriate goal of
campaign finance regulation? Or did the Court merely say, “Be
concerned about improper influence, but don’t imagine that you can do
anything about it; the First Amendment as we understand it declares
every cure for the favoritism produced by political contributions and
288

See, e.g., id. at 268 (majority opinion) (“The offense is complete at the time
when the public official receives a payment in return for his engagement to perform
specific official acts.”). Bribery also includes what might be called attempted
agreements—solicitations by a single party and transactions in which one party merely
feigns agreement. Favoritism, however, is insufficient. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
289
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 908.
290
See Appendixes B, C, D, and E to this article.
291
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
292
Id. at 361.
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expenditures worse than the disease”? 293 After the Court acknowledged
that concern was appropriate, it said, “The remedies enacted by law . . .
must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our
tradition that more speech, not less is the governing rule. An outright ban
on corporate political speech during the critical preelection period is not a
permissible remedy.” 294
If conscious favoritism is “out,” not only bans of corporate speech but
also all other remedies that limit contributions and expenditures are
impermissible. The Court’s view is that only the actuality or appearance
of quid pro quo corruption can justify any limitation of speech. Citizens
United might have disabled Congress from addressing the favoritism
generated by contributions and expenditures in the only appropriate
way—through specific ex ante regulation.
Definitions of bribery exclude conscious favoritism, not because the
practice is legitimate, but because turning 15-year prison sentences on ex
post assessments of motive would be frightening. Inferring favoritism is
even easier than inferring unexpressed agreement. If an official were
subject to lengthy imprisonment whenever a jury could be persuaded that
he had acted deliberately to benefit a campaign contributor or other
benefactor rather than the public, only a fool would take the job.
The judgment that favoritism should not be regulated through ex post
judgments of motive does not imply that it should not be regulated at all.
When ex ante campaign finance regulation is forbidden, legislators,
prosecutors, and lower federal courts may press for the expansion of less
satisfactory criminal remedies. For example, they may widen the bribery
net to include practices with ominous names that, as defined (or as left
undefined), are likely to sweep in legitimate conduct—undisclosed
conflicts of interest, deprivations of the intangible right to honest
services, and undisclosed self-dealing. 295 If precise ex ante regulations
were to wane while ex post judgments of motive waxed, the law would
get things backwards.
Concluding that conscious favoritism does not qualify as quid pro
quo corruption not only would block the most appropriate way of curbing
this practice; it also would narrow the government’s regulatory interest to
the point that it might not justify even the limits on contributions the
293
Or perhaps: “Don’t imagine that you can do anything about it except elect saints
to office.”
294
Id. Note the Court’s failure to recognize the difference between the two sorts of
persuasion emphasized by this Article. “More speech” is not a plausible remedy for a
harm not produced by speech. In the absence of a governmental corrective, the only
plausible remedy for the purchase of favoritism with cash is “more cash.”
295
See Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator
Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling v. United States, S.M.U. L. REV. (2014).
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Court left intact.
The interest in combatting bribery cannot justify campaign finance
regulations because that’s not the way things are done. Campaign
contributions rarely buy promises of favorable governmental action; they
buy influence. Moreover, even the interest in preventing the appearance of
bribery cannot justify campaign finance regulations, because everyone
knows that’s not the way it’s done.
The problem is not that donors and candidates fail to spell everything
out. It is not that their agreements usually are left to winks, nods, and
implication. The problem is that, with rare exceptions, there are no
agreements, express or implied. Contributions are accompanied by hope
but not by an understanding that a candidate will provide anything in
return. The hope may turn out to be justified often enough to make the
contributions good investments. Citizens United observed, “[F]ew if any
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements.” 296
Criminal “arrangements” are rare both because they are criminal and
because they are unnecessary. A rare or nonexistent practice cannot
justify a sweeping restriction of speech. 297
Even if bribery were more frequent than it is, campaign finance
regulations would do little to stop it. People willing to violate bribery
laws are willing to violate campaign finance regulations too. Enforcing
the campaign finance regulations is usually not much easier than
enforcing the law against bribery. 298 A small tail would wag a huge
mastiff if reducing bribery were to become the only permissible reason
for campaign finance regulation.
Excluding conscious favoritism from the realm of quid pro quo
corruption not only might block the most appropriate form of regulation
and narrow the government’s regulatory interest to the point that it could
not justify anything; it also would depart from the common
understanding of the words corruption and quid pro quo. When an
official has deliberately used public dollars to return private favors, those
words seem to fit. If, after attending a religious revival, a legislator were
to confess to supporting widget subsidies simply to please major
296

558 U.S. at 357.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“Broad prophylactic rules in
the area of free expression are suspect.”).
298
To be sure, it sometimes is easier to prove that someone gave or accepted an
unreported donation or a donation above the limit than to establish that he gave or
accepted this payment as a bribe. Both the enforcement of campaign finance regulations
and the enforcement of bribery laws, however, typically require proof of what happened
between consenting parties in private, and when officials can prove what happened
between consenting parties in private, they might as well enforce the law against
bribery.
297

74

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

[August 27, 2014]

contributors to his campaign, just about everyone would conclude that he
had confessed to corruption and to giving a quid for a quo. Only a few
people might dissent—all of them justices of the Supreme Court.
Perhaps, however, there would be no dissenters. Despite the contrary
indications discussed above, conscious favoritism may be “in.”
a. The Significance of Buckley v. Valeo
A central theme of Citizens United was “back to basics and to
Buckley.” The Supreme Court emphasized in particular that it drew its
concept of corruption from Buckley. “When Buckley identified a
sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo
corruption,” 299 it wrote. One should not interpret Citizens United in a
way that would overrule Buckley rather than follow it. And Buckley
clearly regarded conscious favoritism as the kind of corruption that can
justify campaign finance regulation. 300
Immediately after declaring that preventing corruption provided a
sufficient justification for limiting campaign contributions, Buckley
wrote, “To the extent that large contributions are given to secure political
quid pro quo’s from current and potential office holders, the integrity of
our system of representative democracy is undermined.” 301 The Court
used the words quid pro quo four more times in its opinion. 302 Someone
who noticed those words and nothing else might assume that the words
meant in Buckley what they mean today in a different legal context.
Today, when the Supreme Court uses the words quid pro quo in a
bribery case, it refers to an actual or contemplated agreement: “[F]or
bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act.” 303 Buckley’s use of
these words, however, came fifteen years before the Court first used them
in a bribery case. 304 At the time Buckley was decided, its language did
not track the definition of a crime, and the Court clearly used the term
quid pro quo differently from the way it now uses this term in bribery
cases.
Buckley in fact rejected the argument that “contribution limitations
299

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 909.
One could in fact make a plausible case that Buckley regarded even preferential
access as “in.”
301
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
302
Id. at 27 (twice), 45, 47.
303
Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States, 526 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1999) (emphasis
in the original).
304
See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
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must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure
requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with ‘proven
and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.’” 305 The Court explained,
“[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only
the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence
governmental action.” 306 In the Court’s view, campaign-contribution
limits were appropriate, not because they prevented bribery that might be
difficult to prove, but because they blocked influences less “blatant and
specific” than bribes. The evil addressed by Congress was the “attempt[]
of those with money to influence governmental action” by subtle as well
as blatant means. The Court spoke repeatedly of “undue influence,”307
“improper influence,” 308 and “post-election special favors.” 309
Buckley pointed to three illustrations of what it regarded as quid pro
quo corruption, and these illustrations consisted of favoritism, not
bribery. Immediately after noting that “our system of representative
democracy” can be undermined by large contributions “given to secure
political quid pro quo’s,” the Court observed, “Although the scope of
such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply
disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that
the problem is not an illusory one.” 310 It then cited the D.C. Circuit’s
recitation of these examples in its own Buckley v. Valeo opinion. 311
The first of the practices described by the D.C. Circuit—the ones the
Supreme Court called “deeply disturbing” and “pernicious”—was “the
revelation [of] extensive contributions by dairy organizations to Nixon
fund raisers, in order to gain a meeting with White House officials on
price supports.” 312 Following this meeting, President Nixon approved
higher price supports for milk producers, and the D.C. Circuit
commented, “It is not material, for present purposes, to review . . . the
controverted issue of whether the President’s decision was in fact, or was
represented to be, conditioned upon or ‘linked’ to, the reaffirmation of [a
305

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 27-28.
307
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53, 70, 76.
308
Id. at 29, 30, 45, 58, 96.
309
Id. at 67.
310
Id. at 27.
311
Id. at 27 n.28 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 & nn. 36-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)). Surprisingly, Citizens United cited the same material to support its claim
that “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery laws if a quid pro quo
arrangement were proved.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-57 (citing Buckley, 424
U.S. at 27 & n.28 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975))).
This material in fact constituted the only support Citizens United offered.
312
519 F.2d at 839 n.36.
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$2 million campaign] pledge.” 313 If favoritism did not constitute quid pro
quo corruption, however, and if only bribery counted, the resolution of
this issue would have mattered.
The court’s second illustration consisted of “lavish contributions by
groups or individuals with special interests to legislators from both
parties, e.g., . . . by H. Ross Perot, whose company supplies data
processing for Medicare and Medicaid programs, to members of the
House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees . . . .”314 Large
contributions to incumbents of both parties by people affected by their
decisions strongly suggest that the contributors hope to curry favor rather
than persuade the public. People who do no more than contribute to
incumbents of both parties in order to gain favor, however, are not guilty
of bribery.
The court’s final illustration was the appointment of campaign
contributors as ambassadors. Referring to a Senate committee report, the
D.C. Circuit said, “As for ambassadorships, while the appointment of
large contributors is not novel, the Committee’s Report exposed scale
and volume, and the widespread understanding that such contributions
were a means of obtaining the recognition needed to be actively
considered.” 315 Again, a practice that “deeply disturbed” the Buckley
Court and that it cited to show the existence of “political quid pro quo’s”
was favoritism, not bribery.
b. Decisions Following Buckley
In 1985, in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 316 the Supreme Court used the words quid pro quo again:
“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for
political favors.” 317 SpeechNow read this sentence as a statement that the
legitimate goals of campaign finance regulation did not include reducing
undue influence. 318 Like Buckley, however, National Conservative
Political Action Committee preceded by several years the earliest of the
Supreme Court decisions articulating the quid pro quo requirement in
bribery cases, and the sentences immediately preceding the “hallmark”
statement sounded a lot like Aristotle: “Corruption is a subversion of the
313

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36.
Id. at 839 n.37.
315
Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.38. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 492-510 (1974).
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470 U.S. 480 (1985).
317
Id. at 497.
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See SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.
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political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their
obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or
infusions of money into their campaigns.” 319 These sentences indicated
that reducing undue influence was “in.”
Supreme Court decisions following National Conservative Political
Action Committee, moreover, were entirely unambiguous. In 2000, in
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 320 the Court wrote that its concern was
“not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[ed] to the broader
threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors.” 321 One year later, the Court declared in FEC v. Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. 322 that corruption must be
“understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment.” 323 And in 2003, in a passage of
McConnell v. FEC 324 that Citizens United did not repudiate, the Court
wrote, “Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple
cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence.’” 325 The Court
noted that it was “not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would
feel grateful for . . . donations and that donors would seek to exploit that
gratitude.” 326 If Citizens United overruled any of these decisions, it did so
sub silento.
c. McCutcheon
The McCutcheon plurality, which included all but one of the
members of the Citizens United majority, offered this explanation of why
Buckley had upheld base contribution limits: “The propriety of large
contributions to individual candidates turned on the subjective intent of
donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to tell which
donors sought improper influence over legislators’ actions.” 327
McCutcheon reaffirmed that the intent to obtain improper influence
was the kind of corruption that, according to Buckley, could justify a
limitation of speech. Because there was no practical way to determine
319

National Conservative Political Action Committee, 400 U.S. at 497.
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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Id. at 389. The Court added, “[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes
large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system.” Id. at 395.
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533 U.S. 431 (2000).
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Id. at 441 (2001).
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when this intent existed, Congress could prohibit contributions large
enough to pose a significant risk of this improper motivation.
A better one-sentence explanation of why contribution limits are
permissible than McCutcheon’s is difficult to imagine, and this
explanation is flatly inconsistent with the suggestion that an explicit or
implicit agreement is necessary.
The Supreme Court’s conflicting signals suggest that Citizens United
might not have focused clearly on the issue and that, despite some
statements that seem to exclude conscious favoritism from the realm of
quid pro quo corruption, the issue at least remains open.
*****
Upholding campaign finance regulations for a questionable reason—
because they are believed to reduce bribery—could make immaterial the
Supreme Court’s rejection of a better reason—because they reduce
conscious favoritism. If the regulations remained in place, they could
serve the appropriate purpose as well as the dubious one. Recognizing
that deliberately using public dollars to repay private favors is corrupt,
however, would make clear that large super PAC contributions are
corrupting. 328
328
The Supreme Court has suggested that super PAC expenditures cannot be
bribes—something that might imply, at least to the D.C. Circuit, that contributions to
super PACs also cannot be bribes. One year after Citizens United, in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), the Court
declared, “The separation between candidates and independent expenditure groups
negates the possibility that independent expenditures will result in the sort of quid pro
quo corruption with which our case law is concerned.” Id. at 2826-27. Much more
modestly, Buckley v. Valeo had said, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination
of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 4. Even Buckley’s humbler observation, however,
makes little sense.
The Court’s argument seemed to be that people who obey the rules forbidding
prearrangement and coordination will have little opportunity to reach explicit and
implicit agreements. If it is appropriate to assume that people obey campaign finance
restrictions, however, why can’t one also assume that they obey the law against bribery?
Perhaps the Court’s assumption was that, while the laws against bribery are difficult to
enforce, candidates and their benefactors will obey the rules requiring the separation of
candidates from independent expenditure groups for the same reason that adventurers
climb mountains—because they are there. Independent expenditures cannot be bribes,
for if they were bribes, they would not be independent. As Thomas Reed Powell is said
to have remarked, “If you can think about something which is attached to something
else without thinking about what it is attached to, then you have what is called a legal
mind.” See Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts: The Rise and Fall of an
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IX. WHY SPEECHNOW ERRED BY STRIKING DOWN LIMITS ON
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPER PACS
A. An Inappropriate Premise
When the D.C. Circuit struck down the BCRA’s limits on
contributions to super PACs in SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 329 its decision
rested on the view that quid pro quo corruption included explicit and
implicit agreements and nothing else. 330 The court could not have
claimed with a straight face that contributions to super PACs do not
generate what Buckley called “post-election special favors.” 331
Even more clearly, SpeechNow rested on Citizens United’s
declaration that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 332 The court reasoned that
contributions to super PACs influence public officials only when they are
spent, and if, as a matter of law, the money going out does not corrupt,
the money coming in cannot corrupt either. The court said that the
standard of review did not matter because “‘something . . . outweighs
nothing every time.’” 333 Its analysis depended on the proposition that the
government had no cognizable interest—none whatever—in limiting
either expenditures by super PACs or contributions to these groups. 334
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1930) (quoting Powell).
The rules requiring the independence of independent expenditures do not bar the
people who make them from having lunch with candidates or from sitting next to them
at official campaign functions. There and elsewhere they can whisper about
coordinating expenditures, bribes, and, if they like, robbing banks. They also can pass
thick envelopes under the table. Of course the candidates and their benefactors are
rarely so criminal; there is no reason for them to be. But if bribery were the way things
were done, the rules forbidding coordinated expenditures would not stop them.
In fact, a sensible bribe taker does not speak directly to a bribe giver. He uses an
intermediary called a bagman. The use of this intermediary makes it difficult for the
bribe giver to implicate the bribe taker, and if the bagman himself attempts to
incriminate the bribe taker, the bribe taker denies everything and accuses the bagman of
defrauding the bribe giver of his money. Someone soliciting funds for either an
independent expenditure group or an official election campaign might be an ideal
bagman.
329
599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
330
See id. at 694.
331
See Buckley, 414 U.S. at 67.
332
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
333
Id. at 695 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d
873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
334
The court did not discuss Cal. Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), in
which the Supreme Court upheld a limit on contributions to a political action committee
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As an earlier section of this Article explained, the statement upon
which the D.C. Circuit relied was dictum and perhaps double dictum.335
Moreover, the ease with which the Supreme Court slipped from declaring
the government’s regulatory interest insufficient 336 to declaring this
interest nonexistent suggested that the Court might not have noticed the
crucial difference between its two formulations. Stopping with the
Court’s narrower and more appropriate statement would have precluded
the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in SpeechNow. 337
The sense that the Supreme Court might not have recognized the
import of its dictum is reinforced by the Court’s failure to recognize the
difference between this dictum and what Buckley had said 34 years
earlier. Citizens United attributed its judgment that independent
expenditures do not corrupt at all to Buckley: “This confirms Buckley’s
reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the
appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.” 338 Buckley, however, did not
say that. It merely held the anticorruption interest insufficient to support
expenditure limits: “We find that the governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify §
608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.” 339 “[T]he independent
advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose
dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with
large campaign contributions.” 340
A final indication that the Court might not have meant its dictum
literally is that this statement, if taken literally, would be inconsistent
with a ruling the Court had made less than a year earlier—one in which
its opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, the same justice who wrote

and rejected the argument that “because the contributions here flow to a political
committee, rather than to a candidate, the danger of actual or apparent corruption of the
political process . . . is not present.” Id. at 195. Cal. Medical Ass’n was distinguishable
from SpeechNow because the PAC in question contributed to candidates; it was not an
independent expenditure group. But the argument that contributions cannot be
corrupting unless they ultimately flow to the candidate himself (rather than to his
mother, brother, or alter-ego super PAC) does not bear reflection. No one would
contend that bribes cannot corrupt unless they ultimately reach the pocket of a public
official himself. See, e.g., note supra (describing the conviction of former Alabama
governor Don Siegelman).
335
See text at notes supra.
336
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (“The anticorruption interest is not
sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”).
337
See text at notes supra.
338
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
339
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
340
Id. at 46.
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the Court’s opinion in Citizens United. 341 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
Co. 342 examined the combined effect of campaign contributions, PAC
contributions, and independent expenditures by the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Massey Coal Company, Don Blankenship. 343
After a jury returned a $50 million verdict against Massey,
Blankenship spent more than $3 million to prevent the reelection of a
justice of the state supreme court that would hear Massey’s appeal. He
contributed the maximum amount the law allowed to the campaign of
this justice’s opponent—a meager $1000. He also contributed $2.5
million to a PAC supporting the justice’s opponent and spent another
$500,000 directly. The opponent won the election and provided the
decisive vote for reversing the $50 million verdict against Massey.
The Supreme Court held that the newly elected justice’s refusal to
recuse himself from Massey’s appeal violated the due process clause.
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “We conclude that there is a serious
risk of actual bias . . . when a person with a personal stake in a particular
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge
on the case by raising funds . . . when the case was pending or
imminent.” 344 Citizens United declared Caperton irrelevant, noting that
Caperton’s “holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be
recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” 345
Caperton concluded that a particular remedy for the “risk of actual
bias”—recusal—was required by the Constitution. Citizens United
concluded that another remedy—restricting independent expenditures—
was precluded by the Constitution. Citizens United observed correctly
that these two remedies, the required one and the precluded one, differed.
If Blankenship’s PAC contributions and independent expenditures did
“not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,” however,
why was any remedy required?
Caperton recognized the public interest in preventing the “serious
risk of actual bias” posed by Blankenship’s expenditures. Does this
interest differ from the public interest in preventing “the appearance of
corruption”? Is it less weighty? Is this interest neither sufficiently
341

Justice Kennedy was in fact the only justice to join both five-to-four decisions.
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
343
The Court lumped all of Blankenship’s electoral efforts together and repeatedly
called them “contributions.” See, e.g., id. at 873 (referring to “Blankenship’s $3 million
in contributions”) & 885 (“Blankenship’s campaign contributions . . . had a significant
and disproportionate effect on the election’s outcome.”). By disregarding the distinction
between contributions and expenditures drawn by Buckley and other campaign finance
decisions, the Court made this distinction seem insubstantial.
344
Id. at 884.
345
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“compelling” to justify a restriction of high-value speech nor sufficiently
“important” to justify a restriction of low-value speech?
Caperton holds that the public interest in limiting the effect of
independent electoral expenditures on the decisions of public officials
exists. Because this interest is more than “nothing,” “something” does not
automatically trump it. A near army of commentators have concluded
that Massey’s holding is inconsistent with Citizens United’s dictum that
“independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.” 346
Speculating that the Supreme Court might not have meant this
declaration quite the way it sounds does not flatter the Court, but the
alternative hypothesis would be worse. Citizens United’s move from a
declaration of inadequacy to a declaration of non-existence might have
been carefully calculated—an effort by a five-justice majority to resolve
issues not presented by the case before the Court while the votes to
resolve them the majority’s way were at hand. On this hypothesis, lower
courts would have had even less reason to regard the Court’s dictum as
controlling.
B. A Better Starting Place
The D.C. Circuit should have emphasized a different statement of the
Citizens United opinion: “[C]ontribution limits, . . . unlike limits on
independent expenditure, have been an accepted means of preventing
quid pro quo corruption.” 347 It should have focused on Buckley’s holding
that limits on contributions to official election campaigns are permissible
and should have asked whether limits on contributions to super PACs
could reasonably be treated differently. That question would have been
easy to answer.
346
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note , at 659-60;
Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 584 (2011); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV.
1, 45-47 (2012); James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth:
Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 729-30
(2011); Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get into This Mess? Observations on the
Legitimacy of Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203, 221-22 (2011);
Adam Liptak, Foreword: Funding Justice, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 203 (2010); Anthony
Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 437-38
(2012); Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United, Caperton, and
the War of the Copper Kings, 73 MONT. L. REV. 25, 54-57 (2012); Burt Neuborne, Felix
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Buckley offered five reasons for upholding contribution limits while
striking down expenditure limits. Three of them suggested that campaign
contributions have less communicative value than expenditures. The
other two suggested that contributions are more corrupting.
The reasons the Supreme Court gave for treating contributions to
official election campaigns as low-value speech all apply equally to super
PAC contributions.
First, the Court declared that a campaign contribution “serves as a
general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does
not communicate the underlying basis for the support.” 348 Equally, a
check written to a super PAC does not convey the underlying basis for the
check-writer’s support.
Second, the Court noted, “The transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.” 349 Transforming a check to a super PAC into political debate
also “involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”
Third, the Court said that limiting the amount of an individual’s
contribution “permits the symbolic support evidenced by the contribution
but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss
candidates and issues.” 350 Contributors might be surprised to learn that
writing a check for the maximum permissible amount to a political
campaign—a check for thousands of dollars—is merely “symbolic
support.” 351 If it is, however, so is writing a check for the same amount to
a super PAC. Moreover, restricting super PAC contributions leaves a
contributor free to communicate his views of candidates and issues in
other ways—for example, by making truly “independent” expenditures to
advocate the candidate’s election. 352
Super PAC contributions have no greater communicative value than
campaign contributions. In addition, one of the two reasons Buckley
offered for viewing independent expenditures as less corrupting than
348

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
Id.
350
Id.
351
The Court’s characterization of campaign contributions as symbolic speech was
unfortunate. It wrote, “[T]he quantity of the communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely
on the undifferentiated symbolic act of contributing.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
Contributions deserve some First Amendment protection, however, not because check
writing is a symbolic gesture, but because these contributions make political speech
possible. The larger the contributions, the more speech (as well as the more illegitimate
clout) they generate.
352
This Article discusses what it takes to make an expenditure independent in text
at notes supra.
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campaign contributions does not apply to super PAC contributions. The
Court said, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate.” 353
The rules forbidding the coordination of expenditures do not prevent
a candidate from discussing anything at all with a contributor to a super
PAC (although the contributor may not then act as an “agent” of the
candidate by conveying talk of expenditures to those who will determine
how the super PAC’s funds are spent 354). When the candidate and the
donor wish to speak improperly about how large a super PAC
contribution will guarantee the donor’s appointment as ambassador to
Belize, the rules against coordinating campaign expenditures do nothing
whatever to stop them. 355
Buckley’s second reason for viewing independent expenditures as less
corrupting than campaign contributions was that independent
expenditures are of less value to a candidate. Experience in the years
since Buckley has called this empirical judgment into question, but it
remains endorsed by the Supreme Court. 356 Unlike any of the Court’s
353

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
See 11 CFR §§ 109.20(a) & 109.21(a) (2013), available at
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=3e2b27155456b235682448fe6f3816df&n=11y1.0.1.1.17.
3&r=SUBPART&ty=HTML.
355
I have suggested that the laws forbidding prearrangement and coordination do
not alleviate the danger of bribery in any situation. See note supra. But I have a power
not granted to the D.C. Circuit—the power to declare that Buckley’s analysis makes no
sense. The discussion at this point in text does not question Buckley’s analysis. Like
Buckley, it assumes that everyone will obey election laws simply because they are there.
Even on this assumption—that is, even on the assumption that the laws forbidding
prearrangement and coordination will be fully observed—these laws do nothing to
prevent or inhibit quid pro quo bargains between candidates and super PAC donors.
356
Buckley’s judgment that independent expenditures are of less value to a
candidate was tentative. The Court observed, “Unlike contributions, . . . independent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive.” 424 U.S. at 47. Note the Court’s use of the word may.
The Court also said, “[I]ndependent advocacy . . . does not presently appear to pose any
dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large
campaign contributions.” Id. at 46. Note the words does not presently appear.
Post-Buckley experience suggests that the Court’s provisional judgment was
erroneous and perhaps backwards. With other things equal, a candidate might prefer to
control expenditures himself, but there is a strong advantage to having messages sent on
one’s behalf for which one need take no responsibility. See text at notes supra. One
lobbyist has testified, “[A]n effective advertising campaign may have far more effect on
a member [of Congress] than a direct campaign contribution,” see McConnell v. FEC,
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 556 (D.D.C. 2003) (separate opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
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other reasons for privileging expenditures over contributions, this reason
may apply to contributions to super PACs. Super PAC contributions, too,
may have lesser value to a candidate.
Because campaign contributions and super PAC contributions can be
distinguished on this ground, Buckley’s holding that Congress may limit
campaign contributions did not control the decision in SpeechNow. The
judgment that remained, however, would not have been difficult.
A candidate might value a $3000 contribution to a super PAC less
than a $3000 contribution to his campaign, but he would not value a $10
million contribution to an “alter ego” super PAC less than a $3000
contribution to his campaign. In McCutcheon, after reiterating that “[t]he
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate,” the plurality acknowledged, “But probably not by 95
percent.” 357 A $10 million super PAC contribution produces in spades
whatever corruption or appearance of corruption a $3000 campaign
contribution can produce. If Congress may prohibit the campaign
contribution (as it may and has), it should be allowed to prohibit the
super PAC contribution as well. If Buckley still stands (and Citizens
United says it does), SpeechNow was wrongly decided.
X. SUPER PACS AND AGGREGATE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
Citizens United allowed large business organizations to use funds
from their general treasuries to support the election of favored
candidates, but the business organizations did not do it. SpeechNow
permitted individuals to make five-, six-, seven-, and eight-figure
contributions to super PACs, and the individuals did. More than Citizens
United, SpeechNow transformed American politics. It did so by drawing
an implication from a dictum in the Citizens United opinion, and it made
no effort to reconcile its ruling with the decision on which Citizens
(reciting “the uncontroverted testimony of lobbyist Wright Andrews”), and a former
senator has noted, “Politicians especially love when a negative ‘issue ad’ airs against
their opponent.” Id. (reciting the testimony of former senator Dale Bumpers).
Citizens United did not consider what lessons America’s experience since Buckley
might have taught. Instead, it swept aside Buckley’s qualifications and hesitancy with
the declaration, “[I]ndependent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. As explained above, this
statement was dictum, but the Court’s reaffirmation of Buckley’s judgment that
independent expenditures are insufficiently corrupting to warrant any limitation was
arguably holding. The D.C. Circuit could not properly have undertaken a reassessment
of the provisional empirical judgment Buckley had made 34 years before.
357
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454.
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United purported to rely.
If the Supreme Court were to reach a different conclusion from the
D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in SpeechNow, its decision might not restore
the situation that existed prior to that decision. The Supreme Court’s
intervening decision in McCutcheon v. FEC 358 might have changed the
landscape.
In 2012, as noted above, Sheldon and Miriam Adelson gave $30
million to Restore Our Future, a super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s
presidential campaign. 359 If the Supreme Court were to reject SpeechNow
and uphold the BCRA’s limits on contributions to super PACs, the
amount an individual could give to a group like Restore Our Future in a
single year would be considerably less—$5000. 360
A candidate’s supporters, however, could create an unlimited number
of super PACs, and a donor could give $5000 to each of these PACs.
Moreover, although a super PAC may not coordinate its expenditures
with those of a candidate, it may coordinate its expenditures with those of
other super PACs. 361 The many super PACs supporting one candidate
might all have the same manager.
Even if multiplying PACs could provide a lawful way for a
contributor to donate $30 million to support a single candidate,
repudiating SpeechNow might not be an empty gesture. Enabling
someone to contribute $30 million in $5000 portions would require the
creation of 6000 super PACs, something that probably would not happen.
Moreover, the risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome could deter a
contributor from writing 6000 checks. 362
Still, multiplying super PACs to receive the contributions that a
single super PAC could not receive looks like an easy way of
circumventing the $5000 base contribution limit. The regime of
campaign finance regulation proposed by this Article would address this
difficulty by allowing an individual to contribute as much as he liked to
as many PACs as he liked while requiring him to take steps to ensure that
no more of his funds were used to influence a single election than the law
allowed. 363
The BCRA addressed the multi-PAC circumvention strategy in a
358

134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
See OpenSecrets.org, Politicians and Elections: Restore Our Future,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=c00490045&cycle=2012.
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See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
361
See Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative “Super PACs” Synchronize Their
Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at A10.
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different way by establishing aggregate contribution limits. An individual
could contribute no more than $48,600 to all PACs during a two-year
election cycle. 364
The BCRA’s aggregate limit on contribution to PACs was distinct
from its aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and national
political parties. A court could uphold this limit while striking down the
statute’s other aggregate limits. In other words, a court could strike down
the provision that prevents an individual from contributing the maximum
amount to as many candidates as he likes while upholding the provision
that prevents an individual from giving $5000 to each of 6000 alter ego
super PACs all supporting the same candidate.
The creation of multiple super PACs was not among the
circumvention strategies the Supreme Court considered in McCutcheon.
SpeechNow was unchallenged, and when an individual could donate $30
million to a single group, cloning PACs would have been pointless.
Rejecting SpeechNow and upholding the BCRA’s base limit on PAC
contributions, however, would bring the multi-PAC circumvention
strategy to the forefront.
The Supreme Court called the circumvention strategies it considered
in McCutcheon “implausible” 365 and “divorced from reality.” 366 There is
nothing at all implausible, however, about the prospect of cloning
multiple PACs to enable donors to evade the limit on contributions to a
single PAC. If the BCRA’s base limit on PAC contributions were upheld
and the statute’s aggregate limit struck down, cloning would happen.
An aggregate contribution limit probably is not the least restrictive
way of blocking the multi-PAC circumvention strategy. This Article has
proposed a less restrictive way. The tracking and accounting
requirements proposed by this Article would be burdensome, however,
and a critic could plausibly maintain that the proposed tracking would not
be feasible at all.
McCutcheon was a fact-specific decision premised on the
assumption that measures truly necessary to prevent the circumvention of
valid base contribution limits are constitutional. If the Supreme Court
were to uphold the BCRA’s base limit on PAC contributions, the
statute’s aggregate limit might be judged necessary to prevent
circumvention. McCutcheon did not resolve this issue.
XI. STORY TIME: OTTO’S FRIENDS EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS
364
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This section presents a hypothetical case to show where the reasoning
of SpeechNow might lead.
Being a state legislator is a full-time job in only eleven states, 367 and
the hypothetical state of Kenduckety is not among them. Otto, the
President of the Kenduckety Senate, receives a small salary from the state,
but he obtains most of his income from a used car dealership he owns and
manages, Otto’s Autos.
Kenduckety recently enacted a tough code of government ethics.
Under this code, Libby, a registered lobbyist, may not buy an automobile
from Otto’s and may not hire Otto’s wife as her real estate agent. In fact,
she may not buy Otto a hamburger.
One day, however, as Otto read the Kenduckety Clarion, he
discovered an advertisement for Otto’s Autos he had not placed. This
advertisement not only praised Otto’s Autos but called the owner of a
rival dealership a deadbeat dad. A note at the bottom of the advertisement
revealed that Libby had approved its message and purchased it. A
delighted Otto telephoned Libby and expressed his gratitude.
Other people who were or wished to be friends of the President of the
Kenduckety Senate followed Libby’s lead. Within weeks, countless
billboards, direct mailings, and radio and television advertisements urged
the public to buy autos from Otto’s and to loathe its competitors.
A few weeks after the barrage began, Otto’s advertising manager
resigned to form a PAC. This PAC was not a “political action
committee.” It was a “placement of advertising committee.” A more
conventional super PAC organized by one of Otto’s former campaign
managers already supported his political efforts.
The mission of the new PAC, Kenduckians Drive Forward, was to
ensure that advertising purchased by the friends of Otto’s Autos would be
distributed among appropriate media outlets and would remain on point
and effective. With the establishment of this PAC, Libby made a large
contribution and stopped placing advertisements on her own.
Libby was confident that both her independent expenditures on behalf
of Otto’s Autos and her contributions to the new PAC were
constitutionally protected. Unlike the lunches at McDonald’s she could no
longer buy Otto, these expenditures and contributions were speech.
Libby in fact consulted a lawyer. At their first meeting, he cautioned
Libby that she had engaged in commercial rather than political speech and
that commercial speech usually is less protected.
Libby then cast some of her favors in the form of political speech.
367
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Under Kenduckety’s new Code of Government Ethics, she could no
longer give bottles of Scotch and fruit baskets as birthday presents to
elected officials. She concluded, however, that the code could not block
her from retaining high-priced political satirists to appear at their birthday
parties. In accordance with a contract Libby then negotiated with Bill
Maher’s agent, Maher knocked at the doors of progressive officials while
their birthday parties were in progress and offered to deliver a monologue.
Dennis Miller knocked at the doors of conservatives. Libby’s birthday
gifts were a hit with everyone. 368
When Libby met her lawyer again, the lawyer reported that he had
done some research. Commercial speech was indeed judged by a different
standard than political speech, but in the lawyer’s view, even Libby’s
commercial speech on behalf of Otto’s Autos was constitutionally
protected.
The lawyer explained that a limitation of commercial speech must
advance a “substantial” governmental interest and be no more extensive
than necessary to advance this interest. 369 Similarly, he said, a limit on
political contributions must be “‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently
important interest.’” 370 Unlike political speech, which is fully protected,
both commercial speech and political contributions land one tier down.
Because the D.C. Circuit held in SpeechNow that super PAC contributions
were protected, the lawyer concluded that Libby’s independent
expenditures on behalf of Otto’s Autos must be protected as well.
The lawyer was somewhat more troubled by Libby’s contributions to
Kenduckians Drive Forward. These contributions were doubly devalued
because they were (1) commercial rather than political and (2)
contributions rather than independent expenditures. The lawyer suggested
that these contributions might land, not one, but two tiers down. 371 He
noted, however, that when no interest at all supports a restriction of
speech, the standard of review does not matter. If super PAC
contributions do not create even the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption, neither do Libby’s, and quid pro quo corruption is the only
kind that counts.
The analysis that led Libby’s lawyer to conclude that Libby’s PAC
368
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contributions were constitutionally protected matched the analysis that led
the D.C. Circuit to protect super PAC contributions. The lawyer began
with Citizens United’s dictum, “[W]e now conclude that independent
expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption” 372 and then concluded that because a PAC’s expenditure of
contributed funds does not corrupt, the contributions themselves cannot
corrupt. In light of Citizens United’s “holding as a matter of law that
independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid
pro quo corruption,” 373 the government simply had “no anti-corruption
interest” in limiting Libby’s contributions. 374 According to Libby’s
logical lawyer, the “task of weighing the First Amendment interests
implicated by contributions . . . against the government’s interest in
limiting such contributions” is therefore easy. 375 “‘[S]omething . . .
outweighs nothing every time.’” 376
The analysis of Libby’s lawyer was careful and compelling, but
something seems wrong with it. Gifts intended to corrupt public officials
should not become constitutionally protected simply because they also
finance speech to the public.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered what can be said for and against a
bumper sticker’s declarations that money is not speech and that
corporations are not people. It has proposed a framework for evaluating
the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulations that differs from the
one currently employed by the Supreme Court. And it has proposed a
legislative scheme of campaign-finance regulation that would effectively
limit contributions while respecting the Supreme Court’s campaign
finance decisions.
Mostly, however, this Article has focused on an issue the Supreme
Court has not addressed—the validity of limiting contributions to super
PACs. Prior to Citizens United v. FEC, 377 the FEC enforced a statute that
limited a person’s contributions to one of these groups to $5000 per year,
and Citizens United did not consider the validity of this statute.
Emphasizing that the issue before it was one of expenditure limits, not
372
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contribution limits, the Court struck down a prohibition of independent
political expenditures by labor unions and corporations.
Contrary to widespread perception, the ruling in Citizens United did
not lead to the domination of American politics by large business
organizations. During the 2012 campaign, not one Fortune 500 company
exercised the right that Citizens United had recognized to make
independent electoral expenditures.
In SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 378 the en banc D.C. Circuit unanimously
held Congress’s limit on donations to super PACs unconstitutional. The
court said that one sentence in the Citizens United opinion compelled its
result. Citizens United had said that independent expenditures do not
corrupt, and the court reasoned that if independent expenditures do not
corrupt, the contributions that make these expenditures possible cannot
corrupt either. Several other courts of appeals made the same judgment.
The SpeechNow ruling led to the proliferation of super PACs. As a
result of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, these “attack dogs” could accept
vastly larger contributions than the candidates’ own campaign
organizations could accept. According to the D.C. Circuit (or the
Supreme Court or the two courts together), the First Amendment required
this bizarre result.
Again, large business corporations were generally uninterested in
exercising the recently recognized right. Four hundred ninety of the
Fortune 500 companies made no super PAC contributions in 2012, and
only one contributed more than $1 million. Wealthy individuals,
however, noted the disappearance of the $5000 limit, and 95 individuals
or couples contributed $1 million or more to super PACs in 2012. 379
As this Article has shown, the pronouncement on which the D.C.
Circuit rested its decision was dictum, and the Supreme Court offered
several indications that it did not mean this declaration quite the way it
sounds. Moreover, SpeechNow rested on a narrow view of corruption—
one declaring in effect that the use of public dollars to repay private
favors does not qualify as corruption unless the payoff was arranged in
advance. Although some language in Citizens United seemed to support
this view, the Supreme Court had endorsed a broader concept of
corruption in prior decisions, and language later approved by most
members of the Citizens United majority in McCutcheon was also
incompatible with this view.
Starting from a different premise in SpeechNow would have produced
378
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a different result. The D.C. Circuit should have asked whether
contributions to super PACs can sensibly be treated differently from
contributions to official election campaigns, and the answer to that
question would have been an obvious no.
Whether Congress may limit super PAC contributions warrants the
Supreme Court’s attention. The SpeechNow decision has driven
American government toward what Aristotle called the “perverted” or
“corrupted” form in which officials neglect the common good and “rule
with a view to the private interest.” 380

380
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APPENDIX A
HAVE CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW ENDED THE GAME?
This Article ended by saying that whether Congress may limit super
PAC contributions warrants the Supreme Court’s attention, but a court’s
attention cannot be paid unless someone brings a lawsuit. This appendix
considers whether, by halting the enforcement of restrictions on
contributions to super PACs, Citizens United and SpeechNow have left
no one with standing to raise the issue again.
Justice Holmes described holding an act of Congress unconstitutional
as “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform.” 381 Chief Justice Marshall said that a court should declare a
statute unconstitutional only when “[t]he opposition between the
Constitution and the law [is] such that the judge feels a clear and strong
conviction of their incompatibility with each other.” 382 The law usually
tilts the game board against litigants who challenge a statute’s
constitutionality. The Supreme Court affords Congress’s action a
“presumption of constitutionality.” 383
In one respect, however, the Supreme Court has tilted the game board
in the opposite direction. No matter how many victories the defenders of
a statute’s constitutionality win, the law’s challengers may keep playing.
Once the challengers score a victory, however, the game is likely to be
over. The game becomes one of sudden death but only for one side.
Rulings upholding statutes and regulations are always subject to
reconsideration. A person or group subject to these regulations can
challenge their enforcement and attempt to persuade a court to overrule
the decisions sustaining them. Citizens United, which overruled two prior
decisions, illustrates how new challengers may bring new lawsuits until
victory is won.
Because hardly anyone has standing to challenge the non-enforcement
of statutes and regulations, however, even a five-to-four decision halting a
statute’s enforcement may be invulnerable. In the years following this
ruling, the composition of the Supreme Court may change, and
circumstances may change too. Because no one can raise the issue again,
however, the declaration of unconstitutionality may last forever. The law
of standing may effectively place decisions about the constitutionality of
statutes on a one-way ratchet.
381

Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
383
E.g., O’Corman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58
(1930).
382
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After the rulings in Citizens United and SpeechNow, the FEC halted
enforcement of the statute limiting contributions super PACs.384
Congress’s use of an administrative agency rather than the judiciary to
enforce election law, however, bends the law of standing, so the ratchet
may not hold.
The Supreme Court allows a litigant to challenge an agency’s nonenforcement of a statute when Congress has specifically authorized this
challenge and the litigant is suffering or is likely to suffer injury in fact.385
And federal election law authorizes challenges to FEC inaction. It allows
anyone who believes that an election-law violation has occurred to
complain to the FEC, 386 and it authorizes a party “aggrieved” by the
FEC’s dismissal of a complaint to seek review in the courts. 387 Some
prospective plaintiffs probably could establish injury in fact. At least a
candidate for federal office whose election was opposed by a super PAC
that accepted contributions above the limits could do so.
The validity of a decision striking down a statute also could become a
collateral issue in a lawsuit brought for a purpose other than challenging
an agency’s failure to enforce it. For example, in a lawsuit brought to
challenge a campaign finance regulation that survived Citizens United, a
defender of the regulation might argue that, even if Citizens United’s
reasoning could lead to invalidating the regulation, Citizens United should
be overruled.
One cannot appropriately assume, however, that an opportunity to
overrule Citizens United will inevitably arise or even that such an
opportunity is likely to arise. Nor can one appropriately assume that the
Supreme Court, which declined to review SpeechNow, 388 will have any
further opportunity to consider the issue presented by that case. Even
when a ruling striking down a statute does not end the game entirely, it
tilts the board substantially. 389
384

See text at notes supra.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the EPA’s refusal
to regulate greenhouse gases presented a risk of harm to Massachusetts that was
“actual” and “imminent”); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (holding that the FEC’s
denial of information to which voters were entitled by statute constituted injury in fact).
386
See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1).
387
See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A).
388
See Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (denying a writ of certiorari to review
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
389
Even after Citizens United and SpeechNow, several states sought to enforce their
own statutory limits on super PAC contributions. The federal courts of appeals,
however, sustained challenges to the states’ enforcement efforts, and none of the states
appear to have sought Supreme Court review. See Letter to the Hon. Mae A.
D’Agostino, United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, from
Brian A. Sutherland, Assistant Solicitor General of the State of New York, May 23,
385
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2014; email to the author from Jonathan Mitchell, Solicitor General of the State of
Texas, Dec. 21, 2013.
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APPENDIX B
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS I: STATISTICAL AND NONSTATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Citizens United declared, “[T]here is only scant evidence that
independent expenditures even ingratiate.” 390 If the Supreme Court
meant to suggest that expenditures differ from contributions (which not
only ingratiate but corrupt so much that Congress may restrict them),
SpeechNow erred by declaring that contributions cannot influence
candidates unless expenditures do too. Perhaps, however, the Supreme
Court saw no reason to believe that either expenditures or contributions
ingratiate.
In support of its claim that independent expenditures had not been
shown to ingratiate, the Court cited evidence that a federal district judge
had assembled to show just the opposite. The Court cited a section of the
separate opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly in McConnell v. FEC 391 headed
“Federal Candidates and Political Parties Know and Appreciate Who
Runs Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements in their Races.” 392 This
section recited testimony from campaign consultants, a lobbyist, and
former office holders, all of it resembling the testimony of former senator
Dale Bumpers: “Candidates whose campaigns benefit from these ads
greatly appreciate the help of these groups. In fact, Members will also be
favorably disposed to those who finance these groups when they later
seek access to discuss pending legislation.” 393
Judge Kollar-Kotelly observed, “Plaintiffs have put forth no contrary
evidence . . .” She then recited testimony that “[a]n effective advertising
campaign may have far more effect on a member than a direct campaign
contribution,” that groups “apprise politicians of the advertisements they
run on their behalf,” and that politicians “demonstrate their appreciation”
by raising money for the groups. 394 Citizens United’s citation of this
material for the proposition that “there is only scant evidence that
independent expenditures even ingratiate” was surprising. Perhaps the
Court considered the evidence “scant” simply because it consisted of the
testimony of knowledgeable observers and was not “scientific” or
390

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. at 310.
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555-57 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
392
Id. at 555. This section spoke of issue advertisements placed by groups more
fettered than today’s super PACs. The expenditures of today’s super PACs would have
as much influence or more.
393
Id. at 556.
394
Id.
391
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quantitative. The misguided sense that only quantitative evidence matters
has become commonplace. I have called this sense “the bottom-line,
collectivist, statistical, empirical mentality.” 395
Statistically-minded researchers have examined whether their
methods can establish that campaign contributions influence legislators’
votes, and although their findings have been mixed, 396 most have
answered no. 397 Because nearly all of their research preceded the
explosion of contributions that followed Citizens United and SpeechNow,
one may question its continuing relevance. Moreover, there was little
reason to give much weight to most of the researchers’ conclusions even
prior to SpeechNow. Their methods foundered on a problem of
covariance and would have been unlikely to reveal a strong effect even if
one existed.
A legislator who supports conservative measures usually is a
conservative. He usually has received campaign contributions from
conservative donors and been elected by conservative voters. Separating
the effects of campaign contributions on his votes from the effects of his
personal views and those of his constituents is difficult and may be
impossible. Statistical analysis cannot determine whether the chicken
came before the egg or the egg before the chicken. Nevertheless,
researchers have kept trying.
Although some researchers have purported to control for legislators’
“ideology,” they could not do so. They could control only for the
legislators’ past actions—actions that themselves might have been
influenced by campaign contributions. The most frequently cited of the
studies concluding that campaign contributions have no provable effect
on legislative votes is one that Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de
Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. published in 2003. 398 This study
focused on the scores that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce gives
members of Congress each year on the basis of their “key business
395

See Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work": The
Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 S. CT. REV. 309, 346.
396
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t Pac, 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000) (observing that
some studies “are said to indicate that large contributions to public officials or
candidates do not actually result in changes in candidates’ positions,” that “[o]ther
studies point the other way,” and that “there is little reason to doubt that sometimes
large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system”).
397
See Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why
is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 105 (2003). Table
1 at page 113 of this study reviews the findings of 36 prior studies. “In three out of four
instances, campaign contributions had no statistically significant effects on legislation
or had the ‘wrong’ sign—suggesting that more contributions lead to less support.” Id. at
114.
398
See id.
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votes.” 399 It reported that these scores did not vary with the size of the
“business and labor” contributions members had received. 400
If notable changes in the legislators’ scores had followed large
changes in either business or labor contributions, one might have inferred
that the contributions affected votes. The absence of any discernable
change, however, provided little reason to conclude that votes were
driven by conviction rather than cash.
Consider a Democrat who recognized on his first run for Congress
that labor union PACs were the largest contributors to Democrats in his
district. This candidate might have swallowed hard and endorsed the
unions’ legislative agenda despite his personal reservations. If, following
his election, this member had continued to support the unions’ proposals
and continued to collect their cash, neither an examination of his
Chamber of Commerce scores nor any other quantitative study would
reveal that his votes had been driven by contributions. Union
contributions might have increased in some years (for example, when the
member faced a tough election) and fallen in others, but his scores would
have remained the same. 401 One former member of Congress
399

See
U.S.
Chamber
of
Commerce,
How
They
Voted,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/legislators/how-they-voted.
400
Actually, when the Ansolabehere group controlled only for party affiliation and
past constituent voting patterns (and when they employed a standard regression model
rather than one with “legislator fixed effects”), they found that business and labor
contributions did predict Chamber of Commerce scores and that this correlation was
statistically significant. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note , at 116. The authors,
however, considered other statistical models more revealing.
401
In some of its models, the Ansolabehere group treated “electoral competition” as
an “instrumental variable.” It explained, “[T]he idea is that a close race increases an
incumbent’s demand for PAC contributions, producing an exogenous shift in
contributions via increase in the propensity to ‘sell’ services, including roll call votes.”
Ansolaehere et al., supra note , at 115. The authors’ hypothesis appeared to be: If
members’ Chamber of Commerce scores became more pro-labor when they faced close
elections and received increased contributions from union PACs, one could reasonably
infer that they bent to their contributors’ desires. By the same token, if their scores
remained the same, one could infer that they voted their consciences (or possibly their
constituents’ desires).
The second inference, however, would be unwarranted. Once a member had “sold
out” to labor interests, one could expect a close election to bring increased contributions
from union PACs without bringing any change in his Chamber of Commerce score. The
purpose and effect of the increased union contributions would have been, not to change
the member’s already favorable votes, but simply to enable him to retain his seat.
Similarly, if a close election brought increases in both business and labor contributions,
one would expect no change in a member’s score.
The authors’ treatment of their second “instrumental” variable was similarly
confusing. They sought to assess the effect of a member’s “power” by employing three
variables—“a dummy variable indicating that a member is a party leader, a dummy
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acknowledged, “[I]t has got to be on your mind that a vote one way or the
other is going to affect the ability to raise money.” 402 No social science
research has called the honesty or accuracy of this statement into
question.
After finding that no effect of contributions on Chamber of
Commerce scores could be proven, Ansolobehere and his coauthors
concluded, “In our view, campaign contributions should not be viewed as
an investment, but rather as a form of consumption . . . .” 403 Interest
groups, however, may seek to advance their interests in either (or both) of
two ways—by promoting the election of candidates who favor their
positions and/or by persuading candidates inclined to oppose their
positions or on the fence to move in a beneficial direction. 404 Whether the
contributions do one thing or the other, contributors hope for a return on
their investments and are not simply buying a yacht. No quantitative
research indicates that donations by interest groups should be regarded as
a form of consumption rather than a form of investment.
To be sure, the two form of investment differ. Unlike giving money
to a candidate to influence him to change his position, spending money to
persuade the public to support a candidate is protected by First
Amendment. But both things can happen at the same time.
Some donations plainly are motivated by a desire to buy favor. Only
the goal of obtaining special access and/or other favors can explain why
corporate PACs “hedge” by giving to both candidates in the same race,
why their contributions regularly favor the party in power, and why they
variable indicating that the member is a committee chair, and a dummy variable
indicating that the member was on the Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce
committee (probably the two most powerful committees with respect to business
issues).” Id.
Powerful members attract more campaign contributions than others, but why they
do so is unclear. Powerful members may attract large contributions because they have
more “clout” than other members and their votes are especially valuable. On this
hypothesis, the price of their votes should increase, and the effect of every dollar
contributed should decline. An equally plausible hypothesis, however, is that powerful
members attract large contributions because they can influence the decisions that
precede roll call votes, including what language important bills contain. These members
may receive large contributions for reasons that have little or nothing to do with
changing their ultimate roll call votes.
402
See Eric Lipton, For Freshmen in the House, Seats of Plenty, NY TIMES, Aug.
10, 2013, at A1 (reporting the statement of Brad Miller, a former Democratic
representative from North Carolina).
403
Id. at 117.
404
Political scientists speak of two models of political giving—the “ideological (or
‘position-induced’) model” and “the investor (or ‘service induced’) model.” See Adam
Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their
Directors and Executives 4 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313232.
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donate generously to powerful incumbents in safe districts. 405
One may reasonably suppose, however, that the other form of
investment predominates. For the most part, even corporate PACs hope
to advance their interests by persuading voters to elect candidates already
disposed to favor these interests. Social science research may establish
that the market for votes is not a spot market and that liberals do not
become conservatives overnight. 406 Still, campaign contributions can
change votes sometimes, and sometimes may be enough to make the
contributions worthwhile even apart from their effect in persuading
voters.
The Ansolobehere study notes that nearly “all research on donors’
influence in legislative politics examines the effects of contributions on
roll call votes cast by member of Congress.” 407 Roll call votes, however,
are watched not only by the Chamber of Commerce but also by other
interest groups, the media, and the public. Favoritism for donors may be
more likely to affect less visible and less ideologically charged
decisions. 408 Daniel Lowenstein has remarked that some social science
researchers resemble “the fabled inebriate who searched for a lost key at
405
See id. at 16-28; Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo & Timothy Groseclose, Corporate
PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUSINESS & POLITICS 75, 76 (2000)
(“[I]t is well-established that PAC contributions flow disproportionately to incumbent
office holders, majority party members, members of powerful committees, and to
members on committees with jurisdictions relevant to the PAC sponsor.”); Lloyd N.
Cutler, Can the Parties Regulate Campaign Financing?, 486 ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 115, 116 (1986) (quoting former Republican Presidential
Nominee Bob Dole: “When political action committees give money, they expect
something in return other than good government.”).
406
This research appears to supply a sufficient answer to the “public choice”
economists who see contributors simply as buying legislators’ votes. William Landes
and Richard Posner describe what appears to be a common view among economists and
taxi drivers:

In the economists’ version of the interest-group theory of government,
legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of
favorable legislation. . . . Payments take the form of campaign
contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes
outright bribes. In short, legislation is “sold” by the legislature and
“bought” by the beneficiaries of the legislation.
William W. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
407
Ansolaehere et al., supra note , at 112.
408
See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and
the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797
(1990) (concluding that political favors are likely to take a less visible form than roll
call votes).
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night at the opposite end of the block from where he dropped it because
the light was better there.” 409
Party leaders, committee chairpersons, and the members of key
committees are in a position to influence the important decisions that
precede roll call votes. They can determine what a bill says and whether
it will come to a vote at all. 410 These legislators receive contributions in
considerably larger amounts than other legislators, 411 and no study
suggests that donors are mistaken in thinking that their contributions to
powerful legislators pay dividends. Returns can take the form of phone
calls, phrasing, and procedure rather than altered roll call votes. 412
The three appendices that follow review some non-quantitative
evidence on the effects of campaign cash. As Yogi Berra explained,
“You can observe a lot by just watching.” 413

409

Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 314-15 (1989).
410
The New York Times recently noted that the House Financial Services
Committee is sometimes called the “cash committee” because its members receive more
donations than those of any other committee. “With so many lawmakers clamoring to be
on the Financial Services Committee, it has grown to 61 members from 44 since 1980,
forcing the installation of four tiered rows of seats in the Rayburn House Office
Building.” Lipton, supra note .
411
See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Money and
Institutional Power, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1673, 1689-98 (1999).
412
Cf. James V. Grimaldi & Susan Schmidt, Lawmaker From Ohio Subpoenaed in
Abramoff Case, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at A4 (“As chairman of the powerful
House Administration Committee, [Representative Robert] Ney promised to add
language to a bill to reopen a casino for a Texas Indian Tribe that [lobbyist Jack]
Abramoff represented. After Ney agreed to prepare the legislation, Abramoff directed
tribal officials to make three contributions totaling $32,000 to Ney’s campaign and
political action committees.”).
413
See Red Foley, Surprise-Choice Yogi on Managerial Spot, in YOGI BERRA: AN
AMERICAN ORIGINAL 105 (New York Daily News Legends Series 1998) (reprinting a
column of Nov. 10, 1963).
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APPENDIX C
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS II: THE GENEROSITY OF SHELDON
ADELSON
This Article has noted that, in 2012, Sheldon Adelson, a Las Vegas
casino owner, and his wife Miriam donated $30 million to Restore Our
Future, a super PAC supporting the election of Mitt Romney as
President. 414 The couple apparently donated $140 million or more to
electoral efforts that year. 415 Prior to their initial $10 million contribution
to Restore Our Future, Sheldon Adelson met with Romney in Las Vegas
and reportedly sought “assurance that Romney would support Israel more
strongly than President Obama has.” 416
Romney was not Sheldon Adelson’s first choice for the 2012
Republican presidential nomination. Before contributing to the Romney
campaign, he and his family donated $21 million to support the campaign
of former Speaker Newt Gingrich. 417 Adelson in fact financed a multimillion-dollar campaign of negative advertisements about Romney, 418
and he complained publicly that Romney waffled on the issues. 419
Romney’s support for Israel did not waver following the Adelsons’
initial $10 million contribution. In the month after this contribution,
Romney accused President Obama of “deriding Israel’s leaders” and of
“shabby treatment of one of our finest friends.” 420 Shortly after making
these remarks, he traveled to Israel where he declared that Jerusalem is
Israel’s capital and announced that he would move the American
414

See OpenSecrets.org, Politicians and Elections: Restore Our Future,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=c00490045&cycle=2012.
415
See Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on
Campaign 2012?, PROPUBLICA, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/howmuch-did-sheldon-adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012.
416
See Callum Borchers, Romney PAC Gets $10M Gift: Casino Magnate May Give
$100M in Election, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2012, at A10.
417
See Alicia Mundy & Sara Murray, Adelson Gives $10 Million to Pro-Romney
ST.
J.,
June
13,
2012,
available
at
Super
PAC,
WALL
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/06/13/adelson-gives-10-million-to-pro-romneysuper-pac/.
418
See Trip Gabriel & Nicholas Confessore, PAC Ads to Attack Romney as
Predatory Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A1.
419
See Peter H. Stone, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More on Campaign than
POST,
Dec.
3,
2012,
Previously
Known,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012election_n_2223589.html.
420
Mitt Romney, Remarks at the VFW National Convention, July 24, 2012,
available at http://historymusings.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/full-text-campaign-buzzjuly-24-2012-mitt-romneys-speech-on-foreign-policy-national-security.
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embassy there when the Israeli government said the time was right. 421 He
also offered an explanation of why Israel’s GDP per capita vastly
exceeds the Palestinians’: “Culture makes all the difference.” 422
Adelson was a member of the audience that stood and cheered
Romney’s remarks. 423 He later was seated next to Romney at a $50,000per-couple breakfast in Jerusalem for American campaign donors. 424 No
one—perhaps not even Romney himself—can remember whether the
chicken came before the egg at this breakfast.
A presidential candidate might bend his rhetoric on a major foreign
policy issue to bring cheers and cash from large contributors, and his
rhetoric might shape his policies once elected. Social science researchers
could never prove it, however, and neither could anyone else.
Although Adelson’s contributions seem to have been prompted
primarily by his concept of the public good, 425 his private interests might
have played a part. For one thing, Adelson’s extensive business interests
abroad receive favorable tax treatment that the incumbent President he
opposed had sought unsuccessfully to end. 426 For another, Chinese
421

See Romney Declares Jerusalem Capital of Israel, THE PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, July 30, 2012, at A3; Jodi Rudoren & Ashley Parker, Romney Backs Israeli
Position on Facing Iran, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A1.
422
See Text of Romney’s Remarks About Culture, Israel and the Palestinians,
Wash. Post, July 31, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/text-of-romneysremarks-about-culture-israel-and-the-palestinians/2012/07/31/gJQAjmsrNX_story.html;
Ashley Parker, Romney Comments on Palestinians Draw Criticism, N.Y. Times Blogs
(The Caucus), July 30, 2012, available on LEXIS.
423
Id.
424
See Thomas L. Friedman, Why Not in Vegas?, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2012, at
A23; Kevin Liptak, Romney Raises More than $1 Million in Jerusalem, CNN Wire, July
30, 2012 (available on LEXIS).
425
Adelson not only criticized the Obama administration’s foreign policy but also
said, “What scares me is the continuation of the socialist-style economy we’ve been
experiencing for the past four years.” Steven Bertoni, Billionaire Sheldon Adelson Says
He Might Give $100M to Newt Gingrich or Other Republican, Forbes.com, Feb. 21,
2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2012/02/21/billionairesheldon-adelson-says-he-might-give-100m-to-newt-gingrich-or-other-republican/.
Adelson, however, does not oppose all forms of socialism. Although he condemns
Obamacare, he favors the sort of “socialized medicine” (his term) found in Israel. See
Alicia Mundy, Sheldon Adelson: “I’m Basically a Social Liberal”, WALL ST. J.
WASHINGTON WIRE, Dec. 5, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/12/05/sheldonadelson-im-basically-a-social-liberal/.
426
According to the New York Times, 90 percent of the earnings of Adelson’s
company come from hotel and casino properties in Singapore and Macau. As a result,
“the company now has a United States corporate tax rate of 9.8 percent, compared with
the statutory rate of 35 percent.” See What Sheldon Adelson Wants, supra note . The
Times did not indicate what taxes the company paid abroad but did note that the income
tax rate in Macau was zero.
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currency restrictions that Governor Romney pledged to oppose were
damaging Adelson’s foreign interests. 427 In addition, both the Securities
Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice were investigating
Adelson’s company, the Las Vegas Sands Corporation, for violating the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 428 The Justice Department was
investigating the company for money laundering as well. 429
Adelson told an interviewer that the accusations against his company
were unfounded and that officials had targeted him because of his
political activity. When he listed several reasons for contributing to the
Romney campaign, his concern that President Obama’s reelection would
bring further “vilification” not only of Adelson himself but also of other
Obama opponents topped the list. 430
Second on the list was the fact that (in the interviewer’s words) “[i]f
427

On the assumption that half the patrons of Macau casinos are Chinese, a 5%
appreciation in the value of the yuan probably would increase Adelson’s company’s
earnings in that city by $73.8 million per year. Governor Romney promised to call the
Chinese government a currency manipulator, something President Obama had not done.
See Alison Fitzgerald & Julie Bykowicz, Donors Invest Millions in Romney for Billions
in Return, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 29, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201208-29/donors-invest-millions-in-romney-for-billions-in-returns.html.
428
See Thomas B. Edsall, Campaign Stops: Embracing Sheldon Adelson, N.Y.
Times
Blogs,
Aug.
6,
2012,
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/embracing-sheldonadelson/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120806.
429
Sands Probed in Money Move, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 2012, available at
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044432070457756680352112113
4.html?mod=WSJ_WSJ_US_News_5&mg=reno64-wsj.
The
money-laundering
investigation ended on August 27, 2013 when Las Vegas Sands entered an agreement
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles to pay $47 million to the federal
government. See Michael Luo, Casino Settles in Money-Laundering Inquiry, NY TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2013, at A16.
In 2001, Adelson was concerned that a congressional resolution opposing China’s
bid to host the 2008 Olympics would harm his business interests. He therefore
telephoned a recipient of his campaign contributions, House majority whip Tom Delay.
After investigating, Delay assured Adelson that the resolution was tied up in House
procedures and “would never see the light of day.” See In Thrall to Sheldon Adelson,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at A22; Connie Bruck, The Brass Ring: A Multibillionaire’s
Relentless Quest for Global Influence, THE NEW YORKER, June 30, 2008,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/30/080630fa_fact_bruck?currentPage=all
.
430
See Mike Allen, Sheldon Adelson: Inside the Mind of the Mega-Donor,
POLITICO, Sept. 23, 2012, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=A72CD8C543B8-437A-A8A4-B6F8BCE3CC6E. Adelson noted that someone—probably a
government official—had leaked the fact that his company was under investigation only
after he and his family had become heavily involved in the 2012 election. The object, he
said, was “making me toxic so that they can make the argument to Republicans, ‘This
guy is toxic. Don’t do business with him.’” Id.
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Romney were elected, Adelson would have a powerful ally on the two
issues he cares most about: the security and prosperity of Israel, and
opposition to unions, including the so-called card-check proposal that
would make it easier for workers to organize.” 431 Las Vegas Sands owns
the only non-union hotels and casinos on the Las Vegas strip. 432
In addition, Adelson has begun a lobbying campaign for federal
legislation to prohibit internet gambling. He opposes this gambling for
“moral” reasons and also says that on-line gambling would be suicidal for
the U.S. casino industry. Adelson told an interviewer that he is “willing to
spend whatever it takes” to see the practice outlawed. 433
Adelson does not believe his political contributions should be
constitutionally protected or even legal. “I’m against very wealthy people
attempting to or influencing elections,” he told an interviewer. “But as
long as it’s doable I’m going to do it.” 434
Governor Romney lost the presidential election, and all but one of the
other seven candidates Adelson supported in the 2012 general election
lost too. Adelson, however, did not seem discouraged. He announced that
he was prepared to double his donations the next time around and
explained, “I happen to be in a unique business where winning and losing
is the basis of the entire business. So I don’t cry when I lose. There’s
always a new hand coming up.” 435
Three days after Mitt Romney announced his choice of Paul Ryan to
be his running mate, Ryan called on Adelson and other donors at
Adelson’s Venetian Hotel in Las Vegas. 436 One week after the RomneyRyan ticket lost the general election, three Republicans then regarded as
possible 2016 presidential contenders—Governors Jindal of Louisiana,
431

Id.
See Dana Spitzer, Billionaire Casino Owner Adelson Takes Aim at Unions,
PEOPLE’S WORLD, Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.peoplesworld.org/billionaire-casino-owneradelson-takes-aim-at-unions/.
433
See Nathan Vardi, Sheldon Adelson Says He is “Willing to Spend Whatever it
Nov.
22,
2013,
Takes”
to
Stop
Online
Gambling,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/11/22/sheldon-adelson-says-he-iswilling-to-spend-whatever-it-takes-to-stop-online-gambling/.
434
Steven Bertoni, Billionaire Sheldon Adelson Says He Might Give $100M to
Newt Gingrich or Other Republican, Forbes.com, Feb. 21, 2012, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2012/02/21/billionaire-sheldon-adelson-sayshe-might-give-100m-to-newt-gingrich-or-other-republican/.
435
See Alicia Mundy, Adelson to Keep Betting on the GOP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
2012,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323717004578159570568104706.html
.
436
See Trip Gabriel, A Quiet Introduction to Big Money Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2012, at A12.
432
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Kasich of Ohio, and McDonnell of Virginia—met privately with Adelson
at the Venetian. 437 On August 1, 2013, Adelson hosted a fundraiser at
another of his Las Vegas resorts for the gubernatorial re-election of a
fourth 2016 presidential possibility, Governor Christie of New Jersey. 438
In March 2014, Adelson hosted a group called the Republican Jewish
Coalition in Las Vegas. The gathering began with a dinner for another
presidential prospect, former Governor Bush of Florida. Three possible
presidential contenders, Governor Walker of Wisconsin and Governors
Kasich and Christie, spoke later. Christie offended some listeners by
referring to the West Bank as the “occupied territories” (a term also used
on occasion by the U.S. State Department and Israeli officials), but the
governor met privately with Adelson to say that he “misspoke.” Some
members of the press referred to the event as the “Sheldon primary.” 439

437

See Kenneth P. Vogel, 2016 Contenders Court Mega-Donors, POLITICO, Dec.
12, 2012, http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/2016-contenders-courting-megadonors-84497.html.
438
See Maggie Haberman, Chris Christie at Sheldon Adelson Fundraiser in Las
Vegas, POLITICO, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/chris-christiesheldon-adelson-fundraiser-95085.html.
439
See Richard Miniter, Did Chris Christie “Bully” Sheldon Adelson’s Friend?,
FORBES, April 1, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardminiter/2014/04/01/is-chrischristie-actually-electable/; Philip Rucker, Sheldon Adelson Plans VIP Dinner for Jeb
Bush at GOP Gathering in Vegas, WASH. POST, March 22, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/22/sheldon-adelsonplans-vip-dinner-for-jeb-bush-at-gop-gathering-in-vegas/.
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APPENDIX D
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS III: EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
The outcry that followed President Clinton’s grant of 177 pardons and
commutations on his last day in office focused particularly on the
pardons he granted Marc Rich and his business partner Pincus Green.
Rich and Green had been indicted on charges of trading with the enemy
(conspiring to purchase more than six million barrels of oil from Iran
while that nation was holding fifty-two U.S. hostages 440) and tax evasion
(“the biggest tax fraud case in the history of the United States,” according
to the chief prosecuting attorney441). Both had been fugitives and had
lived in Switzerland since their indictments.
The Justice Department’s rules barred the consideration of a
fugitive’s clemency application through ordinary channels, 442 and White
House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy Counsel Bruce Lindsey, and all the
other lawyers in the White House Counsel’s office opposed clemency.
White House Chief of Staff John Podesta advised the President against
clemency as well. 443
Denise Rich, however, Marc Rich’s former wife, had written two
letters to the President requesting a pardon. “I am writing as a friend and
admirer of yours to add my voice to the chorus of those who urge you to
grant my former husband, Marc Rich, a pardon for the offenses unjustly
alleged and so aggressively pursued,” she wrote. 444 Her earlier financial
contributions had included “more than $1 million to the Democratic Party
and its candidates, $450,000 to Clinton’s library fund, $100,000 to a fund
to help Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign, $10,000 to the President’s
defense fund, and $7,375 worth of furniture to the Clintons.” 445
Denise Rich pressed a White House social secretary for an invitation
to a dinner honoring recipients of the National Medal of the Arts and the
National Humanities Medal. At this dinner, she sought a private moment
with the President. According to Jack Quinn, a former Clinton White
440
See Eric Lichtblau & Davan Maharaj, Sunday Report: Clinton Pardon of Rich a
Saga of Power, Money and Influence, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at A1.
441
The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings Before
the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. at 88 (2001) (statement of Morris
“Sandy” Weinberg, Jr., former assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York).
442
See 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2012).
443
See Excerpts from Testimony on Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A19
(testimony of John Podesta).
444
See Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Cashed in a World of Chits to Win Pardon, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001, at A1, A18.
445
James V. Grimaldi & Dan Eggen, House Panel Expands Probe of Rich Pardon:
3 Former Clinton Aides Subpoenaed, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2001, at A3.
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House Counsel then representing Marc Rich, Denise Rich said simply, “I
know you got my letter, and it means a great deal to me.” 446
Beth Dozoretz also made a personal appeal to Clinton. She was a
prominent Democratic fund-raiser, a former finance chair of the
Democratic National Committee, and a friend of Denise Rich. 447
President Clinton later wrote, “The suggestion that I granted the pardons
because Mr. Rich’s former wife, Denise, made political contributions and
contributed to the Clinton library foundation is utterly false. There was
absolutely no quid pro quo.” 448
A less familiar tale of Clinton’s magnanimity on his last day in office
is almost as revealing. Carlos Vignali had served six years of a fifteenyear prison term when Clinton commuted his sentence to the time already
served. According to the judge who sentenced Vignali, he was “one of
the top two or three” of a group of thirty conspirators who had shipped
about eight hundred pounds of cocaine from southern California to
Minneapolis. 449
Vignali’s father, Horacio Vignali, had given $160,000 in political
contributions since his son’s conviction, most of it to California
Democrats. Horacio encouraged the recipients of these contributions and
other prominent figures to endorse clemency for Carlos. He obtained
letters or favorable phone calls from two members of Congress, two
California State Assembly speakers, a cardinal of the Catholic Church,
the Los Angeles County sheriff, a Los Angeles County Supervisor, a city
councilman, and the United States Attorney in Los Angeles. 450 Carlos’s
446

Cowan, supra note , at A18.
See Melinda Henneberger, Pardon Puts New Spotlight on a Clinton FundRaiser, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at A12.
448
William Jefferson Clinton, Op-Ed, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2001, at § 4, at 13. For a fuller description of the Marc Rich and Pincus Green
pardons, see Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIM. 1131, 1137-42 (2010).
449
See David S. Doty, Clemency: A View from the Bench of Two Commutations—
Vignali and Willis, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 162 (2001). Judge Doty, who had written
letters supporting the successful clemency applications of two other drug dealers he had
sentenced, was “aghast” at the Vignali commutation. See Politics: Criminal Probe of
Rich Pardon Opened: Other Developments, FACTS ON FILE WORD NEWS DIG., Feb. 14,
2001, at 100A2, available at LEXIS.
450
See Richard A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A.
TIMES MAG., Apr. 29, 2001, at 10. The United States Attorney in Minneapolis, the
district in which Carlos had been convicted, opposed clemency. See Margaret Colgate
Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last Pardons, 32 CAP. U.L. REV.
185, 211 (2002). See also Alschuler, supra note , at 1143 (noting that Horatio Vignali
paid fees of $204,280 to Hugh Rodham, a Florida attorney and Hillary Clinton’s
brother, to promote Carlos’s cause in the White House but that Rodham returned the
money at the behest of President and Mrs. Clinton after the press publicized the fees).
447
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clout-less co-conspirators collected no commutations, and several of
them remained in custody when Carlos went home. 451
John Catsimatidis, the owner of a supermarket chain, had been a
contributor to both Democratic and Republican candidates and had been
particularly supportive of the Clintons. He also had pledged to raise $1
million for the Clinton Presidential Library. Catsimatidis wrote letters
supporting the successful clemency applications of Edward Downe, Jr., a
former Bear Stearns director who had pleaded guilty to tax and securities
violations, 452 and William Fugazy, the “limo king of New York” who
had pleaded guilty to perjury. Catsimatidis then telephoned Clinton’s
Chief of Staff, John Podesta, to ask him to bring the letters to the
President’s attention. He told the press, “In the last 50 years, I don’t
know of anyone who’s gotten a pardon who hasn’t paid a lot of money to
a lawyer or hasn’t known somebody . . . . How do you create a pardon
other than talking to people?”453
Republican as well as Democratic Presidents may have taken note of
campaign contributions in deciding whether to grant clemency. Clinton’s
predecessor, George H. W. Bush, approved clemency at a far lower rate
than any other twentieth-century American President, 454 but he did
pardon Armand Hammer, the Chairman of Occidental Petroleum, who
recently had given $100,000 to Republican state committees and another
$100,000 to the Bush-Quayle Inaugural Committee. 455 Hammer had
pleaded guilty 17 years earlier to making an illegal contribution to
President Nixon’s reelection campaign. 456
451

See Richard A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, In Many Drug Cases, Normal
Clemency Process Bypassed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001, at A1 (reporting that Todd
Hopson, a Vignali co-defendant serving eighteen years, “more closely fits the model
that Clinton, FAMM [Families Against Mandatory Minimums] and others have spoken
of—a first-time offender, a minor role in the drug crime, and someone who does not
have the money or connections to get out of prison early”).
452
Downe himself had contributed $21,500 to Democratic candidates since 1991
and had given $1000 to Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign. See David Lightman, Dodd
Helped Friend Secure Presidential Pardon, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 24, 2001, at
A11.
453
See Greg B. Smith, Clinton Library Fundraiser Helped Perjurer Get Pardon,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2001, at A2.
454
See Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Clemency Statistics,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
455
See PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8182 (2001) (statement of Member of Congress Jerrold Nadler); Joe Conason, The Bush
Feb.
27,
2001,
available
at
Pardons,
SALON.COM,
http://www.salon.com/news/col/cona/2001/02/27/pardons.
456
Eric Pace, Armand Hammer Dies at 92; Executive Forged Soviet Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at A1; David Rampe, Armand Hammer Pardoned by Bush, N.Y.
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Bush also pardoned Edwin L. Cox, Jr., who had served a short prison
sentence for bank fraud. After Bush’s loss to Clinton in the 1992
Presidential election, former Texas governor Bill Clements called Bush’s
chief of staff, James Baker, to seek a pardon for Cox. Baker passed along
Clements’s request to the White House Counsel’s office with a note
reporting that Cox’s father was “a longtime supporter of the President.”
He sent a copy of his note to President Bush. After Bush approved the
pardon, Cox’s father continued his support by donating at least $100,000
to the Bush Presidential Library, $125,000 to Republican campaign
committees, and $30,000 to the gubernatorial campaign of President
Bush’s son, George W. Bush. 457 Edwin Cox Jr. would have been
ineligible for a pardon under the rules applicable to people without White
House connections.
APPENDIX E
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS IV: THE APPOINTMENT OF
AMBASSADORS
In recently released post-Watergate testimony, former President
Richard Nixon acknowledged that he reserved many ambassadorships for
campaign contributors. “I did give top consideration to major financial
contributors,” he declared. 458 “It was not vitally important . . . to have . . .
an individual whose qualifications were extraordinary” in positions like
the U.S. ambassadorships to “Luxembourg or El Salvador or Trinidad et
cetera.” 459 “There was a lot of in-fighting within the Administration . . .
as to . . . how many posts would be available to financial contributors.” 460
The former President pointed to tradition:
[I]n every presidency that I know of contributors have been
appointed to non-career posts in considerable numbers. . . . Bill
Bullitt, for example, was probably the best ambassador to
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/15/us/armandhammer-pardoned-by-bush.html.
457
See Michael Weisskopf, A Pardon, a Presidential Library, a Big Donation,
Time,
Mar.
6,
2001,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,101652,00.html.
458
Deposition of Richard M. Nixon at 35, United States v. Doe (Jan. 1974 grand
jury investigation) (D.D.C.) (June 23, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Nixon Deposition],
available at http://media.nara.gov/research/nixon-grand-jury/9-16a/9-16a-testimonynixon-6-23-1975-Part1.pdf.
459
Id. at 18.
460
Id. at 32.
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Russia and the best ambassador to France we have had in a
generation. Now he didn’t get his job because he happened to
shave the top of his head. He got his job because he contributed
a half million dollars to Mr. Roosevelt’s campaign. . . . Pearl
Mesta wasn’t sent to Luxembourg because she had big bosoms.
Pearl Mesta went to Luxembourg because she made a good
contribution. 461
White House tapes that became public after Nixon testified show that
he said to his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, “My point is that anybody
who wants to be an ambassador must at least give $250,000.” He said of
Raymond Guest, who had expressed an interest in becoming ambassador
to Belgium, “Uh, he’s fine. His wife speaks French, he speaks French,
uh, uh, but the cost is uh, a quarter million.” On being told of a press
report that Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney would be named ambassador to
Spain (something that Nixon apparently did not know), he declared,
“Hell, if we did it, it was a great sale. He gave a quarter of a million
dollars.” 462
461

Id. at 21, 25-26. Perle Mesta, a famed Washington hostess and Harry Truman’s
ambassador to Luxembourg, inspired the Irving Berlin musical “Call Me Madam.” She
was portrayed on stage and screen by Ethel Merman. Perle Mesta, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perle_Mesta (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
Mesta’s name was almost never mentioned without the tag line “the hostess with
the mostest,” and William Bullitt might have been the host with the most. His career
was even more colorful than Mesta’s. It included co-authoring a psycho-biography of
Woodrow Wilson with Sigmund Freud (who had personally psychoanalyzed Bullitt),
serving as the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, conducting a back-door
campaign to have Sumner Welles dismissed from the State Department because Welles
had solicited gay sex from Pullman porters, and hosting at his Moscow residence “the
Spring Ball of the Full Moon,” a 1935 party at which more than 100 zebra finches flew
throughout the house and a baby bear got drunk on champagne fed to it by Communist
leader
Karl
Radek.
William
Christian
Bullitt,
Jr.,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Christian_Bullitt,_Jr. (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
462
See George Lardner, Jr. & Walter Pincus, Nixon Set Minimum Contribution for
Choice Diplomatic Posts, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1997, at A19. After Thomas Pappas
raised funds that Nixon knew would be paid to the Watergate burglars for their silence,
Nixon agreed to Pappas’s request that he not replace the ambassador to Greece. “Let
him stay,” the President said of the ambassador. “Let him stay. No problem. Pappas has
raised the money we need for this other activity.” See George Lardner, Jr. & Walter
Pincus, Contributor Got Oval Office Thank-You for Watergate Funds, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 1997, at A19.
Nixon acknowledged that “the making of an absolute commitment for
ambassadorships” would be illegal. Nixon Deposition at 37. Prosecutors sought his
testimony because some of his aides apparently had made such absolute commitments.
Notably, two campaign contributors who had obtained ambassadorships in Nixon’s first
term apparently had been promised that he would appoint them to better (i.e., European)
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The custom of giving campaign contributors a large leg up in
obtaining ambassadorships has not faded in the years since the Nixon
administration. In the administration of President Barack Obama, as in
those of his predecessors George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H. W.
Bush, Ronald Reagan, and Jimmy Carter, slightly more than 30% of all
ambassadors have been political appointees. 463 The cost of a top
ambassadorship apparently has increased, however, from $250,000 to $1
million.464

ambassadorships if each gave $100,000 to his re-election campaign. Nixon’s personal
lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, in fact went to prison for making this arrangement with the
ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, Fife Symington, Jr. See Bob Woodward & Carl
Bernstein, Haldeman Role in Envoy Deal Told, WASH. POST, June 26, 1974, at A1. See
generally FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
ACTIVITIES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 492-510 (1974) (compiling extensive evidence of
the influence of campaign contributions on President Nixon’s ambassadorial
appointments).
463
See Al Kamen, Embassy Openings for Open Wallets, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
2011, at A13. See also Brandon Conradis, Obama Selects Key Donor as Ambassador to
Hungary,
Open
Secrets
Blog,
Nov.
8,
2013,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/11/obama-selects-key-donor-as-ambassad.html;
Michael Beckel, Big Donors and Bundlers Among Obama’s Ambassador Picks, Open
Secrets Blog, May 28, 2009, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/05/big-donorsbundlers-among-obam.html; Michael Beckel, Obama’s New Ambassador Nominees
Gave Big—And Bundled Bigger, Open Secrets Blog, June 18, 2009,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/06/obamas-new-ambassador-nominees.html.
464
See Kamen, supra note .
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APPENDIX F
PARTISAN ADVANTAGE AND INCUMBENT PROTECTION
The plurality wrote in McCutcheon, “[T]hose who govern should be
the last people to help decide who should govern.” 465 The last people
who should have a job, however, may be the ones to whom the
Constitution assigns it. Sadly perhaps, legislators are the only people who
can supply election laws. Under the “rule of necessity,” even a judge with
a financial interest in the outcome of a case may hear it when no
disinterested judge can replace him. 466
When legislators enact campaign finance regulations, they influence
the outcome of elections, and when judges strike down campaign finance
regulations, they do too. Because members of Congress must stand for
reelection, there is good reason for mistrusting their decisions. The
Supreme Court’s partisan division on the validity of campaign finance
regulations raises eyebrows too. 467
Considerable discussion has focused on whether contribution limits
benefit incumbents (because challengers can overcome the electoral
advantages of incumbents only by raising vast sums) or challengers
benefit (because incumbents can more easily raise vast sums). In Randall
v. Sorrell, 468 the Supreme Court saw low contribution limits as a form of
incumbent protection. It invalidated Vermont’s extremely low limits
partly because they threatened to “harm the electoral process by
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against
incumbent officeholders.” 469 But the Court apparently got it backwards.
Recent empirical studies have concluded that “[i]n real world elections,
the benefits of low contribution limits largely redound to challengers.” 470
Generalizations on this subject are of dubious value. Contribution
limits plainly benefit some incumbents and plainly disadvantage others.
465

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,1442-43 (2014) (emphasis in the original).
See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
467
Moreover, Bush v. Gore, 31 U.S. 98 (2000), still casts a shadow.
468
548 U.S. 230 (2006).
469
Id. at 248-49.
470
CLARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, KAHLIL WILLIAMS, & THOMAS STRATMANN,
ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND LOW CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 2 (Brennan Center for
Justice
2009),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Electoral.Competiti
on.pdf. See Thomas Stratmann, Do Low Contribution Limits Insulate Incumbents from
Competition?, 9 ELECTION L.J. 125, 125, 126-27 (2010) (describing prior studies and
offering further findings that “[t]he tighter the [contribution] limits, the more
competitive the election”).
466
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An incumbent from a “swing” district who expects wealthy donors to
target him at the next election would be likely support contribution limits
with enthusiasm. An incumbent who has been reelected repeatedly from a
safe district, however, would be likely to oppose them. This member’s
seniority and the power accompanying it could enable him to fill a large
war chest, which he would not need to use to wage war. Whether
progressive or conservative, this incumbent might use most of the funds
he collected to aid other politicians and to pay the expenses of
campaigning and office holding—including expenses he might incur at
the National Democratic Club or the Capitol Hill Club and at five-star
resorts. This member would have little to gain by voting to limit
contributions. 471
A less discussed, more easily answered, and probably more relevant
question is which political party benefits from contribution limits. When
one party tends to attract small donors and the other large donors, capping
contributions is likely to benefit the party that disproportionately attracts
small donors. Today the party that benefits politically from contribution
limits is almost certainly the Democratic Party. 472
471

Since 1989, federal law has prohibited federal office holders, former office
holders, and current candidates from using campaign funds to pay personal living
expenses. See U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL
154 n.428 (2003). Candidates and former candidates, however, may donate these funds
to charities without limit, to political parties without limit, and to political campaigns
other than their own within limits. They also may use campaign funds to pay legal
expenses if charged with official misconduct, to buy furniture and art for their offices,
and to pay other expenses of campaigning and office holding. Id. at 154-55. Officials
have used these funds to enable their spouses to accompany them on work-related travel
and to host extended fund-raising gatherings at resorts in places like Vail, Park City,
Puerto Rico, Las Vegas, South Florida, and Bermuda. One member of Congress even
has used campaign funds to pay herself 18% interest on loans from herself to her
campaign. See 60 Minutes: Washington’s Open Secret: Profitable PACs (C.B.S.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162Television,
Oct.
20,
2013),
57608255/washingtons-open-secret-profitable-pacs/; Eric Lipton, A Loophole Allows
Lawmakers to Reel in Trips and Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A1; Ken
Silverstein, Beltway Bacchanal: Congress Lives High on the Contributor’s Dime,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Mar. 2008, at 47; Dave Mann & Abby Rapoport, Lifestyles of the
Corrupt and Elected: How Do Texas Legislators Live Large on their $7200 Salaries?
Campaign Funds Pay for Lavish Perks and Personal Expenses, Courtesy of Special
TEXAS
OBSERVER,
Jan.
16,
2011,
available
at
Interests,
THE
http://www.texasobserver.ord/cover-story/lifestyles-of-the-corrupt-and-elected; Thomas
J. Cole, Lawmakers Use Campaign Funds for Expenses, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Feb.
15, 2012, at A1; Adam Schwartzman, Joe Bruno, Other Pols Use Campaign Funds to
Pay Legal Expenses, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS, Sep. 3, 2010, available at
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2010/09/joe_bruno_other.php.
472
In 2012, the Barack Obama presidential campaign raised three times more cash
from “small individual contributors” than the Mitt Romney presidential campaign. It
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It may not be a coincidence that the five majority justices in both
Citizens United and McCutcheon were appointed by Republican
presidents while three of the four dissenters in Citizens United and all of
the dissenters in McCutcheon were appointed by Democrats. To explain
this alignment, one need not embrace the cynical view that Republican
justices strive to get Republicans elected. Instead, Republican-appointed
justices might simply have been more suspicious than Democratappointed justices of legislators whose approval of campaign-finance
limitations could have furthered their own partisan interests. Without
seeking to tilt the game board in favor of their party, these justices might
have sought to block Democratic legislators from tilting it in favor of
theirs.
Undoubtedly legislators of both parties do consider the electoral
consequences of campaign finance restrictions, and their efforts to gain
electoral advantage should lead judges to be wary. Wariness goes too far,
raised only 1.3 times more cash from “large individual contributors.” See Center For
Responsive
Politics,
OpenSecrets.org,
2012
Presidential
Race,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
In the 2010 midterm elections, conservative super PACs outspent liberal super
PACs by 25 percent. See Michael Beckel, Led by Karl Rove-Linked Groups, “Super
PACs” and Nonprofits Significantly Aid GOP in Election 2010, OpenSecretsblog, Nov.
5, 1010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/led-by-karl-rove-linked-groupsnonp.html.
According to the New York Times,
In the first seven weeks of 2012, about two dozen individuals, couples or
corporations gave $1 million or more to Republican super PACs.
Collectively, their contributions totaled more than $50 million, making
them easily the most influential and powerful political donors in politics
today. They have relatively few Democratic counterparts so far . . . .
Campaign Finance (Super PACs), TIMES TOPICS, Sept. 13, 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/campaign_finance/index.
html.
A Times update in late September 2012 reported:
While Democratic super PACs have begun to attract a growing number of
donors giving six- and seven-figure checks, they remain far behind their
Republican equivalents in terms of fund-raising. The four top Democratic
groups had together raised less through the beginning of September than
Restore Our Future, which is backing Mitt Romney.
Nicholas Confessore, Reversing Course, Soros Gives $1 Million to a Pro-Obama
TIMES
CAUCUS,
Sept.
27,
2012,
“Super
PAC”,
N.Y.
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/soros-gives-1-million-to-democraticsuper-pac/?src=recg.

116

LIMITING CONTRIBUTIONS

[August 27, 2014]

however, when it causes judges to turn a blind eye to the contributions
that make deliberate favoritism in the award of government benefits
likely.
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